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1.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Technological advancements, such as digitalization and the Internet, have an 
impact on most industries, the media industry however, is perhaps impacted the 
most significant (Zerdick et al. 2001, pp. 140-143). As Elberse (2013, pp. 154-155) 
points out, digitalization reduces transaction- and search cost in every industry, it 
also lowers an additional cost factor in the media industry: the cost for producing 
and reproducing. For decades, media products have been distributed from the 
producers (writers, filmmakers, musicians, etc.) to the consumer by traditional 
media companies (e.g. publishers, music labels, broadcasters, distributors, etc.). 
Digitalization and the Internet started to call into question some of the traditional 
value added structures (Hess and Walter 2007, p. 2). In particular, various authors 
postulate again and again that due to the influence of digitalization, intermediation 
will either be omitted entirely, or it will occur in a completely different form 
(Cunningham and Fröschl 1999, p. 31; Picard 2002, pp. 34-36; Seufert 2004, pp. 63-
66; Wirtz 1995, p. 49; Wirtz 2012, p. 763). However, a closer review of the available 
literature indicates that the various aspects associated with intermediation are by 
no means systematically analyzed, so that the discussion often remains relatively 
flat and diffuse.  
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Intermediation is an economic concept, which has proven its usefulness in 
the analysis of certain industries such as the trade or the financial service sector. 
Despite the large number of authors making predictions about the impact of 
technological advancements on intermediaries in the media industry, the 
microeconomic-based concept of intermediation itself is typically not used for the 
analysis of technology-driven changes. In this context, it has to be noted, that so far 
no comprehensive theoretical contribution on intermediation in media markets has 
emerged.  
Walter (2007) is one of the few authors, who is explicitly focusing on 
intermediation in media markets. In his dissertation, Walter (2007) develops and 
introduces the concept of content intermediation. His contribution represents a 
significant step forward, towards the establishment of the concept of 
intermediation in media markets. However, his work has some serious limitations 
as well. These mainly result from his sole focus on the functions of intermediaries 
and changes in transaction cost. Thus, a complete picture of intermediation in 
media markets can hardly emerge. 
An author, who attempts a more holistic approach and investigates 
intermediation from various perspectives, is Tietz (2007). In addition to the 
activities of intermediaries, he also investigates the different types of value that 
intermediaries provide and points out, that most of all, it is the upstream and 
downstream companies that have to support the intermediary in order for the 
intermediary to survive. Tietz (2007, pp 107-110) therefore stresses the need to 
incorporate incentives to cooperate with intermediaries into the analysis as well. 
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However, his contribution has some limitations as well. These result from the fact 
that he focuses on the tourism industry in his dissertation rather than on the media 
industry. Since in the tourism industry the product is actually a service, physical 
activities recede into the background. In the media industry, however, especially 
the physical activities have a high change potential due to digitalization (Wirtz 
2012, p. 763). Due to these limitations and the missing considerations of media 
industry specific aspects, the contribution by Tietz (2007) cannot easily be 
transferred and applied to the media industry.  
The aforementioned limitations of the contributions by other authors and the 
general lack of a comprehensive analysis approach for intermediation in media 
markets is the starting point of this dissertation. The limitations of previous works 
will be addressed and a new approach that is suitable for the analysis of 
technological induced changes in the structure of intermediation in media markets 
will be created. 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The main research objective of this dissertation is to systematically capture 
and explain those changes in a particular sector of the media industry that are 
triggered through technological advancements and have an impact on 
intermediation. In order to achieve this objective, two additional research 
objectives have to be completed first. These can be divided into one theoretical and 
one practical research objective: 
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1. Theoretical Research Objective: Development of an Intermediation 
Analysis Approach that can explain the influence of technological 
advancements on intermediaries in media markets.  
2. Practical Research Objective: Demonstrating the applicability of the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach by employing it in the analysis of a 
selected sector of the media industry. 
 
The development of the Intermediation Analysis Approach, which is capable 
of capturing and explaining the influence of technological advancements on 
intermediaries in media markets, is the theoretical objective of this dissertation. The 
analysis approach can be understood as a set of tools that allow the systematical 
analysis of intermediation from all relevant viewpoints. The steps of the analysis 
approach, the various tools that will be developed and the corresponding practical 
research questions are all visualized in Figure 1. The analysis approach allows 
researchers and practitioners alike to capture the significant transformation 
processes and to put them in a generic context, so that implications for the practice 
as well as for the theory of media management and media economics can be 
derived. The analysis approach is designed in such a way, that it can be employed 
in a variety of use cases: 
 Either ex-post (to explain) or ex-ante (to predict).  
 For different media industry sectors and to a certain degree unrelated 
industries. 
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 To assess the impact of other factors than technological advancements on 
intermediation, for example new regulations. 
 
 
Fig.1: Analysis Steps, Tools and Practical Research Questions, based on: own 
research. 
The demonstration of the applicability and usability of the analysis approach 
is the practical research objective of this dissertation. In order to demonstrate the 
applicability, the analysis approach will be applied to a sample sector of the media 
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industry. For this the motion picture sector has been selected. This sector is an 
appropriate object for the analysis as intermediaries such as sales agencies and 
distributors traditionally play an important role. In addition, the motion picture 
sector has witnessed numerous technological advancements in the past and is thus 
perfectly suited for an ex-post analysis of the last fifteen years. Lastly, while 
intermediaries in certain sectors of the media industry, especially the music 
(Clement and Schusser 2009; Pachet et al. 1999; Tuomola 2004; Walter 2007) and 
publishing sector (Janello 2010; Picot and Janello 2007), have received at least some 
attention, research on intermediaries in the motion picture sector is extremely 
limited. This dissertation will thus directly close this gap. The ex-post application 
of the analysis approach will provide answers to the following two-folded practical 
research questions: 
1. Who are the intermediaries in the industry? Which new intermediaries have 
appeared and which intermediaries disappeared in the last fifteen years? 
2. In how far and why did the activities of intermediaries in the motion picture 
sector change in the last fifteen years due to technological advancements? 
3. In how far and why has the value that intermediaries in the motion picture 
sector provide changed in the last fifteen years due to technological 
advancements? 
4. In how far and why have the incentives and disincentives to cooperate with 
intermediaries changed in the motion picture sector in the past fifteen year 
due to technological advancements? 
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1.3 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE AND OUTLINE 
The research objectives discussed in the previous sub chapter provide the 
basis for the structure of this dissertation. After the introduction in Chapter 1, the 
theoretical foundation of this dissertation will be discussed in Chapter 2. Industrial 
Economics will be used as the theoretical frame of reference. It provides a suitable 
frame of reference for the research objectives and questions of this dissertation as 
it is characterized by a high degree of reality. Just as Industrial Economics in 
general, this dissertation is located at the interface between macroeconomics and 
business economics.  
As part of the discussion of the basic principles of Industrial Economics, the 
theory of the firm is discussed in detail and from different viewpoints (Chapter 
2.1). This is necessary as the theory of the firm explicitly deals with the existence 
and boundaries of companies. For a holistic view on changes in intermediation 
structure, however, the theory of the firm is not sufficient, as it merely provides an 
efficiency oriented instrument. Thus, relevant findings from other research areas 
must be considered as well. This includes findings from various research strands 
on intermediation, including, but not limited to, the trade and marketing literature 
as well as the literature on financial intermediation (Chapter 2.2). The detailed 
analysis of the various facets of intermediation is of great importance for the 
development of the analysis approach in Chapter 3 and builds the foundation for 
the discussion of intermediation in the following chapters. 
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The theoretical research objective of this dissertation is reflected in Chapter 
3. Here the Intermediation Analysis Approach will be developed based on the 
extensive findings from Chapter 2. As pointed out by Tietz (2007, p. 74), the 
activities that intermediaries carry out (Chapter 3.2), the value intermediaries 
provide (Chapter 3.3) as well as the incentives to cooperate with intermediaries 
(Chapter 3.4) are key facets that have to be considered when analyzing 
intermediation. Consequently, a sub chapter is devoted to each facet and for each 
of these facets an analysis tool and guidance will be developed.  
Chapter 4 on the other hand is dedicated to the practical research objective, 
the demonstration of the applicability of the analysis approach. The motion picture 
sector will be introduced and the previously developed tools will be applied. The 
analysis of the industry characteristics and the value added structure (Chapter 4.1) 
will identify numerous intermediaries. Each of these will then be examined in 
detail in Chapter 4.2, where the activities, the value and the incentives to cooperate 
will be examined for each intermediary.  
Lastly, the findings of this dissertation will be summed up in Chapter 5 and 
an outlook on related research will be given. The literary sources used in this 
dissertation are referenced in Chapter 6. This dissertation has no appendix. 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODS  
This dissertation was created in multiple stages with different research 
methods being employed in each stage. The different stages and corresponding 
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research methods are visualized in Table 1 and will be explained in more detail in 
this sub chapter. 
 
Tab.1: Research Stages, Research Methods and Results, based on: own research. 
In the first stage, the creation of this dissertation relied heavily on qualitative 
literature analyses. The results are reflected in Chapter 2 and provide the 
foundation for the remaining chapters of this dissertation. The qualitative literature 
analysis is from paramount importance for the systematical development of the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach in Chapter 3. The method of qualitative 
literature analysis is considered an implicit, hermeneutic and interpretive approach 
(Mayering 2010, pp. 17-47). The literature sources used for the analysis are mainly 
selected and evaluated based on the frequency with which they are mentioned in 
relevant journals and in standard works from their specific economic disciplines. 
Research Stage Research Methods Results
Stage 1
- Qualitative literature review of contributions
  from various research strands
- Based on the results of the literature review the draft 
  of the Intermediation Analysis Approach was created 
Stage 2
- Presentation of the preliminary research 
  results and the draft of the Intermediation
  Analysis Approach at the 3rd FOM Congress
  of Media Economics
- (Informal) expert interviews and background
  discussions conducted during the Congress
- Valuable feedback and insights for the finalization of
   the Intermediation Analysis Approach were provided
   by the Congress participants 
Stage 3
- Group discussion conducted as part of the
  program of the 3rd FOM Congress of Media
  Economics
- A transcript of the discussion was created based on
  the audio recording of the group discussion
- The discussion provided some insights for the actual
  application of the Intermediation Analysis Approach
Stage 4
- Quantitative product and market data of the
   motion picture industry for the past fifteen
   year has been collected
- Descriptive statistics has been used to
  visualize and describe the collected data
- Through the data collection an extensive database of
   the key features of 1500 motion pictures was created 
- The analysis provided valuable insights and context
  about product and demand changes in the past fifteen
  years
Stage 5
- Comparative-statics analysis of intermediation
   in the motion picture industry
- Basis for the explanation of technological induced
   changes created
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For an analysis, however, researchers cannot solely rely on their own 
common sense. It would take away the possibility to differentiate between what 
they understand as a member of society and what they understand due to their 
theoretical framework (Cicourel 1970, p. 218). Thus, in addition to literature 
analyses, Hopf (1979, p. 14) recommends to conduct complementary expert 
interviews and background discussions. Accordingly, after the completion of the 
literature analysis and the creation of a first draft of the Intermediation Analysis 
Approach, in the second stage, these preliminary results have been presented at the 
3rd FOM Congress of Media Economics1 in Cologne, Germany in September 2014. 
The feedback and questions from the participants2 provided valuable insights and 
aided in the refinement of the Intermediation Analysis Approach. 
In the third stage, an additional research method was employed. A formal 
group discussion has been conducted in a separate session at the 3rd FOM Congress 
of Media Economics in Cologne, Germany in September 2014.3 Workshops and 
other formats that require the active involvement of the participants are a vital part 
of the congress format. The group discussion was recorded and transcribed. The 
objective of the group discussion was to obtain an assessment from media industry 
                                                     
1  The presentation, the program and a video summary of the congress are 
available online (Wrobel 2014a, w/o p.; FOM 2014, w/o p.; FOM 2014a, w/o p.). 
2  The audience consisted of experts from various media industry sectors and all 
hierarchy levels – from camera men over producers to the heads of marketing 
agencies. 
3  The preparation, execution and analysis of the group discussion was conducted 
by following the recommendations provided by Kühn and Koschel (2011). 
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experts on important changes that have occurred in the various sectors of the media 
industry in the past and what challenges have arisen from those changes - in 
particular for intermediaries. The results of the group discussion thus provided 
some insights into the actual application of the Intermediation Analysis Approach 
in Chapter 4.  
In addition to the previously mentioned qualitative methods, quantitative 
research was conducted in the course of the creation of this dissertation as well. In 
the fourth stage, which started roughly in parallel to the second stage and lasted 
approximately seven months, data4 for the one hundred highest domestic5 grossing 
motion pictures for each year from 1999 to 2014 has been collected and analyzed. 
This was done, in order to be able to quantify some of the product and demand 
related changes in the motion picture sector of the past fifteen years. Selected 
findings based on the collected data have already been published in a separate 
publication in 2016 (UCAM-FOM 2016). These as well as additional findings are 
highlighted in Chapter 4.1 and provide valuable insights in regards to the first step 
of the analysis approach – the identification and analysis of relevant industry 
characteristics. 
Lastly, in the fifth and final stage, the Intermediation Analysis Approach was 
applied to the motion picture industry. Through the comparative-statics analysis 
                                                     
4  The data originates from various industry databases. For an overview of the 
collected meta-data refer to Wrobel (2016, p. 121). 
5  Domestic refers to the United States and Canada as the perspective of an U.S. 
based studio is assumed, see Chapter 4.1.3 for additional information. 
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of various intermediation facets in 1999 and in 2014, the impact of technological 
advancements could be derived. This, in turn, formed the basis for the explanation 
of the transformation processes that have occurred in the motion picture industry 
in the last fifteen years. 
  
 
2 INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS AND INTERMEDIATION 
The importance of a robust theoretical foundation for this dissertation cannot 
be overstated. This has two reason: (1) intermediation has various facets that all 
have to be taken into account. Those are the activities of intermediaries, the value 
intermediaries provide as well as the incentives to cooperate with them. (2) These 
facets are discussed in literature from various research strands. Thus, only by 
examining all relevant research strands in regards to their contribution towards the 
aforementioned three facets, can a sufficient foundation for the development of the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach be created. 
The depth of the required literature review is reflected in the volume of this 
chapter. The chapter is divided into two main sections: (1) the theory of the firm 
will be discussed from different viewpoints in Chapter 2.1. (2) In Chapter 2.2 the 
focus will then shift towards intermediation. The term will be defined and 
literature from various research strands will be examined. Both parts will conclude 
with a summary, where the contribution of the preceding analysis towards the 
research objective - the development of the Intermediation Analysis Approach – 
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2.1 INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS – THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
Industrial Economics is the study of firms, industries and markets. It is 
concerned with the structure, the functionality and the behavior of enterprises and 
their interactions with the industry (Schwalbach 1997, p. 166; Tietz 2007, p. 8; Tirole 
1995, p. 4). Industrial Economics therefore provides a suitable theoretical 
foundation for this dissertation. In the face of the broad declaration claim of 
Industrial Economics, it seems unsurprising that it represents no clearly defined 
research direction (Tirole 1995, p. 4). Instead, it consists of a variety of different 
research directions, which employ different methods that overlap and compliment, 
but also partly contradict each other (Foss and Knudsen 1996, p. 6). This situation 
is accurately summed up by Kaufer (1980, p. 11), who refers to Industrial 
Economics as a swampy terrain, whose surveying requires methodological 
eclecticism. The subject matter of Industrial Economics is not the individual 
enterprise, but rather the entire sector or industry (Bain 1968, p. vii). However, in 
order to be able to create an understanding of an industry, Industrial Economics 
must also analyze the structure and behavior of enterprises6, which creates 
                                                     
6  The issues Industrial Economics attempts to address can best be demonstrated 
with the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SCP paradigm) and its 
advancement. For an overview on the SCP paradigm and its history refer to the 
relevant literature (Albarran 2002, pp. 29-31; Audretsch 1995, p. 4; Bain 1968, pp. 
1-4; Carlton and Perloff 2005, pp. 246-267; Church and Ware 2000, p. 425; Kaufer 
1980, p. 6; Mason 1939, p. 61; Mason 1957, p. 1; Oberender 1994, p. 67; Scherer 
1980, p. 4; Schwalbach 1994, p. 94; Shepherd 1997, p. 5). 
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numerous interfaces to business administration (Schwalbach 1997, p. 165; Tietz 
2007, p. 8).  
One research area of Industrial Economics that is particular useful for the 
analysis of potential changes in the structure of intermediation is the theory of the 
firm. This is because, the theory of the firm is concerned with the existence, the 
structure and the boundaries of companies (and hence includes intermediaries). 
The theory of the firm can therefore help to understand the role of intermediaries 
and the reasons for their existence. Since the theory of the firm is concerned with 
the boundaries of companies as well, it can also provide important insights for the 
explanation of disintermediation, because disintermediation is usually connected 
with a shift in company boundaries (Wrobel 2014, pp. 47-48). As a result, it is not 
surprising that virtually all studies on disintermediation or similar structural 
changes are explicitly or implicitly based on the theory of the firm, in particular the 
sub area of transaction cost theory (Tietz 2007, p. 8).  
The theory of the firm has gained increasing attention at the beginning of the 
21st century, although the basic literature, e.g. The Nature of the Firm from Coase 
(1937), was written decades ago. The theory of the firm can be understood as “the 
body of theory that addresses the existence, the boundaries and the internal 
organization of the firm” (Foss 2000, p. xxiv). The theory of the firm is not a single 
closed theory, rather a variety of different and sometimes contradictory scientific 
theories contribute to an understanding of the firm (Audretsch 1995, p. 27; Bühler 
and Jaeger 2002, p. 46; Foss and Knudsen 1996, p.6; Foss 2000, p. xxiv; Göbel 2002, 
p. 169). These theories are visualized in Figure 2 and include: (1) the neo-classical 
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or technical view of the firm, (2) New Institutional Economics (NIE) and (3) the 
information- and competence perspective. 
 
Fig.2: Research Areas influencing the Theory of the Firm, based on: Tietz 2007,  
 p. 9. 
It has to be noted that there is no consensus about the structure or grouping 
of research areas that have an influence on the theory of the firm. Similar and 
different groupings are provided by Audretsch (1995, p. 27), Bühler and Jaeger 
(2002, p. 13), Foss (2000, p. xxiv) as well as Tirole (1995, p. 35). Due to different 
points of view and independently developed schools of thought, some 
contradictions arise among these approaches. However, the respective approaches 
can therefore be applied to different problems (Foss 2000, p. xxi). In the following 
sub chapters, the influence of these three approaches will be analyzed more closely 
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and their contributions in regards to the objectives of this dissertation will be 
discussed. 
2.1.1 Neoclassical View on the Firm 
The technical view of the company, also called the production function 
approach, is based on a neoclassical microeconomic approach (Foss 1996, pp. 6-7). 
It assigns a company a specific ability of converting inputs into outputs and views 
the company as a profit-maximizing production unit. The corresponding process 
is represented by a production function (Audretsch 1995, p. 28; Bühler and Jaeger 
2002, p. 14).  
To maximize profits, the company aligns itself with the predetermined price 
and volume behavior on the market, while taking into account their cost function 
(Bühler and Jaeger 2002, p. 16). The cost curve is influenced by technical factors 
such as economies of scale and economies of scope. Economies of scale occur, when 
through the increase of the production volume, the average unit cost of the 
produced goods decreases or if the output more than doubles with twice the input 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2013, pp. 285-287; Tirole 1995, p. 33). According to Bühler 
and Jaeger (2002, p. 19), economies of scale result among other things from: 
1. More efficient production methods (technical economies of scale). 
2. Fixed costs distributed among a larger production volume. 
3. A higher degree of specialization and/or division of labor.  
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4. The spreading of production risks (such as damage to the machine) and/or 
sales risks (such as fluctuations in demand). 
 
In reality however, with a certain size, decreasing returns of scale can be 
witnessed. These may result, for example, from a growing internal coordination 
complexity and the subsequent overburden of the management or through 
bottleneck factors such as the lack of appropriate developers or managers as well 
as from an increase in transportation costs (Bühler and Jaeger 2002, p. 20; Tietz 2007, 
p. 10).  
Economies of scope, on the other hand, exist when a joint production of 
several different goods reduces the average unit cost of the goods produced or a 
higher output can be achieved with constant input. Advantages from economies of 
scope may result, among other things, from spreading fixed cost among a larger 
production amount, e.g. marketing costs or investments in machinery and 
infrastructure - if used in multiple products (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2013, pp. 307-
314; Tirole 1995, p. 33). 
The technical view of the firm provides an informative basis for the optimal 
number and size of companies as, for example, the extent of existing economies of 
scale can be used to explain the size and number of existing providers within an 
industry, i.e. the horizontal concentration level (Tirole 1995, p. 38). Economies of 
scale can present a barrier to vertical integration as well. This is because a single 
company may not be able to achieve the minimum optimal size for the 
corresponding activity (Scherer and Ross 1990, p. 109; Tietz 2007, p. 10). Economies 
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of scope can explain, why the production of a bundle of goods by a single 
corporation is more efficient than the production by several specialized companies, 
and thus contribute to the explanation of vertical integration and market entries 
into production-related industries (Bühler and Jaeger 2002, p. 22).  
A direct application of these concepts to intermediaries is however 
problematic. Since an intermediary carries out no production tasks in the technical 
sense, no technical scale or scope effects can exist. An expanded understanding of 
the concept however, allows its application to the organizational performance of a 
company, where scale and scope effects can occur (Tietz 2007, p. 11). Economies of 
scale, for example, can be achieved by specialization and economies of scope by 
transferring management skills. In these cases the transaction is viewed as part of 
the organizational performance of a company similarly to the viewpoint of 
production in the neoclassical view (Richter and Furubotn 2010, p. 81). 
Even when taking into account this extended understanding, the neoclassical 
view can only represent a small component of the theory of the firm, since many 
questions regarding the existence, the size and the structure of enterprises remain 
open (Bühler and Jaeger 2002, p. 28; Foss 2000, p. xviii; Hart 1995, p. 17; Tirole 1995, 
p. 45). For example, no compelling theoretical explanation is provided, why 
advantages resulting from economies of scale decrease with a certain size or why 
no single giant world-company can exist (Bühler and Jaeger 2002, p. 28; Tirole, 1995, 
p. 45). It does also not explain, why economies of scale can only be realized within 
a company and not with the help of inter-company contractual agreements (Tirole 
1995, p. 45). The internal organization of a company and incentive problems 
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regarding the delegation of tasks are additional neglected aspects (Bühler and 
Jaeger 2002, p. 28). Accordingly, additional contributions have to be considered as 
well. 
2.1.2 New Institutional Economics 
New Institutional Economics is concerned with the economic analysis of the 
institutional framework of the economy. The scientific object of investigation is 
thus the organization of the economy (Richter and Bindseil 1995, p. 132). Different 
definitions can be found for the term institution (Göbel 2002, p. 1; Picot et al. 2003, 
p. 39; Richter and Bindseil 1995, p. 133; Richter and Furubotn 2010, pp. 7-8). An 
institution can be defined, for example, as a system of behavior controlling informal 
and formal rules or standards, which puts human interactions for a larger group of 
people into order, in the sense of guiding principles for an extended time period 
(Göbel 2002, p. 3; Richter and Furubotn 2010, pp. 7-8). Institutions include 
organizations such as companies, authorities, associations, etc., but also things such 
as the state, money or marriage (Göbel 2002, p. 3). The publication of the widely-
cited essay The Nature of the Firm by Coase (1937) is often called the birth of New 
Institutional Economics (Foss 2000, p. xix; Göbel 2002, p. 49). However, economic 
theorists didn’t start to pay increased attention to the institutional framework of 
the economy until the 1960s. The term New Institutional Economics itself wasn’t 
coined until 1975 (Tietz 2007, p. 12), when Oliver E. Williamson released Markets 
and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Williamson (1975; 1990a; 1996) in 
particular advanced the portion of transaction cost economics. 
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Just as the neoclassical microeconomic view, New Institutional Economics 
also assumes methodological individualism7, individual benefit maximization8 and 
individual rationality9 (Picot et al. 2003, p. 45; Richter and Bindseil 1995, p. 132; 
Richter and Furubotn 2010, pp. 3-6). In addition and opposed to the neoclassical 
perspective, New Institutional Economics also assumes limited rationality10 and 
secondly, opportunistic behavior, which Williamson (1975, p. 26) defines as “self-
interest seeking with guile”. By assuming limited rationality, two crucial 
assumptions from the neoclassical perspective are no longer valid: (1) the 
assumption of symmetric information between parties or economic agents, as well 
as (2) the assumption of free and thus complete contracts (Foss 2000, p. xxvii). 
Information asymmetries allow opportunistic behavior and opportunistic behavior 
leads to incentive problems, which, among other things, New Institutional 
Economics attempts to solve. By assuming incomplete contracts, New Institutional 
Economics acknowledges that contracts cannot be created and closed for free (i.e. 
search or initiation costs occur), nor can they consider all eventualities that may 
arise after conclusion of the contract, thus monitoring and adjustment costs occur 
as well (Tietz 2007, p. 13).  
                                                     
7  The focus is on the preferences, objectives and decisions of single individuals 
(Richter and Bindseil 1995, p. 132; Richter and Furubotn 2010, p. 3). 
8  Individuals maximize their benefits within their existing degree of freedom 
(Richter and Bindseil 1995, p. 132; Richter and Furubotn 2010, p. 3). 
9  Individuals behave purposeful and rational (Kürble 2005, p. 21; Richter and 
Bindseil 1995, p. 132; Richter and Furubotn 2010, pp. 4-5). 
10  Individuals have incomplete knowledge and limited information processing 
capacity (Tietz 2007, p. 12). 
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By repealing these two assumptions, New Institutional Economics, in 
contrast to the neoclassical model, accepts the existence of so-called transaction 
costs. Transaction costs are the costs incurred by a transaction, which according to 
Williamson (1990a, p. 1) occur when a good or a service is transferred across a 
technically separable interface. The definition by Williamson (1990a, p. 1) differs 
from the definition provided by Commons (1932, p. 454), for whom transaction cost 
are the cost that incur from a transfer of property rights. Thus Commons (1932) 
provides a stricter definition, since he only includes the costs for the usage of the 
market, but not company internal transaction costs (Göbel 2002, p. 130). 
Transaction costs are vividly described as the costs of running the economic system 
(Arrow 1969, p. 48) or the cost for producing the organizational performance (Picot 
et al. 2003, p. 27). 
Transaction costs consist primarily of information- and communication costs, 
as well as follow up costs from incomplete information, such as negotiation costs 
and enforcement costs, which includes monetarily unquantifiable costs such as 
time and effort as well (Picot and Dietl 1990, p. 178; Richter and Bindseil 1995, p. 
136; Tietz 2007, p. 13). Following the definition from Williamson (1990a, p. 1), two 
kinds of transactions can be distinguished: market transactions as well as hierarchy 
transactions (Benjamin and Wigand 1995, pp. 64-66; Göbel 2002, p. 132; Gümbel 
1985, p. 151). 
A transaction is referred to as a market transaction, when a good or a service 
is transferred beyond company boundaries (by using the market). A market 
transaction can be subdivided into several temporally successive phases, in each of 
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which transaction costs occur (Picot et al. 2003, p. 50; Richter and Bindseil 1995, p. 
136; Richter and Furubotn 2010, p. 72): 
 Initiation phase (including search and inspection from a customer 
viewpoint or marketing/sales from a provider perspective). 
 Agreement phase (including negotiation, contract documentation and 
decisions). 
 Processing phase (including the definition of performance controls). 
 Control and adaptation phase (including monitoring and enforcement of 
contractual obligations regarding date, quantity, quality, etc., as well as any 
contract adjustments). 
 
Within companies, transactions and transaction costs occur as well. These are 
also referred to as managerial transaction costs, hierarchy costs or bureaucracy 
costs (Göbel 2002, p. 131; Richter and Bindseil 1995, p. 136). Examples include the 
costs for corporate governance or information- and communication costs. 
The exact percentage of the share of transaction costs of the total economic 
costs is hard to determine due to the difficult demarcation from production- and 
transport costs. An extensive investigation conducted by Wallis and North (1986, 
pp. 95-162) in the U.S. economy shows a doubling of the proportion of transaction 
cost from 26.09% in 1870 to 54.71% in 1970 and thus provides some insights into 
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the high significance.11 The share has likely continued to rise since then (Tietz 2007, 
p. 14). Based on several individual studies and plausibility considerations, Richter 
and Furubotn (2010, pp. 65-67) for example, estimate the share to be roughly 60-
70% of the gross national product.12  
Incomplete contracts and transaction costs contribute significantly to the 
explanation of the existence of institutions and thus to a theory of the firm. As 
Coase (1937, p. 388) points out in his essay from 1937, in a world with zero 
transaction costs and perfect contracts, the entire economic activity could be 
optimally coordinated over markets with single individuals as market participants, 
so that companies would be superfluous. In this so called Arrow-Debreu-World all 
individuals are fully informed at all times about the current and future state of the 
world (for free). This includes the preferences of all consumers, product features, 
technologies etc., so that no occasions for opportunistic behavior arise. All contracts 
for the entire future can be completed on spot and forward (Richter and Bindseil 
1995, p. 133). Taking into account transaction costs results in a more realistic 
representation of the economy and the existence of institutions can be explained by 
their ability to reduce transaction costs. Additionally, the importance of 
information and communication is thus highlighted (Picot et al. 2003, p. 39). 
                                                     
11  A summary of the investigation conducted by Wallis and North (1986) is 
provided by Picot et al. (2003, p. 27). 
12  Hammes and Poser (1992, pp. 885-889) provide an overview on attempts to 
quantify transaction cost. 
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New Institutional Economics represents not a single theory, but rather a 
collection of different approaches, which, even though they are methodologically 
related, have different viewpoints. Accordingly, different approaches for the 
explanation of the phenomenon of the firm can be found. Usually, the following 
three approaches are named as the core components of New Institutional 
Economics: (1) the transaction costs theory, (2) the property rights approach and 
(3) the principal agent approach (Göbel 2002, p. 49; Richter and Bindseil 1995, p. 
134; Tietz 2007, p. 15). These three approaches are explained in more details in the 
following sub chapters. 
2.1.2.1 Transaction Cost Theory 
Although the assumption of positive transaction costs represents a 
characteristic of New Institutional Economics as a whole, Göbel (2002, p. 132) 
identifies the transaction cost theory as an independent portion of research, which 
differs from the other approaches. The fundamentals of the transaction cost theory 
have been developed by Williamson (1990) and are based on the work by Coase 
(1937). In transaction cost theory the scientific object of investigation is the single 
transaction (Williamson 1990a, p. 20). It is assumed that contracts are generally 
incomplete, so that not all contingencies have been considered and significant 
transaction costs for the enforcement of the contract may occur (Williamson 1996, 
p. 7). By using transaction cost theory, different institutional arrangements and/or 
organizational forms for a specific transaction can be analyzed and assessed in 
regards to the transaction cost efficiency. Based on Coase (1937, p. 389), two basic 
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forms of organization are differentiated: market and hierarchy. These represent the 
two endpoints of a continuum, which takes intermediate forms such as 
cooperations into account as well (Picot et al. 2003, p. 54; Williamson 1990a, p. 18). 
According to transaction cost theory, a hierarchy or company, has a 
justification for its existence, if it can reduce the transaction cost relative to the 
coordination form market (Williamson 1990a, p. 19). The classic application field of 
transaction cost theory is the make-or-buy decision or in other words, vertical 
integration and thus, the determination of the vertical boundaries of the company 
(Göbel 2002, p. 185; Picot and Dietl 1990, p. 182; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, p. 32; 
Shelanski and Klein 1995, p. 341). Vertical integration refers to a change in the form 
of coordination between two vertical consecutive activities in the value system (or 
in the respective companies), where market-like exchange relations (with largely 
independent control) are replaced by coordinated or integrated and usually 
hierarchical (i.e. internal) exchanges (Perry 1989, p. 185).13 Thus, the coordination 
mechanisms market and hierarchy introduced by Coase (1937, p. 389), are part of 
the definition of vertical integration. 
Due to the problematic quantification of transaction cost, most investigations 
do not even attempt to do so. Instead, usually a relative, indirect analysis of 
transaction costs is carried out by comparing discrete institutional alternatives and 
transaction costs influencing factors or characteristics (Williamson 1991, p. 219). 
                                                     
13  Carlton and Perloff (2005, p. 396), Fell (2001, p. 12) and Shepherd (1997, p. 274) 
provide additional definitions for vertical integration. Wrobel (2014, pp. 47-48) 
discusses the relationship between intermediation and vertical integration. 
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Depending on the characteristics of these factors the most efficient coordination 
form for the analyzed transaction can be determined. Therefore, the determination 
of those characteristics, which influence transaction costs, is of great importance. 
Based on the assumption of incomplete contracts, Williamson (1990a, p. 59) 
identifies three characteristics, which determine the cost of the transaction: (1) 
factor specificity, (2) uncertainty and (3) frequency. 
For Williamson (1990), the factor specificity (i.e. asset specificity) is the most 
important aspect. It is high, if the value of a production factor in a specific 
transaction relationship is significantly higher than in its next best use case (Klein 
et al. 1978, p. 298). Williamson (1990a, p. 66) argues that with transaction-specific 
investments – i.e. investments with high specificity - a hierarchical relationship is 
more beneficial than a market relationship, because otherwise, significant 
incentives for opportunistic behavior would arise after closing the contract. This 
risk can be reduced through vertical integration. Opportunistic behavior after 
conclusion of the contract is also referred to as hold-up and plays a central role in 
Williamson’s approach. A hold-up can occur, when a company with a high, specific 
investment is entering into a dependency with the contractual partner, who can 
opportunistically exploit this dependency as soon as loopholes in the contract are 
identified. By looking at the hold-up as the main problem, Williamson (1990) 
focuses, unlike Coase (1937), on incentive problems in regards to investments, 
rather than coordination aspects, to explain the existence of companies (Holmström 
and Roberts 1998, p. 74). 
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In regards to the factor uncertainty, two uncertainties can be differentiated: 
(1) uncertainty regarding the environment and (2) uncertainty regarding the 
behavior of the contract partner. Transaction cost theory primarily deals with the 
latter. Behavior uncertainty results from the assumption of opportunistic behavior 
in combination with limited rationality. But Williamson (1990a, p. 68) argues that 
behavior uncertainties only raise serious problems, and have a cost increasing 
effect, when simultaneously transaction specific investments occur. Otherwise the 
contract partner can be replaced relatively easily. Thus, uncertainty alone is not a 
sufficient reason for vertical integration. 
Williamson (1990a, p. 69) assess the frequency with which a transaction 
occurs similarly. For rarely occurring transactions, vertical integration is rather 
impractical on the basis of the then underutilized capacity. On the other hand, 
frequently occurring transactions can easily be coordinated on the market, if there 
is no high specificity. Thus, the specificity is the main factor, which makes the 
coordination form hierarchy beneficial to the coordination form market.  
2.1.2.2 Property Rights Approach 
Property rights, in the context of New Institutional Economics, refers to the 
usage and disposal rights over tangible or intangible resources resulting from the 
law, contracts or social obligation (Göbel 2002, p. 67; Picot et al. 2003, p. 46). The 
research focus of the property rights approach is on the effects that property rights 
have on the behavior of economic entities in regards to the use of scarce resources. 
The main hypothesis is that this behavior is predictably dependent on the structure 
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS AND INTERMEDIATION  49 
of property rights (Göbel 2002, p. 70; Picot et al. 2003, p. 46; Richter and Bindseil 
1995, p. 136; Tietz 2007, p. 18). The property rights approach, just like the 
transaction cost theory, assumes incomplete contracts and positive transaction 
costs, because without the existence of transaction costs, the optimal distribution of 
all available rights would occur as they would be freely transferable (Göbel 2002, 
p. 69; Picot et al. 2003, p. 48). 
In regards to the theory of the firm, the property rights approach is capable 
to analyze those organizational decisions, which incorporate a change in property 
rights (Picot et al. 2003, p. 49). In addition to decisions within companies, the 
property-rights approach can contribute to the demarcation of company 
boundaries as well. The basis for this was developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) 
as well as Hart and Moore (1990), who enhanced the traditional property rights 
approach. The approach has some similarities with the transaction cost theory, for 
example the acceptance of incomplete contracts and focusing on the hold-up 
problem, but there are important differences as well (Foss 2000, p. xli; Holmström 
and Roberts 1998, p. 75). The company is understood as a sum of assets (i.e. 
valuables such as machines and even intangible goods) in uniform ownership 
(Grossman and Hart 1986, p. 63). The owner has the so called residual control right, 
which means that the owner can decide on the use of the assets, as long as the 
owner is not already contractually bound and no eventualities occur, which have 
not been contractually addressed. The last point is particular important. By residual 
control rights the hold-up problem is reduced, while the influence on the 
subsequent distribution of the profits increases. Thus, the biggest investment 
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incentives exist for an owner. It must be noted that a two-sided hold-up problem is 
assumed, while through vertical integration the hold-up problem for the acquiring 
company is solved, it creates or increases the hold-up problem for the previous 
owner. The optimum distribution of the available rights is therefore the 
distribution, which has the least number of hold-up problems and thus the overall 
best investment incentives (Grossman and Hart 1986, p. 78). This trade-off explains 
why vertical integration can bring disadvantages as well.  
2.1.2.3 Principal Agent Theory 
At the core, the principal agent theory is concerned with incentive problems 
created by asymmetric information within the framework of principal and agent. 
The principal agent theory examines situations in which a contracting authority 
(principal) commissions a contractor (agent) with the execution of a certain task or 
performance. Due to asymmetric information and difficulties in controlling the 
agent, the principal cannot be sure that the agent provides the optimal performance 
from the principal’s perspective (Göbel 2002, p. 62; Richter and Furubotn 2010, pp. 
173-174). The principal agent theory assumes the position of the principal and asks, 
which contractual arrangements ensure the selection, disciplination and 
motivation of the agent and will best pursue the interests of the principal (Göbel 
2002, p. 104). Classic examples of principal-agent relationships are the relationships 
between employer and employee, customer and producer or shareholder and 
management (Meinhövel 1999, p. 27; Picot et al. 2003, p. 56; Richter and Furubotn 
2010, p. 174). Examples in the services sector are the relationships between patient 
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and doctor or client and lawyer (Tietz 2007, p. 19). However, in many relationships 
both subjects can each be viewed as principal or agent. For example, a producer 
may see the trade as an agent, which the producer entrusts with the distribution of 
the products. On the other hand, the trade may see its suppliers as agents, which 
carry out the task of production for them (Göbel 2002, p. 104).  
The following paragraphs will discuss different types of information 
asymmetries and the resulting problems. From the onset, pre-contractual and post-
contractual information asymmetries can be distinguished (Tietz 2007, p. 20). 
Pre-contractual information asymmetries include so-called hidden 
characteristics. The term hidden characteristics refers to the information advantage 
of the agent before conclusion of the contract, since the properties of the 
performance offered by the agent are not fully transparent for the principal (Göbel 
2002, p. 101). Hidden characteristics are typical for services, because in this case, 
the product cannot be inspected in advance. Pre-contractual information 
asymmetry can be reduced through screening on the part of the principal (i.e. the 
search for agents with appropriate services) and signaling on the part of the agent 
(credible communication of the properties). Additionally, contractual incentives 
may be used to harmonize interests. Building trust is another option for a solution 
(Picot et al. 2003, p. 57). If significant hidden characteristics remain, market failure 
is a possible outcome due to the phenomenon of adverse selection. Since customers 
are unwilling to pay more than the average expected benefit for a specific product 
or service, quality providers will drop out of the market. This in turn lowers the 
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average benefit of the offered goods and a negative cycle is started, which 
ultimately leads to market failure (Akerlof 1970, p. 489). 
Post-contractual information asymmetries are referred to as hidden actions 
and hidden information. A situation, in which the principal cannot completely 
observe the behavior of the agent - or only at unreasonable cost - is referred to as 
hidden action (Richter and Furubotn 2010, pp. 174-180). If the principal is not able 
to readily judge the quality of the product or service on the basis of the final result, 
the agent may behave opportunistically, for example, simply through laziness. 
Hidden information, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which the 
principal can observe the behavior of the agent, however, it is difficult to judge the 
quality. This phenomenon occurs often in the contracting of service providers with 
expertise such as lawyers or doctors (Göbel 2002, p. 101). The risk of opportunistic 
behavior of the agent, emerging from hidden action and hidden information, is also 
known as moral hazard. The moral hazard problem can be addressed by 
monitoring from the perspective of the principals on the one hand or reporting 
from the perspective of the agent (thus reducing information asymmetry) on the 
other hand. The building of trust and the harmonizing of interests through 
contractual incentives are additional solutions for the moral hazard problem (Tietz 
2007, p. 20).  
Hidden intentions are unknown intentions of the agent or contractor. These 
can exist before and after the conclusion of the contract. The hold-up problem, 
already discussed as part of the transaction cost theory, is caused by hidden 
intentions. Similarly, it is conceivable that an agent requires an advance and then 
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denies the provision of the service. Hidden intentions, in contrast to hidden- 
characteristics, -actions or -information, can usually not be addressed by reducing 
information asymmetry, instead, a harmonization of interests and the building of 
trust is required (Tietz 2007, p. 20). 
For the selection of the optimal institutional arrangements the so-called 
agency costs can be used. Agency cost are defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976, 
p. 251) as the sum of (1) monitoring expenditures or monitoring and control costs 
of principals, (2) bonding expenditures or signaling and warranty costs of the 
agent, and (3) residual loss or remaining welfare loss. An exact quantification of the 
agency costs, however, is often hard or not possible at all, thus a mathematically-
precise application of the concept of agency costs is often difficult (Göbel 2002, p. 
126). Göbel (2002, p. 126) criticizes as well that no agency benefits arising from any 
superior skills of the agent are considered and compared to the agency costs. As a 
result, it remains unclear, why the principal should hire an agent at all. 
Accordingly, no recommendation can be derived, whether the principal should 
hire an agent or create the goods or services directly. 
2.1.2.4 Comparison 
As has been shown, there are a variety of similarities between the three New 
Institutional Economics approaches that contribute to the explanation of the 
phenomenon of the firm. All three approaches have in common that they consider 
contract issues and derive the decision for specific institutional arrangements from 
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the reduction of these contract issues or from the reduction of transaction costs. 
However, the approaches look at different types of transaction costs: 
 Both transaction cost theory and property rights approach focus mainly on 
problems after the conclusion of the contract. These problems, above all the 
hold-up problem, result from incomplete contracts. Especially the costs for 
the preparation are responsible for the incompleteness of contracts as it 
would be impossible and too expensive to account for all eventualities in a 
contract. The hold-up problem leads to a risk, because high monitoring and 
enforcement costs may apply. 
 The principal-agent approach, on the other hand, focuses on incentive 
problems due to information asymmetries and opportunistic behavior 
rather than incomplete contracts. This approach considers transaction costs 
in the sense of agency costs, especially in the form of signaling and warranty 
costs on the part of the agent as well as monitoring and control costs on the 
part of the principal. Vertical integration is one of several possible solution 
to reduce these costs.  
 
Due to the diversity of these approaches, they can be interpreted as mutually 
complementary perspectives. This allows the consideration of a specific problem 
from different points of view (Williamson 1990, p. 69). 
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2.1.2.5 Summary 
As the analysis in the previous chapters revealed, vertical integration 
represents the classical field of application for New Institutional Economics. In 
contrast, structural changes on the horizontal level can hardly be explained (Göbel 
2002, p. 214). It has to be noted, however, that New Institutional Economics cannot 
fully explain the phenomenon of vertical integration. In particular, it can be 
criticized, that while disadvantages of contractual cooperation such as the risk of 
hold-up are considered, the benefits, such as the use of superior abilities of others, 
are not addressed at all. In addition to such conceptual criticism, the 
operationalization and implementation of New Institutional Economics is often 
criticized as well (Demsetz 1993, p. 105; Döring 1998, p. 45; Göbel 2002, p. 204; 
Holmström and Roberts 1998, p. 80). The main points of criticism are summarized 
in following paragraphs. 
Representatives of New Institutional Economics, such as Williamson (1990a, 
p. 69), acknowledge that in addition to transaction costs, production and transport 
costs must also be considered when making decisions between alternative 
institutional arrangements. However, an instrument for the analysis of the same is 
not provided (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997, p. 47). There is also no consensus 
whether transaction costs or production- and transport costs play a greater role in 
the determination of the optimal institutional arrangement (Rindfleisch and Heide 
1997, p. 47). The difficult distinction between production-, transport- and 
transaction costs creates additional problems. As has been mentioned before, due 
to the problematic quantification of transaction costs, usually discrete institutional 
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alternatives are compared and transaction costs influencing factors or 
characteristics examined. Due to this indirect method of analysis, an additional 
challenge arises: the problem of completeness. In order to make a decision in a 
particular case, it has to be ensured that all factors are considered.  
The traditional transaction cost approach by Williamson (1990), on the other 
hand, puts the influencing factor specificity in the foreground. In that regard, 
Holmström and Roberts (1998, p. 75) accurately comment that: “Firms are complex 
mechanisms for coordinating and motivating individuals' activities. They have to 
deal with a much richer variety of problem than simply the provision of investment 
incentives or the resolution of hold-ups”. In this context, Demsetz (1993, p. 109) 
notes that science has developed too few insights into the influencing factors on 
transaction costs to actually apply the theory. Some typically as neglected regarded 
aspects are (1) that vertical integration can abrogate (efficiency increasing) market 
control and flexibility, (2) vertical integration facilitates the transfer of knowledge, 
skills and information, and this induces an increase in efficiency, (3) that trust can 
develop better in long lasting relationships and can have an efficiency-enhancing 
effect. 
Due the large number of influencing factors, in most cases a trade-off is likely. 
This means, however, that a clear decision in a particular case without 
quantification is hardly possible. Depending on the weighting of the factors, one or 
another alternative can be considered to be the efficient one. This problem is 
exacerbated, when not only the two coordination forms market and hierarchy are 
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compared, but intermediate forms such as partnerships, alliances, or long-term 
contracts are considered as well. 
Despite the criticisms, New Institutional Economics provides a powerful 
toolset for the analysis of vertical organizational boundaries and, through the 
introduction of positive transaction costs, in contrast to the neoclassical 
perspective, provides valuable explanations for the existence of intermediaries and 
certain industrial structures. Since intermediation is also considered to be a vertical 
phenomenon, New Institutional Economics seems to be appropriate for the 
analysis of intermediation as well. It thus comes as no surprise that an essential 
part of the scientific research on intermediation is based explicitly or implicitly on 
New Institutional Economics and transaction cost theory.14 It is also not surprising 
that New Institutional Economics can be particularly useful for the analysis of the 
impact of new information and communication technologies on industrial 
structures, as transaction costs consist mainly of information and communication 
costs. Accordingly, a large part of the literature on electronic commerce and 
electronic markets is based on transaction cost theory as well.15 
 
 
                                                     
14  Popular examples include the contributions by Alderson (1954), Demsetz (1968), 
Picot (1986) and Spulber (1999). 
15  Examples include the contributions by Chircu (2001), Hunziker (2003), Picot et 
al. (1997), Resnick et al. (1995) and Sarkar et al. (1995). 
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2.1.3 Information- and Competence Perspective 
Just like New Institutional Economics, the information perspective and 
competence perspective on the firm also assume limited rationality and incomplete 
contracts (Foss 2000, p. xliv). However, they consider limited rationality from a 
different view point. Instead of emphasizing incentive problems or possibilities for 
opportunistic behavior due to limited rationality, they are concerned with the costs 
for capturing, processing and disseminating information (Radner 1996, p. 1361). 
While these costs are usually not considered in New Institutional Economics, they 
do represent a form of transaction costs as well (Foss 2000, p. xliv). The information 
perspective and the competence perspective can be distinguished. The former 
considers the information processing and communication tasks of a company.16 The 
latter regards the company as a bundle of resources used for the creation of a good 
or service.17 
2.1.3.1 Information Perspective 
Although the theoretical basis for the information-based viewpoint of the 
company was created in the 1970s, roughly at the same time as the work by 
Williamson (1975) on transaction cost, it wasn’t until the 1990s that the approach 
received increased attention (Foss 2000, p. xliv). The approach is thus still relatively 
                                                     
16  Examples for the information perspective are the contributions by Bolton and 
Dewatripont (1994) as well as Crémer (1990). 
17  Barney (1991), Foss and Knudsen (1996), Penrose (1955) as well as Rumelt (1984) 
and Wernerfelt (1984) are representatives of the competence perspective.  
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new, and accordingly cannot boast such large number of publications as New 
Institutional Economics does. Important contributions include those of Crémer 
(1990) as well as Bolton and Dewatripont (1994). To illustrate the key findings of 
the information perspective, the contribution by Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) 
will be summed up in the following paragraphs. 
The company in the knowledge perspective is considered a “communication 
network that is designed to minimize both, the costs of processing new 
information, and the costs of communicating this information among its agents” 
(Bolton and Dewatripont 1994, p. 809). The objective is to structure the internal 
organization in a way that minimizes the cost of information recording, processing 
and dissemination. A trade-off between the advantages of specialization and the 
required communication effort can be witnessed. On the one hand, the division of 
labor creates advantages as learning effects in regards to information processing 
occur. On the other hand, increased communication costs occur with a division of 
labor, because the information must be transferred between people. On the basis of 
this model, recommendations on aspects such as the optimal size of a team or the 
optimal number of hierarchy levels can be derived. Bolton and Dewatripont (1994, 
p. 835) for example conclude that with a reduction of information- and 
communication cost, flatter hierarchies become more favorable. 
As becomes evident, the strength of the information perspective is the 
explanation of internal structures of companies (Foss 2000, p. xlv). An application 
of the approach to determine company boundaries appears essentially possible. 
Instead of the boundaries of departments or teams, the borders of the company 
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would be determined. If one assumes that certain information flows across 
company borders are associated with higher cost than in-house, the boundaries of 
a company should be set in such a way that these problematic interfaces are bridged 
internally. On this basis, the approach should be able to particularly capture the 
vertical information flows of the value system in an attempt to optimize them. For 
example, it could be beneficial for a producer to handle the selling of the products 
directly, assuming customer information can thus be obtained easier or better and 
the customer information is actually essential for the optimization of the 
production (Tietz 2007, pp. 24-28). 
2.1.3.2 Competence Perspective 
The foundation for the competence perspective was developed by Penrose in 
1955 (Foss 2000, p. xlvii). For Penrose (1955, p. 10) a company is a bundle of 
resources or abilities that are required for the creation of products and services. On 
this basis, she develops a theory of organic growth. As resources become free over 
time, i.e. due to efficiency increases, the company must decide on how to use them. 
The contractual transfer of these resources is often difficult, e.g. due to indivisibility 
or specificity, which implicitly implies positive transaction costs (Teece 1982, p. 
224). As a result, the company will decide to use the resources for an expansion of 
the business, exactly in those areas, which require similar skills. Based on these 
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considerations, Penrose (1955) is primary able to explain horizontal growth and 
market entries into related industries.18  
The contribution by Penrose (1955) inspired various resource-based scholars 
such as Lippman and Rumelt (1982), Wernerfelt (1984) and also evolutionary 
theorists such as Nelson and Winter (1982). After the publication of the article A 
Resource-based View of the Firm by Wernerfelt (1984), researches began to refer to the 
growing body of literature on the competence perspective as “the resource-based 
view” (Foss and Knudsen 1996, p. 3). In this context a variety closely related 
contributions can be identified such as on core competences (Prahalad and Hamel 
1990), the capabilities approach (Langlois 1992), the competence perspective (Foss 
1993; Foss and Knudsen 1996), and the dynamic capabilities approach (Teece et al. 
1990).  Foss and Knudsen (1996, p. 2) note that all of the aforementioned 
contributions highlight the “strategic importance of those firm-specific assets that 
are knowledge-related and intangible, often tacit, hard to trade and shared among 
the agents of the firm”. They therefore group all these approaches under the 
heading competence perspective. The assets that conform to these characteristics 
are what Foss and Knudsen (1996, p. 2) refer to as competences. They go on to 
highlight that their understanding of competence refers to the knowledge capital 
that allows its holder to solve problems in certain ways and more efficient than 
                                                     
18  Some empirical studies were able to confirm the hypothesis that the direction of 
expansion depends on the existing resources of a company (Teece et al. 1994). 
Refer to Schuler (2002, p. 158) for a concise representation of additional 
investigation. 
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others. Competence may reside in individuals, but Foss and Knudsen (1996, p. 1) 
point out that in the context of the theory of firm and strategic management, 
competence is “perhaps best seen as a property of organizations rather than 
individuals (it is therefore hard to imitate and transfer)”. The competence 
perspective allows to model a firm in terms of its competences. A special attention 
is given to the accumulation, protection and deployment of competences. 
Particular interesting for this dissertation is the observation by Foss and Knudsen 
(1996, p. 1) that the competences of a firm also have an influence on the boundaries 
of the firm, notably the firm’s degree of diversification.    
Additional explanations for the vertical borders of a company come from 
contributions by Richardson (1972), Demsetz (1993) and Langlois (1992). 
Richardson (1972, p. 20) determines that in an industry, specific activities must be 
performed, which in turn require certain skills or capabilities. When different 
activities require the same skills or capabilities, they are referred to as similar 
activities. According to Richardson (1972, p. 21) activities are complementary, if 
they follow each other in the production process and must thus be coordinated 
with each other. Complementarity and similarity do not go together. Furthermore, 
he assumes that complementary activities are often dissimilar. For determining the 
boundaries of the company, Richardson (1972, p. 26) sees the capabilities of the 
company as the main criteria. Similar activities should be carried out within a 
company, because they require the same skills. In the event that activities, although 
not similar, are strongly complementary, he does not necessarily propose vertical 
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integration, but instead refers to the possibility of inter-firm cooperation such as 
long-term contracts. 
Demsetz (1993, p. 116) builds on the idea that every company has special 
knowledge. He determines that the inter-company transfer of this knowledge, in 
the sense of giving work instructions or instructions regarding the use of products, 
can create high costs. Based on this logic he infers, that it is more cost effective or 
economically sensible, when (1) those with much knowledge give instructions to 
those with little knowledge (and not vice versa) and when (2) the boundaries of a 
company are set in such a way that only largely self-explanatory products are 
traded through the mechanism market, so that little knowledge must be transferred 
across company interfaces.19 Demsetz (1993, p. 11) points out that there are 
moments in the production process, where an intermediate result can be used for 
many different purposes and each purpose requires different skills. It is unlikely 
that all required skills can be built up in one individual company. In this context, 
Casson (2001, p. 94) notes that it can be beneficial for a company to not outsource 
the production, if there are uncertainties in regards to the abilities of the potential 
supplier and/or if a transfer of these skills or building up those skills would be too 
costly. Langlois (1992, p. 188) picks up the idea of costs for the transfer of 
knowledge as well as skills and integrates them more closely with the transaction 
cost school of thought. He coined the term “dynamic transaction costs”, which he 
                                                     
19  By itself, the second point would rationale a full vertical integration along the 
entire value system. 
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defines as “the costs of transferring capabilities: the costs of persuading, 
negotiating and coordinating with, and teaching others”. 
2.1.3.3 Summary 
As has been pointed out, the information perspective and competence 
perspective put important aspects in the foreground, which neither the neoclassical 
perspective nor New Institutional Economics have taken sufficiently into account. 
The information perspective and competence perspective therefore complete the 
view of the phenomenon of the firm. Since intermediaries do not carry out any 
production, these aspects are of increased importance. Intermediaries are often 
largely information processors and producers choose to work with intermediaries 
on the basis of their competence. In addition, it is immediately apparent that a 
consideration of the information processing aspect is useful for the explanation of 
the impact of technological advancements such as new information- and 
communication technologies. 
2.1.4 Limitations of the Theory of the Firm 
The theory of the firm is helpful for the explanation of the existence of 
companies as well as for the analysis of institutional arrangements. The 
consideration of the optimal vertical organizational boundaries, which is of 
paramount importance for the explanation of intermediation, represents one of the 
classic areas of application of the theory of the firm. Nevertheless, the theory of the 
firm cannot claim to explain these issues completely, because it provides strongly 
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS AND INTERMEDIATION  65 
efficiency-oriented instruments. However, there are a number of reasons for 
structural changes that are not based on efficiency and are therefore not taken into 
account, these include (Döring 1998, p. 45; Göbel 2002, p. 204; Tietz 2007, p. 28): 
1. Aspects of competitive strategy, such as the creation of market entry 
barriers.  
2. Benefit aspects, such as the influence of the form of an organization on the 
quality of the created product or service. 
3. Effects, which are not directly associated with the actual production, for 
example tax benefits.  
 
A focus on efficiency is legitimate, but also means that the analysis of a 
specific use case, based solely on the theory of the firm, is likely insufficient. The 
theory of the firm must be supplemented by suitable other industrial-economic 
approaches and methods, which can cover the missing aspects. In particular, 
Industrial Economics provides further insights in regards to the strategic reasons 
for the shift of vertical organizational boundaries. Accordingly, these aspects will 
be incorporated into the development of the analysis approach in Chapter 3 as well. 
2.1.5 Summary 
The previous sub chapters analyzed the theory of the firm from various 
viewpoints. This was necessary as the theory of the firm provides insights into the 
existence, the structure and the boundaries of companies and thus can help to 
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understand the role of intermediaries and the reasons for their existence. Table 2 
provides an overview of the various examined research areas contributing to the 
theory of the firm. Their relevant contributions in regards to the objectives of this 
dissertation and the relevant facets of intermediation, which are explicitly or 
implicitly addressed, are highlighted as well. This initial consolidation of the 
findings not only provides a helpful overview and illustrates the different foci of 
the various research areas, it will also be of aid in the development of the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach, for which the findings for each facet will have 
to be further consolidated. 
 
Tab.2: Contributions from the Research on the Theory of the Firm, based on: 
own research. 
Research Strand Contribution Relevant Facet
Neoclassical view of 
the firm
- Expanded understanding of the production function as the organizational
  performance of a company
- Economies of scale 
- Economies of scope 




- Information asymmetries 
- Incomplete contracts and thus monitoring and adjustment costs 
- Opportunistic behavior and thus incentive problems
- The existence of transaction cost




- Arguments for vertical integration
- Market and Hierarchy as the two basic forms of organization 
- Factor specificity (hold-up), uncertainty and frequency as the transaction
  cost influencing factors






- The introduction of a different approach to set company boundaries
- Disadvantages of vertical integration





- Introduction of agency cost and different types of information
  asymmetries: (I) Hidden characteristics, (II)  hidden actions,  
 (III) hidden information and (IV) hidden intentions 




- Introduction of a different type of transaction costs: The costs for
  capturing, processing, and disseminating of information 





- Introduction of a different type of transaction costs: The cost for building
  up and transferring knowledge and skills
Value provided by 
Intermediaries
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As has been mentioned before, the various contributions on the theory of the 
firm are particularly suited to explain the value intermediaries provide. This is 
reflected in the overview provided in Table 2 as well. However, additional insights 
regarding the incentives and disincentives to cooperate with intermediaries can 
also be derived. As was highlighted in the previous discussion, the many 
arguments for vertical integration provided by Williamson (1990) can be 
understood as arguments against intermediation as well.  
Before these findings can be further consolidated into the analysis approach 
in Chapter 3, additional insight are necessary, particularly in regards to the 
activities of intermediaries as the theory of the firm is not particularly helpful in 
this regard. Thus, the second part of the theoretical foundation of this dissertation 
will be established in the next sub chapter, where intermediation will examined 
from different perspectives. The objective is to gain insights in regards to the 
activities of intermediaries and also to identify additional benefits and cooperation 
incentives. 
2.2 INTERMEDIATION 
Composed of the Latin etyma inter (between) and medius (middle), 
intermediation refers to what is located in the middle or in between. Economic 
theory applies the concept of intermediation in markets (Schoder 2003, p. 171). 
Many different definitions for intermediation can be found in literature. The 
middle position between supply and demand in imperfect markets emerges as the 
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primary definitional characteristic of intermediation. A selection of definitions for 
intermediation is presented in Table 3. 
All these definitions have in common, that the performance of the 
intermediary is embedded in the context of the market. In particular, the 
importance of supply and demand is stressed, and consequently, the aim of 
reducing costs for each individual market side. According to the definitions, 
intermediation is a theoretical concept for the analysis of entities, which are located 
between supply and demand. This extends the analysis compared to the term trade 
by not only the looking at the buying and selling of goods, but considering the 
agent-like mediation between trading partners as well (Walter 2007, p. 31). 
 
Tab.3: Definitions for Intermediation, based on: Rose 1999, p. 51; Spulber 1999, 
p. 3; Tietz 2007, p. 31; Picot et al. 2003, p. 377; Yavas 1995, p. 18.   
The number of scientific contributions, which analyze intermediation from a 
holistic perspective is limited. Thus, a fully developed theory of intermediation 
Author Intermediation Definition
Yavas (1995)
„One of the main explanations of intermediaries in search markets … is that they 
resolve … inefficiencies in return for a profit …”.
Rose (1999)
„An intermediary is an independent, profit-maximizing economic agent mediating 
between two market sides in presence of market imperfections. Intermediation is the 
bridging of the incompatibilities between the two (market) sides involved in a transaction 
by transformation of output attributes of the supply market side to appropriate input 
attributes of the demand market side ...”.
Spulber (1999)
"An intermediary is an economic agent who purchases from suppliers for resale to buyers or 
who helps buyers and best-sellers meet and transact”.
Picot et al. (2003)
Intermediaries are generally understood to be entities that are the neither the provider nor 
the customer, but instead, enable or facilitate the functioning of the market and therefore 
receive a commission.
Tietz (2007)
An intermediary is an economic trading subject, whose main purpose is not the production 
or processing of goods, but rather the support of transactions between suppliers and 
customers, and with this purpose, either purchases goods from a producer or service 
provider in order to sell the same or a similar good to the customer (market maker), or 
supports the transactions between producers and customers in other ways (match maker).
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does not exist.20 Most studies are more focused on certain forms of intermediaries 
such as the trade or financial intermediaries. Accordingly, it is not surprising that 
no uniform definition exists. The most important forms of intermediaries, from an 
economic perspective, are financial intermediaries, such as banks or insurance 
companies, and trade organizations such as wholesalers or retailers. Other 
examples are the stock market, real estate agencies, talent agencies, distributors and 
content aggregators. According to an estimate by Spulber (1999, p. 2), 
intermediaries account for approximately a quarter of the gross domestic product 
of the United States. 
As stated above, many contributions on intermediation can be assigned to 
certain research strands. These contributions focus on certain aspects or on certain 
types of intermediaries. Since the mid-1990s, with the raising interest in the 
influence of electronic commerce on industry structures, however, researchers 
started to take a cross-industry view on intermediation. These studies typically 
focus only on certain functions of intermediaries, such as the information- or the 
search function (Sarkar et al. 1995; Bakos 1998; Palvia and Vemuri 1999). In the 
following sub chapters the individual research strands dealing with intermediation 
will be analyzed and the most valuable contributions in each strand will be 
                                                     
20  Winkler (1989, p. 299) already highlighted in 1989 that "a general theory of 
intermediation seems desirable". Despite the large amount of research on 
intermediation since then, Tietz (2007, p. 40) as well as Walter and Hess (2005, 
p. 20) point to the lack of a general theory of intermediation. Chapter 2.2.5 and 
Chapter 2.2.6 will discuss the shortcomings of these contributions in more detail 
and highlight, why thus a general theory does still not exist. 
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discussed. This analysis will provide the final insights for the development of the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach in Chapter 3. 
2.2.1 Trade Research on Intermediation 
The origin of the scientific interest in intermediation is the literature on the 
trade.21 Its source is the distinction between production and sales (Leitherer 1961, 
p. 145). While the contribution of production to the economy was generally 
recognized, the trade had to justify its existence from the onset. Scholastic business 
ethicists looked at the economic activity in regards to its compatibility with ethical 
standards as early as the Middle Ages (Leitherer 1961, p. 13). In their doctrine, they 
distinguish between farmers, artisans and merchants. Discussions arose especially 
about merchants, as it was difficult to measure their work. The poorly measurable 
level of work led to a suspicion of exploitation (Gümbel 1985, pp. 19-22) and 
sparked discussions about the fair price, which put the trade in the position of 
having to justify its existence (Leitherer 1961, pp. 15-17, Walter 2007, p. 31). 
These debates about the trade can be grouped under the heading 
productivity conflict. This quite fundamental and, in its results, infertile discussion 
about the justification of the trade was primarily based on divergent views on the 
(intangible) productive contribution of the trade to the economy. Studies assumed 
less that all merchants would be dishonorable, but rather that the trade compared 
                                                     
21  A comprehensive trade literature overview is provided by Gümbel (1985, pp. 
95-97), Leitherer (1961) as well as Walter (2007, pp. 31-34). 
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to producers (due to the trade’s activities being intangible) has the chance to act 
dishonorably (Walter 2007, pp. 31-32). 
This negative view of the trade changed with the increasing economic 
importance of the trade in the 14th and 15th century (Leitherer 1961, pp. 16-17). At 
that point in time, the services or capabilities of the trade were being tallied, which 
justified a wage or profit in return for the services rendered. The productivity 
conflict was thus gradually replaced by significantly more constructive analyses, 
which describe and measure the performance of the trade based on functional 
relations. The focus of theses analyses was primary on finding a fair market price, 
with primary the commercial function and its share in the procuring of goods being 
discussed from the perspective of the overall economy. Bernard von Siena was one 
of the first to justify the existence of the trade through a detailed analysis and by 
doing so, characterized the emerging individual economics (Leitherer 1961, pp. 19-
20; Walter 2007, p. 32).  
The following beginnings of individual economics then comprised less 
theoretical theses, but rather practical trading books and holistic economic 
overviews. Mercantilism evolved in parallel to practical science for a long time. It 
builds logically on the early scholastics, but dispenses with the ethical point of view 
and instead, acts as an advocate of the absolutist chieftain. By comparing practical 
science on the one hand, and mercantilism on the other hand, the characteristic 
position of the trade between the individual and macroeconomic view becomes 
evident for the first time (Leitherer 1961, p. 81). 
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The disciplines of practical science and mercantilism began to dissolve at the 
time of the political revolutions at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th 
century due to new scientific developments. The main innovation in the scientific 
field was the emergence of National Economics, which is characterized by a strong 
theoretical orientation (Walter 2007, p. 33). Adam Smith contributed to this new 
school of thought, as one of the first, by designing a theoretical construct of the 
capitalist economic world of his time in 1776. For Smith (1976, pp. 450-473), the 
trade had a high importance. He saw the productivity of the trade on the same level 
as the productivity of the primary production. However, also for Smith, the trade 
was not equally productive as other sectors of the economy (Leitherer 1961, p. 88). 
While Smith and other national economists significantly shaped the modern 
discipline of macroeconomics, it is a special form of Austrian trade-economic 
literature, which contributed to the development of business economics in today's 
understanding in the early 20th century (Leitherer 1961, p. 97). An important 
representative of this school of thought is Oberparleiter (1955), who developed one 
of the first catalogs of trade functions (Falk and Wolf 1992, p. 41; Gümbel 1985, pp. 
95-98; Tietz 1993, p. 11). The contribution by Oberparleiter (1955) has strongly 
influenced subsequent research on the trade, in which different attempts are made 
to catalog the tasks and functions of the trade (Marré 1974, pp. 709-720). While, the 
different catalogs vary in level of detail and grouping, as well as in content, the 
overarching similarity between them is the overcoming of various differences 
between the producer and customer through the trade as visualized in Figure 3 
(Falk and Wolf 1992, p. 41; Marré 1974, p. 714; Tietz 1993, p. 12; Tietz 2007, p. 33). 
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Fig.3: Functions of the Trade, based on: Tietz 2007, p. 33. 
The last author who has to be mentioned as part of the trade literature is Schär 
(1923). With his work, Schär (1923) is considered to be the founder of the normative 
oriented business economics and a significant pioneer of business economics as a 
whole (Koch and Albach 1962, p. 16). In his work, Schär (1923) however does not 
take an individual economic perspective. He focuses less on the buying and selling 
of goods, instead, he is interested in the link between the trade and the economy as 
a whole (Leitherer 1961, p. 100). Schär (1923, p. 194) concludes that the existence of 
an intermediary is justified, if the functions of the intermediary cannot be 
performed as well and as economically by others. He sees two potential values: (1) 
increased efficiency and (2) increased effectiveness.  
2.2.2 Marketing Research on Intermediation 
The marketing literature was created in response to declining sales figures in 
the 1930s and the corresponding change from seller’s to buyer’s markets. This 
development led to the recognition that the sales related problems of the industry 
can only be fully understood by considering all steps from production up to the 
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actual consumption (Leitherer 1961, p. 104). The position of the trade, as previously 
discussed, between supply and demand on the one hand, and, at the same time, 
between individual and overall economy is thus reflected in marketing literature 
as well (Sundhoff 1956, p. 270; Tietz 1974, preface w/o p.). 
The focus shifted away from an isolated consideration of the trade towards 
the view of the producers, who see the trade as a sales organ, and at the same time, 
towards the consideration of consumer behavior. In this context, topics such as 
market research and advertising are included in the scientific discussion as well. 
Thus, marketing literature is characterized by an interdisciplinary view on 
intermediation. Tietz (1974, preface w/o p.) points out, marketing literature 
includes selected results from psychology, social psychology and sociology.  
As Leitherer (1961, p. 106) notes, by splitting up marketing activities into 
individual parts, the seemingly endless and diverse mercantile operations, can 
ultimately be reduced to certain basic tasks that comprise the very essence of the 
trade. This, in turn, allows researchers to explain the value that the trade provides. 
Leitherer (1961, p. 107) stresses, that in an industrially developed economy, the 
trade cannot be analyzed by itself, separated from production and consumption, 
instead, the trade must be considered as one part in the bridging of mismatches 
between human needs. This vision, mainly based on Erich Schäfer, helped the trade 
to be taken seriously and being seen as equal in relation to production. Such 
approaches evolved parallel to U.S. marketing research, wherein Shaw (1912, pp. 
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703-705), as one of the first, provides a classification scheme of trade functions.22 
This functional point of view and the examination of the marketing or selling of 
goods from the producer's perspective became characteristic for marketing 
literature (Barth et al. 2015, p. 21; Nieschlag et al. 2002, p. 12).23 
Since a producer can decide to sell his goods with or without an intermediary, 
intermediaries are examined in this context as well. In the years after Shaw (1912), 
various catalogs of distribution functions were developed by different authors. 
These functions can either be executed by the producer or delegated to an 
intermediary (Churchill and Peter 1998, pp. 366-370; Kotler and Armstrong 2012, 
pp. 351-356; Rangan et al. 1992, p. 72; Zikmund and D'Amico 2001, pp. 314-316). 
The contribution of Churchill and Peter (1998, pp. 366-370) will serve here as an 
example for such a catalog. They identify the following three categories of 
distribution functions: 
 Transactional functions: buying, selling, risk taking. 
 Logistical functions: aggregation, storing, sorting, physical distribution. 
 Facilitating functions: financing, grading, marketing research. 
 
                                                     
22  Shaw (1912) is thus usually credited as being the father of the functional school 
of marketing thought (Hunt and Goolsby 1988, p. 36; Sheth et al. 1988, p. 53). 
23  MacKenzie and Pearce (1995, p. 73) highlight that “the functional approach 
became so popular, it dominated marketing thought for five decades”. 
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In contrast, the German marketing research, strongly influenced by its 
American roots, employs actor-centered approaches. Meyer (1973, pp. 86–87) for 
example, differentiates between different categories of providers and in this context 
considers the trade as a provider as well. Meyer (1973, p. 86) distinguishes between 
initial supplier (e.g. the initial creation of a product), intermediaries (e.g. 
reproduction) and the end-providers that offer the product to the consumer. He 
also considers others players such as print shops, whose functions is the 
reproduction and conservation of the products. Thus, they are also located between 
production and consumption. Lastly, he points to additional players, such as 
market helpers (polling organizations), market consultants and opinion leaders. 
The marketing literature thus incorporates more players into the analysis, 
especially when compared to the classic trade literature. Increasingly, the 
justification for the existence of the trade is not only measured in relation to its 
contribution to the economy, but justified by comparing a situation with the 
presence of the trade to a situation without the presence of the trade (Gümbel 1985, 
p. 97).  
While the function catalogs from marketing and trade literature illustrate the 
tasks and activities of intermediaries, they do not justify their existence, as they do 
not explain why a fulfillment of these activities by intermediaries is more beneficial 
than a fulfillment by the producers themselves (Tietz 1993, p. 14). For this purpose, 
other approaches and models are necessary. As mentioned previously, Schär (1923, 
p. 194) sees two potential values, namely increased efficiency as well as increased 
effectiveness. The effectiveness is often mentioned in marketing and trade 
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literature but usually only the efficiency gain is examined closer (Churchill and 
Peter 1998, p. 367; Myers 1986, p. 45; Zikmund and D'Amico 2001, p. 315). An 
important source of efficiency gain is highlighted by Alderson (1954, pp. 7-10). He 
points out that on a central marketplace with multiple buyers and sellers, the 
number of necessary contacts can be reduced through intermediaries. Other 
reasons for the more efficient, or more effective, execution of distribution activities 
include advantages through specialization, experience and scale effects (Gümbel 
1985, p. 104; Kotler and Armstrong 2012, p. 342; Sharma and Dominguez 1992, p. 
6; Tietz 1993a, pp. 21). 
Lastly, it has to be noted that in the last decades, transaction cost theory has 
been increasingly applied to determine the advantages of specific distribution 
structures (Tietz 2007, p. 35). However, Alderson (1954, p. 8) already highlighted 
the importance of transaction costs when evaluating distribution channels in 1954: 
“Economic analysis of the factors in the price equilibrium generally rests on the 
assumption that exchange transactions are costless. Marketing analysis directed 
toward an understanding of trade channels must begin with a recognition of the 
costs involved in the creation of time, place, and possession utility”. 
2.2.3 Finance Industry Research on Intermediation 
The concept of intermediation has particularly been applied in the financial 
sector (Allen and Santomero 1998; Bitz and Gunnar 2015; Diamond 1984; 
Greenbaum and Thakor 2007; Merton 1995; Rombach 1993; Schmidt et al. 1999). 
The existence of a Journal of Financial Intermediation also reflects the importance of 
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intermediation in this particular sector. As financial intermediaries do not act with 
material goods, logistical functions reside into the background and thus, no 
function catalogs are created. Intermediation is considered in the context of the 
performance of the market instead. The focus is on the informational level of 
market transactions. Thus, the market design and market organization as well as 
the involved exchange institutions are examined. In this context the term market 
microstructure was coined (Garman 1976, pp. 257; Gerke and Rapp 1994, p. 7; Hirth 
2000, p. 1; Lipson 2003, p. 378; Spulber 1999, p. 3). The research focus is on the 
market organization and its influence on the behavior of market participants, the 
market efficiency and the market results (Bienert 1996, p. 136; Gerke and Rapp 1994, 
p. 6; Hirth 2000, p. 2; O'Hara 1997, p. 1). 
Financial intermediaries are located between supply (investors) and demand 
(borrowers) on financial markets. They are generally described as institutions, 
whose function it is to establish a balance between investments and loans for 
different economic entities (Bitz and Gunnar 2015, p. 4). In contrast to the trade, 
where intermediaries primarily occur in the form of market makers, intermediaries 
in the financial sector occur to a greater extent in the form of match makers 
(Büschgen 1998, p. 34). Among the match makers, agents and brokers can be 
distinguished. They differ from each other in that broker are characterized by a 
higher degree of independence (Eckardt 2002, p. 3). The existence of intermediation 
on financial markets is generally examined in the context of (1) positive transaction 
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costs (Allen and Gale 1988, 1989, 1990; Gurley and Shaw 1960) and (2) asymmetrical 
information distribution (Leland and Pyle 1977; Diamond24 1984). 
The work from Gurley and Shaw (1960) is considered to be an important 
contribution on the functions of financial intermediaries (Hellwig 1991, pp. 36-39; 
Spajić 2002, p. 62). They highlight that financial intermediaries reduce risk through 
diversification and also reduce market imperfections (Gurley and Shaw 1960, p. 
191). Demsetz (1968, p. 35) considers market imperfections in the sense of positive 
transaction costs. He notes that the New York stock exchange reduces transaction 
costs by ensuring the immediate availability of the product and bringing 
transaction partners with compatible needs together. 
In addition to the reduction of transaction costs, intermediaries can prevent 
market failure due to information asymmetries as well. For financial 
intermediaries, this aspect was examined by Leland and Pyle (1977, pp. 371-372). 
They discuss the problem of adverse selection when hidden characteristics are 
present. They come to the conclusion that, based on economies of scale, the quality 
of the product can be more efficiently identified by an intermediary, compared to 
a situation, in which the product is inspected by each individual customer (Leland 
and Pyle 1977, pp. 383-384).25 In addition, Intermediaries can also prevent market 
                                                     
24  In contrast to Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984, pp. 407-409) focuses on 
post-contractual information asymmetries and thus on moral hazards. 
25  Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1995) as well as Allen (1990) examine markets for 
information in this context and show that under certain circumstances, 
information can be gathered by a single party and sold to many investors so that 
the cost is shared. 
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failure, if the transaction would otherwise be considered too costly for many 
customers. Finally, Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993, p. 8) highlight that not only 
economies of scale, but also superior skills in the interpretation of information 
based on experience or specialization, can lead to efficiency gains in bridging 
information asymmetries. 
2.2.4 Real Estate Industry Research on Intermediation  
In addition to research on the trade and on financial intermediaries, 
intermediaries in the real estate industry have received some attention in the past 
as well. Real estate agents are interesting as they do not carry out any production 
or transport function, nor do they buy products at their own risk. They are thus 
purely coordinating match makers (Tietz 2007, p. 37).  
Accordingly, it is the matching function by real estate agents that is primarily 
analyzed. Yinger (1981, p. 591), for example, models the “search-and-match” 
behavior of real estate brokers under the assumptions of uncertainties in regards to 
the number of offers, the number of buyers as well as the compatibility of supply 
and demand. These assumptions acknowledge the high search costs in real estate 
markets due to the high individuality of objects as well as varying buyer 
preferences. However, the value that real estate agents provide is not explained by 
his model (Tietz 2007, p. 37). 
Although Bartlett (1981, p. 85) does not develop a formal model, he does 
consider the reasons for the existence of real estate agents under the 
aforementioned market imperfections. Firstly, he points to the function of real 
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS AND INTERMEDIATION  81 
estate broker as “information broker”. The broker obtains information about the 
available objects and forwards the information to the customers, thus reducing 
information costs for the buyer. In addition, Barlett (1981, p. 86) highlights that a 
real estate agent, in contrast to the seller, has no incentive to pass on whitewashed 
information. If for the broker reputation is critical, there is vice versa even a strong 
incentive to forward only completely accurate information. The contribution by 
Bartlett (1981) thus provides some important explanations for why the use of an 
intermediary, efficiently and effectively, eliminates pre-contractual information 
asymmetries. 
2.2.5 Media Industry Research on Intermediation 
In addition to the previously discussed research strands dealing with 
intermediaries, a substantial amount of literature is also available on intermediaries 
in the media industry. Those either deal with the media industry in general or 
examine specific sectors of the media industry, such as the music sector (Clement 
and Schusser 2009; Pachet et al. 1999; Tuomola 2004; Walter 2007) or the publishing 
sector (Janello 2010; Picot and Janello 2007). 
Wirtz (2012, p. 763; 1995, p. 49) as well as Cunningham and Fröschl (1999, p. 
31), for example, point to the Internet as the enabler of direct contact between 
producers and consumers. They hence predict that certain activities in the 
distribution chain will increasingly be eliminated. Picard (2002, pp. 34-36) examines 
disintermediation and reintermediation of media- and communication companies 
as well. Schumann and Hess (2014, pp. 192-194), on the other hand, identify and 
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differentiate various activities of intermediaries in the media industry. In addition 
to various types of intermediaries, Hermann (2002, pp. 99-102) also differentiates 
between various activities of intermediaries. Hass (2003, p. 48) suspects that media 
companies will increasingly convert to trading intermediaries, while Seufert (2004, 
pp. 63-66) analyses multiple intermediaries in media markets and concludes that 
primarily intermediaries rather than the producers are threatened by the influence 
of technological advancements. Lang (2001, pp. 72-74) uses the term media-
intermediary and focuses on the consequences of disintermediation. Buhse (2004, 
pp. 102-104) and Tuomola (2004, pp. 33-37) are interested in disintermediation as 
well and use the music industry as an example. Finally, Caves (2003, pp. 75-79) 
analyses players that facilitate intermediation between artists and consumers, and 
for him, agencies fulfill that role. 
A particularly noteworthy contribution on intermediation in media markets, 
as highlighted in Chapter 1, is the concept of content intermediation introduced by 
Walter and Hess (2005) and finalized by Walter (2007). Rather than taking the 
traditional view of media companies, such as publishers or TV stations, as 
producers and suppliers of media products such as books and motion pictures, 
Walter and Hess (2005, p. 20) highlight that media companies act as intermediaries 
in media content markets as well. Walter and Hess (2005, p. 20) argue that while 
the role of media companies as intermediaries in media markets has already been 
discussed by other authors, “a profound analysis of intermediation inside the 
media sector has been neglected so far”.  
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Following the example of the trade and marketing literature, Walter (2007, p. 
80) develops a catalog of functions for content intermediation. He distinguishes 
between core functions, support functions as well as social and political functions, 
but only the core functions are examined further. 26 In addition, Walter (2007, pp. 
67-70) introduces a cost framework for the analysis of the functions as well. While 
the general idea of the cost framework is a valuable addition that will find its way 
into the Intermediation Analysis Approach, it also represents one of the main 
limitations of his work. It was already highlighted before that a sole focus on the 
functions of intermediation and changes in transaction cost is not sufficient. 
Consequently, a complete picture of intermediation in media markets cannot 
emerge from Walter’s contribution as well. 
2.2.6 Cross-Industry Research on Intermediation 
In the previous sub chapters the contributions on intermediation from 
specific industries and research strands have been examined. It has to be pointed 
out, however, that some studies exist, which focus on the phenomenon of 
intermediation across industries. To a certain degree, they thus contribute to the 
development of a general theory of intermediation.  
The study Vertical Market Configurations by Baligh and Richartz (1967) is 
considered to be the first major milestone in regards to the development of a 
                                                     
26  Thus, important aspects such as financing and licensing are excluded from his 
analysis and a holistic picture of intermediation cannot emerge. 
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general theory on intermediation (Tietz 2007, p. 38). Baligh and Richartz (1967) pick 
up knowledge from different research strands, but take a National Economics 
perspective. During their investigation, Baligh and Richartz (1967, p. 19) highlight 
the reduction of contact- and communication costs as an essential value that is 
provided by intermediaries.  
 
Fig.4: Contact Reduction through Intermediaries, based on: Gümbel 1985, p.  
 112. 
Baligh and Richartz (1967) assume that every transaction and every exchange 
is accompanied by positive contact- and communication costs. They argue that 
these contact- and communication costs can be significantly reduced by 
intermediaries.27 Since the authors are able to sophisticatedly explain this idea and 
demonstrate it in a formal model, Gümbel (1985, pp. 110-111) refers to it as the 
Baligh-Richartz-Effect. The efficiency gain is highlighted in Figure 4. The efficiency 
                                                     
27  This is essentially the same effect of contact reduction that has already been 
discussed as part of the analysis of the trade literature (Chapter 2.2.1). 
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS AND INTERMEDIATION  85 
gain only occurs if multiple customers want to contact multiple producers, for 
example, to compare products or to negotiate prices. Picot (1986, p. 6) adds that the 
efficiency advantage is greatest in a structure with multiple producers / consumers 
and exactly one intermediary.  
With the rise of the Internet and the emergence of e-commerce28 around the 
change of the millennium, the concept of intermediation received increased 
attention again. In this context, questions about the general persistence of 
intermediaries and tendencies of replacing traditional intermediaries by new 
electronic intermediaries are discussed (Bailey and Bakos 1997; Chircu and 
Kauffman 2000; Chircu and Kauffman 2000a; Giaglis et al. 1999; Klein and Selz 
2000; Picot and Heger 2001). In early studies on the influence of e-commerce on 
intermediation, the role of intermediaries is often strongly reduced (Wigand and 
Benjamin 1995, w/o p.). In later studies, extensive catalogs of functions are 
developed (Sarkar et al. 1995, w/o. p.; Resnick et al. 1995, pp. 289-292; Bailey 1998, 
pp. 33-35; Bakos 1998, p. 35, Wimmer et al. 2000, pp. 409-410). The aforementioned 
catalogs are characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity. They not only differ 
in the level of detail and in their structure, but also partly on the view taken. 29 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the authors assume that due to the better 
availability of information on the Internet, direct contact between supply and 
                                                     
28  Electronic commerce (e-commerce) refers to the support of market-related 
economic activities through information and communication technologies 
(Wigand 1997, pp. 1-16; Wyckoff 1997, pp. 5-10). 
29  Wrobel (2014, p. 41) provides an overview on the aforementioned catalogs. 
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demand increases. This is based on the idea that essential neoclassical assumptions 
in regards to perfect markets are satisfied to higher degree (Palvia and Vemuri 
1999, pp. 118-120). In an extreme scenario, this development would result in a 
situation, in which intermediaries, should pure price competition indeed be 
achieved, would no longer be needed to mediate between supply and demand. 
From a product perspective, it is argued that the Internet, changes information 
services to information products, which equals disintermediation, as people are 
replaced by machines (Bieberbach and Hermann 1999, p. 7). 
To a decline in the relative importance of intermediaries points the 
observation that through the Internet, supply and demand can find each other 
more easily. Entering into direct business relations with each other is easier as well. 
On the other hand, more buyers and sellers meet on the Internet, which should 
strengthen the market position of intermediaries. These discussion can be divided 
into the disintermediation hypothesis (Evans and Wurster 2000, pp. 69-72; Gellman 
1996; Wigand and Benjamin 1995) and the intermediation hypothesis (Malone et al. 
1987; Sarkar et al. 1995).  
Chircu and Kauffman (1999, pp. 109-110) make the valuable contribution of 
integrating the two hypotheses. The two authors developed the so-called IDR-
Cycle, which stands for the three cyclic phases of intermediation, 
disintermediation, and reintermediation in electronic commerce. The IDR-Cycle is 
shown in Figure 5. 
Based on other scientific results and their own field studies, Chircu and 
Kauffman (1999, pp. 109-110) conclude that successful intermediaries in traditional 
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markets are increasingly supplanted (disintermediation) by new electronic 
intermediaries, which they refer to as EC-only intermediaries. This process 
continues until the traditional intermediaries integrate digital technologies into 
their business models (EC-able intermediary) as well. By using other advantages, 
such as financial strength, market position and/or reputation, the traditional 
intermediaries can then strengthen their market position (reintermediation) again 
compared to the purely digital intermediary. 
 
Fig.5: IDR-Cycle, based on: Chircu and Kauffman 1999, pp. 109-110. 
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The critical and equally positive forecast that, while intermediation is 
transformed by information technology, it will not be completely replaced by direct 
contact between supply and demand, is also confirmed by numerous other authors, 
including Bailey (1998), Buhl and Kundisch (2003), Mikdashi (2001), Rose (1999), 
Schmidt et al. (1999) and Westarp et al. (1997). 
As was already highlighted in the introduction of this dissertation, a 
contribution that is particularly noteworthy is the one from Tietz (2007). His focus 
is on the influence of e-commerce on intermediaries in the travel industry and in 
the course of the analysis Tietz (2007, p. 74) identifies (1) the activities of 
intermediaries, (2) the different types of value that intermediaries provide and (3) 
the incentives of the upstream and downstream companies to support the 
intermediary as the main facets of intermediation that have to be taken into 
account. Tietz (2007) thus provides one of the first holistic overviews of all the 
various aspects that have to be taken into account when analyzing intermediation. 
Many of his insights will be picked up during the development of the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach in Chapter 3 and enhanced. This is necessary, 
as the contribution by Tietz (2007) cannot easily be transferred and applied to the 
media industry, not at least due to the strict focus on the influence of e-commerce 
and the travel industry, where physical activities recede into the background. 
2.2.7 Summary 
In the previous sub chapter, literature on intermediation from various 
research strands has been analyzed. The analysis was necessary in order to receive 
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additional insight for the development of the Intermediation Analysis Approach in 
the next chapter. Table 4 provides an overview of the examined research strands 
and highlights the key findings in regards to the development of the analysis 
approach – the theoretical objective of this dissertation. 
 
Tab.4: Contributions from the Research on Intermediation, based on: own 
research. 
It comes as no surprise that the numerous function catalogs that have been 
developed in the various research strands on intermediation are particularly 
helpful for deriving the different activities of intermediaries. Certain research 
strands, for example the trade and marketing literature, particularly highlight the 
activities on the physical level, while other research strands, such as the research 
on financial intermediaries or real estate agents, focus on completely different, but 
Research Strand Contribution Relevant Facet
Trade 
- Justification of the trade by its transaction cost reducing effect
- Function catalogs of the trade
- Identification of two potential benefits provided by intermediaries: 





- Catalogs of distribution functions 
- Transactional functions: buying, selling, risk taking
- Logistical functions: aggregation, storing, sorting, physical distribution





- Risk reduction through diversification
- Reduction of market imperfections
- Reduction of transaction costs





- Importance of information processing capabilities of the intermediary





- Concept of Content Intermediation
- Function catalog
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equally important activities, for example, the informational activities. Thus, with 
the analysis of various intermediaries, a complete picture begins to emerge.  
The activities of intermediaries is however not the only facet of 
intermediation to which the preceding analysis contributed. In regards to the value 
that intermediaries provide and the incentives of up- and downstream companies 
to cooperate with intermediaries, additional insights could be gained as well. 
Particularly noteworthy is the Baligh-Richartz-Effect, which highlights and 
explains how intermediaries reduce contact costs – a fundamental value provided 
by intermediaries.  
Finally, the IDR-Cycle, highlighted as part of the e-commerce literature on 
intermediation, has to be mentioned again as well. While the IDR-Cycle itself does 
not provide any input for the development of the Intermediation Analysis 
Approach directly, it provides a valuable indication for the application of the 
analysis approach. Since an ex-post analysis of intermediation in the motion picture 
industry will be conducted in Chapter 4, the findings by Chircu and Kauffmann 
(1999) might either be confirmed or proven irrelevant for this specific sector.  
2.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter started by pointing out the importance of a robust theoretical 
foundation for this dissertation. This was explained by the multiple facets that have 
to be taken into account when analyzing intermediation and by the fact that these 
facets are covered in a wide variety of research strands. Accordingly, in the 
preceding analysis the theory of the firm and intermediation have been discussed 
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from various viewpoints and in the progress, a sufficient foundation for the 
development of the Intermediation Analysis Approach has been created. 
The individual contributions of each examined research strand in regards to 
the development of the analysis approach have already been summed up in 
Chapter 2.1.5 and Chapter 2.2.7. These results will not be repeated here. However, 
it is still worthwhile to reflect on the overall results.  
Two problems were highlighted in the introduction of this dissertation: (1) 
the flat and diffuse discussion about intermediation in the available literature and 
(2) the lack of a comprehensive theoretical contribution on intermediation in media 
markets. The preceding analysis explains why both these problems exist. Only a 
few other research topics are scattered in or are based on so many different research 
disciplines. In regards to the first point mentioned, it thus comes as no surprise that 
the discussion about intermediation remains diffuse, when typically only 
transaction cost related aspect are included in the analysis. The preceding analysis 
showed that there are many more aspects to take into account. In regards to the 
second point, this dissertation is unique in that it attempts to fill the gap and 
provide a comprehensive theoretical contribution on intermediation in media 
markets. The establishment of the theoretical foundation in this chapter is the first 
step towards such a comprehensive theoretical contribution. The following chapter 
represents the next step. In the course of the development of the Intermediation 
Analysis Approach the various findings of this chapter will be consolidated further, 







3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERMEDIATION ANALYSIS APPROACH 
The theoretical foundation of this dissertation has been established in the 
previous chapter, where the findings from the analysis of the various research 
strands on the theory of the firm and on intermediation have been conveniently 
summed up in regards to their contribution to the research objectives. The focus 
can thus shift towards the first research objective, the development of the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach. The objective now is to consolidate the findings 
from the previous chapter into a holistic approach that can be used in practice.  
 
Fig.6: Steps of the Intermediation Analysis Approach, based on: own research. 
As visualized in Figure 6 and already highlighted in the introduction of this 
dissertation, the Intermediation Analysis Approach consists of four steps. During 
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the first step of the analysis approach, the industry characteristics are examined. It 
comes as no surprise that it is necessary to identify the structure of the industry and 
the intermediaries before they can be analyzed. In addition, Chapter 2 revealed that 
demand characteristics and product characteristics influence the ability of 
intermediaries to add value. These aspects are thus included in Step 1 as well.  
 Tietz (2007, p. 45) highlights the importance of the activities of 
intermediaries, the value they provide as well as incentives to cooperate with them, 
as the main aspects that have to be taken into account when analyzing 
intermediation. This ensures that not only the efficiency and effectiveness are 
considered, but competitive strategic aspects as well. Accordingly, each of these 
aspects will be analyzed in an individual step.  
The questions arises, in what order these aspects have to be analyzed. 
Chapter 2 showed that the more efficient and effective execution of certain activities 
are often highlighted as the main values provided by intermediaries as they 
translate to cost savings for supply and demand. Consequently, if technological 
advancements alter certain activities, the potential for the intermediary to add 
value through efficiency and effectiveness is likely altered as well. Thus, the 
activities (Step 2) will be analyzed before the value of intermediaries (Step 3). 
Chapter 3.4 will highlight the many incentives and disincentives for companies to 
cooperate with intermediaries. Some of these incentives are not linked to the 
activities or the value intermediaries provide at all and are purely company 
specific. However, the efficiency and effectiveness advantages provided by 
intermediaries are generally in the interest of the up- and downstream companies 
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as well. Thus, when the ability of the intermediary to add value is altered (for 
example because certain activities became obsolete), the up- and downstream 
companies are more likely to re-evaluate their incentives or disincentives to 
cooperate. Accordingly, the company specific incentives will be analyzed after the 
value provided by intermediaries in Step 4. 
3.1 STEP 1: RELEVANT INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
An understanding of the industry structure is important before it can be 
analyzed (Giaglis et al. 2002, p. 240). Thus, in a first step, general aspects such as 
the product characteristics, the demand structure as well as the value added 
structure have to be examined, as these factors influence the structure of 
intermediation (Bailey 1998, p. 54; Giaglis et al. 2002, p. 240; Scott 2000, w/o p.). 
These aspects will be highlighted further in the following sub chapters. 
3.1.1 Product Characteristics 
The analysis of the product characteristics is important and effects the ability 
of intermediaries to add value. For example, intermediaries can only reduce logistic 
costs for material, transportable products. A physical product presentation is 
especially relevant for products, which the customer wants to feel, taste or smell 
before making the purchase decision (Jin and Robey 1999, pp. 47-65). For products 
with hidden characteristics, an intermediary can add value by inspecting and 
classifying the product for potential buyers (Tietz 2007, p. 120).  
 
FLORIAN WROBEL  96 
3.1.2 Demand Characteristics 
An analysis of the characteristics of the demand structure is important as 
well, as these characteristics have an effect on how intermediaries can add value. 
A composite demand, for example, increases the potential for a reduction of 
transaction costs through the aggregation of products from different producers. 
The transaction frequency determines to which degree benefits from the Baligh-
Richartz-Effect or through coordination occur. Furthermore, the experience of the 
consumers determines the extent of information asymmetries and whether 
consumers have any specialization disadvantages compared to the intermediary. 
Finally, the heterogeneity of demand has an influence on how useful different, 
parallel existing intermediation structures are (Tietz 2007, p. 120). 
3.1.3 Value Added Structure and Market Participants  
A sound knowledge of the value system and the market participants is 
imperative for the analysis of intermediation as well. For example, only with a large 
number of sellers and buyers, can an increase in transaction efficiency be achieved. 
Whether intermediaries can add value through risk diversification or through 
lower capital costs, depends on the risk-aversion and the access to capital of the 
producers. Low skills in sales and marketing or a lack of knowledge of the customer 
on the part of the producer represent additional reasons for intermediation (Tietz 
2007, p. 120). 
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In regards to the visualization of the value added structure on company- and 
industry level it has to be noted that the basic tools for this have been provided 
decades ago. The prominent value chain model, for example, was introduced by 
Porter in 1985. In subsequent years, Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998) expanded the value 
chain model and introduced the value shop model and the value network model. 
All three models are intended for the visualization and analysis of the value added 
structure on company level (Picot et al. 2007, pp. 211-214). For the analysis of value 
added structure at the industry level, a variety of models exist as well, the most 
popular ones are (1) the value system (Porter 2004, p. 35), (2) the business web 
model (Hagel 1996, p. 6) and (3) the value net concept (Parolini 1999, p. 80).30 
In practice however, especially the value chain model and value system 
model, are used very differently. As Bloore (2009, p. 7) accurately notes “it has been 
conventional to show the value chain or value system as a series of arrows or lines 
going from left to right, with the customer or end-user on the right”.31 This is 
exemplary illustrated in Figure 7.  
                                                     
30  Wrobel (2014, pp. 14-28) provides an analysis and comparison of the 
aforementioned models. 
31  This is reflected in almost every attempt to visualize the value added structure 
of the motion picture industry as well (Wrobel 2014, pp. 61-70). 
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Fig.7: Common Practice in the Visualization of Value Added Structure, based 
on: own research.32 
This approach seems questionable for a variety of reasons33 and it becomes 
evident, that such an approach would neither help with the identification and 
visualization of intermediaries, nor can it reflect the complexity of certain industry 
structures. Accordingly, a different model will be used in the Intermediation 
Analysis Approach. The key features of this model will be briefly highlighted in 
the following paragraphs and explained in more detail in Chapter 4, when the 
                                                     
32  Chapter 4.1.4 will highlight some of the authors that follow this practice of value 
chain / value system visualization. 
33  Wrobel (2014, p. 73) and Crissey (2010, pp. 5-6) discuss many of the reasons why 
the current practice of the use of the value chain or value system model is 
questionable. Some of these will also be highlighted in Chapter 4.1.4 when the 
value added structure of the motion picture industry will be discussed. 
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value added structure of the motion picture industry will be analyzed. A generic 
draft of the model is shown in Figure 8.  
 
Fig.8: Enhanced Value System Model, based on: own research. 
The model carriers many of the features of Porter’s original value system 
model, but differs in a variety of aspects as well. These can be summed up as 
follows:34 
 The inclusion of different value added constellations to accurately reflect 
the activity logic of the value system participants. 
 The introduction of a color coding to highlight intermediaries and 
differentiate among different types of intermediaries. 
                                                     
34  The basis for the new value system model has been developed in a previously 
published work (Wrobel 2014). The value system model as used in this 
dissertation represents an advancement from the previously published model. 
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 The value system participants are described by the major activity they are 
carrying out. 
 The model is further divided into different stages to provide additional 
structure. 
 The model is stretched vertically to further emphasize the complexity of 
certain industry structures. 
3.1.4 Summary 
In the previous sub chapters, the product characteristics, the demand 
structure and the value added structure have been highlighted as relevant general 
industry characteristics that can have an influence on intermediation. Accordingly, 
these elements will be analyzed in the first step of the Intermediation Analysis 
Approach as has been highlighted in the preceding analysis. 
Particular attention was given to the visualization of the value added 
structure at the industry level and the corresponding identification of the 
intermediaries. In this context the first tool of the analysis approach was 
introduced, the Enhanced Value System Model. 
3.2 STEP 2: ACTIVITIES OF INTERMEDIARIES 
The previous sub chapter highlighted various aspects that have to be taken 
into account when analyzing the influence of technological advancements on 
intermediation – the first step of the analysis approach. This sub chapter is 
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dedicated to the second step of the analysis approach – the activities of 
intermediaries. The objective is the development of a template or tool for 
intermediaries in the media industry, which (1) systematically identifies and 
categorizes the activities these intermediaries perform, and (2) allows the 
methodological assessment of the impact that technological advancements have on 
the identified activities.  
The following sub chapters will detail each activity that has been included in 
the model. The activities in the model are based on both, the generic activities and 
functions of intermediaries that have been discussed in Chapter 2, as well as on the 
specific activities and functions of market participants in the sectors of the media 
industry as discussed in the literature on media management (Walter and Hess 
2005; Walter 2007; Wirtz 2012). 
The model of the activities is designed in such a way, that it is neither a purely 
macroeconomic perspective, which would be too abstract, nor a too detailed task-
oriented perspective, which loses sight of the emergence of the market and thus, 
intermediation. In regards to the structuring and grouping of the activities, this 
approach follows Tietz (2007, p. 78) suggestion of dividing activities into three 
activity levels: (1) informational level, (2) legal-financial level and (3) physical level. 
The relevant activities for intermediaries in media markets are illustrated in Table 
5. 
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Tab.5: Intermediation Activity Matrix, based on: own research. 
While the contribution provided by Tietz (2007, p. 78) is of aid in ensuring 
that all relevant activities are captured, structured and grouped in a systematical 
way, it does not help in the actual analysis of each relevant activity. Accordingly, a 
model for the comparative statics analysis of the activities will be developed in 
Chapter 3.2.5, once all activities have been discussed. The comparative statics 
analysis will be conducted on the basis of the cost for the execution of the activities 
in qualitative terms. It is thus necessary to develop a cost framework before each 
activity and their cost influencing factors can be discussed.   
3.2.1 Intermediation Cost Framework 
Chapter 2 highlighted that an essential part of the scientific research on 
intermediation is based explicitly or implicitly on New Institutional Economics and 
transaction cost theory. While its assumptions of opportunistic behavior, 
asymmetrical information and limited rationality are undeniably important, it was 
Informational Level Legal-Financial Level Physical Level
Identification Capital Procurement Aggregation
Selection Licensing Transformation
Inspection and Classification Procurement and Sales Presentation 
Negotiation Support Payment Processing Reproduction 
Information Processing Contract Adjustment Distribution / Repair Processing
Monitoring and Reporting Warranty Processing Preservation 
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already made clear that such a cost understanding cannot capture all factors that 
are relevant for intermediation. This is highlighted by Bailey (1996, p. 398) as well, 
who notes: “While more research is needed to determine the quantitative benefit of 
an intermediary in some markets, it is clear that reduction of transaction costs may 
not be the proper metric”. Bailey (1996, p. 398), by citing the work of Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt (1998, p. 49-51) regarding the productivity paradox, further points out that 
“the metrics that would quantify transaction cost may come from an older market 
paradigm. The newer paradigm of customized goods, reduced delivery time, and 
greater customer satisfaction is more difficult to measure but, as the roles of an 
electronic commerce intermediary may indicate, most important”. 
While thus the focus is not just on transaction costs in the strict sense, it is still 
appropriate to speak of the costs that occur for the transition of goods and their 
reduction. The cost concept used in the dissertation has the following 
characteristics: 
 The cost term used here includes transaction costs, as well as other costs 
incurred when goods or services move from the producer to the customer. 
 Time and effort are included as a cost factor as well, so that, for example, a 
reduction in the time for the fulfilment of a specific activity is equated with 
a relative reduction in costs. 
 The understanding of cost is of relative nature, so no absolute values are 
used. 
FLORIAN WROBEL  104 
 The naming of the different cost types is based on the activities they arise 
from, e.g. identification cost, selection cost or reproduction cost.  
3.2.2 Activities on the Informational Level 
As the discussion in Chapter 2 revealed, particularly the informational 
activities of intermediaries are discussed in a variety of contributions from various 
research strands. The activities on the informational level that are particularly 
relevant for intermediaries in the media industry and thus included in the model 
are highlighted in Table 6. The following sub chapter will examine each activity in 
detail. 
 
Tab.6: Activities on the Informational Level, based on: own research. 
3.2.2.1 Identification 
The activities identification and selection, the latter will be detailed in the next 
sub chapter, can be derived from various research strands, examples include the e-
commerce literature, the literature on financial intermediation as well as media 
management specific literature. Bailey (1998, p. 38) and Bakos (1998, p. 35) define 
the search as one of the most important roles of intermediaries. Search itself can 
logically be divided into the finding of goods (identification) and into choosing 
Identification Negotiation Support
Selection Information Processing
Inspection and Classification Monitoring and Reporting
Informational Level
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERMEDIATION ANALYSIS APPROACH   105 
among the identified goods (selection) (Bailey 1998, p. 38). In the literature on 
financial intermediation, Bitz (1989, pp. 430-431) stresses that lenders and issuers 
must first of all obtain knowledge of the existence of suitable market partners. In 
regards to media markets, Wirtz and Kleineicken (2000, pp. 630-631) describe 
identification as collecting the produced content. Picard (2011, p. 50) is also 
convinced that “information-gathering” will be one of the increasingly important 
features of media companies in the future.  
From the perspective of New Institutional Economics, identification 
corresponds to the screening activity and thus can be helpful to reduce information 
asymmetries (Hermann 2002, p. 107). Search costs are a major cost factor for the 
fulfillment of the identification activity and can be divided into costs for finding 
out prices and costs for the identification of appropriate offerings (Bakos 1997, p. 
1676-1678). Markets, which are characterized by a large number of products, thus 
generate high search cost (Walter 2007, pp. 81-82). 
It has to be noted that some authors sum up the activities identification and 
selection under the heading matchmaking or matching. According to Di Noia et al. 
(2004, p. 9) for example, “matchmaking is the process of searching the space of 
possible matches between demand and supply”. The authors highlight that this 
process is quite different from simply finding, once given a demand, a matching 
supply (or vice versa). Instead, it includes finding all the supplies that can fulfill 
the demand to some extent and identifying the most promising ones (Di Noia et al. 
2004, p. 9). Thus, while identification refers to finding all offers, which can meet the 
demand to a certain extent, filtering out the most promising offerings is quite 
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different as stressed by the authors. Accordingly, selection will be analyzed 
separately in the subsequent sub chapter.  
3.2.2.2 Selection 
The selection activity includes rule-based matching and selection. It is carried 
out with the aim to ensure the suitability of the products for the customer. The 
selection activity can be derived from various research strands, including the trade 
literature and media management literature. Schumann and Hess (2014, p. 193) for 
example, see the selection of content according to the needs of customers as one of 
the essential tasks of intermediaries in media markets. Other authors highlight the 
importance of the selection activity as well (Picard 2011, p. 46; Wirtz and 
Kleineicken 2000, pp. 630-631). Negroponte (1996, p. 84), for example, notes that 
any kind of distribution carried out by media companies must be supplemented by 
filtering and selection processes. 
The actual selection can be divided into a quantitative and a qualitative 
component. In trade literature, Oberparleiter (1955, p. 43) stresses the importance 
of this distinction between the quantity and the quality functions of the trade. While 
the objective of the quantitative component is the suitability of the products 
through the reduction of quantities, the qualitative component attempts to achieve 
the suitability on the basis of quality criteria. Therefore, quantitative selection is 
especially important when there is a large number of products (Oberparleiter 1955, 
p. 43). The cost for the selection activity, similar to the identification cost, increases 
not only with the number of products offered, but also with the heterogeneity of 
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the goods and the required quality standards of the selection process (Walter 2007, 
p. 84). 
3.2.2.3 Inspection and Classification 
The activities inspection and classification refer to the verification of the 
characteristics of goods and the creation of an appropriate classification, especially 
in terms of quality. In addition, it also includes the verification of the properties of 
the transaction partners, such as the willingness or ability of the customer to pay as 
well as the reliability of the producer. The classical method is the personal 
inspection of the product (Tietz 2007, p. 79). However, other mechanisms exist, e.g. 
scoring systems, in which the customers make an assessment after consuming the 
goods (Jallat and Capek 2001, p. 57). These activities could be subsumed under 
matching, but in order to highlight the importance, they are included as separate 
activities in the model.  
The important role of intermediaries in regards to inspection and 
classification is often addressed in literature. This is because an intermediary can 
build up skills in quality assurance and thus become an expert (Biglaiser 1993, p. 
212). In addition, an intermediary is in frequent contacts with the same provider 
and can therefore rate experience goods as well (Biglaiser 1993, p. 212; Resnick et 
al. 1995, p. 290). The costs for inspection and classification increase with the number 
of products and transaction partners to be inspected. The costs are influenced by 
the descriptiveness of the goods and the required quality standard as well. 
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3.2.2.4 Negotiation Support 
Intermediaries can play a mediating role during negotiations, for example by 
moderating the negotiation or by providing bidding mechanisms for pricing (e.g. 
auctions). In addition, intermediaries can design the contract and the 
accompanying documentation as well. Through these activities, intermediaries 
supports the agreement phase of a transaction (Tietz 2007, p. 79). These activities 
have been summed up under the heading negotiation support in the model.  
Negotiation support is performed by match makers and includes the 
facilitation of negotiations or the support of the price determination by other 
means. Market makers, who purchase and sell goods on their own account, conduct 
the negotiations in their own name as well. In both cases, different price 
determination mechanisms are available, including free negotiations, fixed prices 
by the producer and auctions. Numerous authors expect that technology will cause 
a shift between those mechanisms (Bakos 1998, p. 39; Gallaugher 2002, p. 92; Giaglis 
et al. 2002, p. 238; Skiera and Spann 2002, p. 689). The costs for negotiation support 
depend on the type of support required and increase with the complexity of the 
negotiations and contracts.  
3.2.2.5 Information Processing 
In order to process a transaction, certain information flows are necessary, 
such as establishing product specifications or delivery dates. The intermediary can 
coordinate or perform this information exchange (Tietz 2007, p. 79). The 
importance of information processing is particularly highlighted in the information 
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perspective discussed in Chapter 2. The costs for information processing depend 
on the amount of information to be processed, the frequency and the number of 
transaction partners involved. Other important aspect to take into account in this 
regard are security concerns. Depending on the sensitivity of the processed 
information, additional security measures may have to be put in place (Jin and 
Robey 1999, pp. 47-65).  
3.2.2.6 Monitoring and Reporting 
Chapter 2 highlighted that the moral hazard problem can be addressed 
through monitoring from the perspective of the principals or reporting from the 
perspective of the agent. Accordingly, these activities have been included in the 
analysis as well. An intermediary supports the control and adjustment phase by 
monitoring the performance of the contract and reporting the results to the other 
transaction partner. The intermediary thus makes compliance with the contractual 
obligations transparent (Tietz 2007, p. 80). The ease of monitoring, the required 
quality standard and the required expertise to evaluate the performance, are the 
key cost factors that have to be taken into account when assessing the cost for 
performing these activities. 
3.2.2.7 Summary 
In the previous sub chapters, the six informational activities of intermediaries 
in media markets have been discussed in detail. The result of the discussion are 
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summed up in Table 7, which shows the activities on the informational level, 
related cost types and cost influencing factors. 
 
Tab.7: Informational Activities and Cost Factors, based on: own research. 
As illustrated in Table 7, the cost for performing the six informational 
activities are influenced by a variety of factors. The table can be understood as the 





- Amount of products and transaction partners
- Descriptiveness of products
- Distance to products
- Degree of market research required
- Required expertise 
- Required infrastructure





- Amount of products and transaction partners
- Heterogeneity of the products
- Descriptiveness of products
- Required quality standard
- Required expertise 
- Required infrastructure
- Degree of automation / use of ICT
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- Contract complexity
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- Amount of information to be processed
- Amount of involved transaction partners
- Required expertise 
- Required infrastructure
- Required quality standard (e.g. speed)






- Required quality standard
- Ease of monitoring (distance, transparency, etc. )
- Required expertise 
- Required infrastructure
- Degree of automation / use of ICT
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first guidance that aids in the analysis of each activity. In practice, it will likely 
always come down to the degree of automation and the degree to which ICT can 
be used as the key factors. If the degree is low, then the activity likely requires 
human resources and as such, the required expertise has to be considered. Is the 
degree of automation and use of ICT high, then infrastructure cost and security 
aspects play a crucial role for the overall costs of performing the activities. 
3.2.3 Activities on the Legal-Financial Level 
All activities summarized under the legal- financial level have direct financial 
or legal implications for the intermediary. The legal-financial level is therefore 
primarily relevant for intermediaries that act as market makers, because they are 
buying and selling products at their own risk. Thus, the cash flows, in which an 
intermediary is directly involved in, are considered here as well. The activities on 
the legal-financial level that are particularly relevant for intermediaries in the 
media industry are highlighted in Table 8. The following sub chapters will examine 
each activity in detail. 
 
Tab.8: Activities on the Legal-Financial Level, based on: own research. 
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3.2.3.1 Capital Procurement 
If the purchasing of the goods occurs before the sale takes place (or if the 
intermediary must pay the producer, before the producer is paid by the customer), 
the intermediary must have sufficient capital available to finance this time period 
(Tietz 2007, p. 80). In some industries, this period can be very long (Alderson 1954, 
p. 10). Accordingly, the activity capital procurement has been included in the 
model as well. The costs for performing this activity depend on the time between 
incoming and outgoing payments, the associated risk as well as interest rates and 
available capital sources. 
3.2.3.2 Licensing / Procurement and Sales 
Since market makers purchase and sell goods at their own risk, they have to 
determine prices and conditions for the procuring and selling of the goods. Thus, 
the intermediary supports the agreement phase and, from a market perspective, 
the price finding process of a market (Tietz 2007, p. 80).  
An important characteristic of media markets however, is the fact that in 
these markets, not necessarily the media itself, but rather rights to content are 
traded on the basis of contracts (Caves 2003, pp. 79-82; Ünlü 2005, pp. 45-49). 
Accordingly, this activity is primarily referred to as licensing. The cost of 
performing this activity increases with the number of products and transaction 
partners as well as with the desired degree of price differentiation.  
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3.2.3.3 Payment Processing 
From the buying and re-selling of goods at their own risk, two cash flows can 
be identified, in which intermediaries are necessarily involved in. One from the 
intermediary to the producer and another from the customer to the intermediary. 
Since the cash flows go through the intermediary, the intermediary must manage 
and handle them accordingly (Tietz 2007, p. 80). The cost for payment processing 
particularly depend on the required quality standard (speed, security, etc.) and the 
required infrastructure. 
3.2.3.4 Contract Adjustments 
Chapter 2 highlighted that New Institutional Economics acknowledges that 
contracts cannot be created and closed for free, nor can they consider all 
eventualities that may arise after conclusion of the contract. Accordingly, in the 
control and adjustment phase, contract adjustments can always occur. Should an 
intermediary act as a market maker, the intermediary is directly involved in these 
adjustments (Tietz 2007, p. 81). The costs for performing this activity are mostly 
depended on the complexity of the contract and thus, the required expertise. 
3.2.3.5 Warranty Processing 
The discussion of the principal-agent approach highlighted additional 
transaction costs in the sense of agency costs, i.e. in the form of signaling and 
warranty costs on the part of the agent as well as monitoring and control costs on 
the part of the principal. Accordingly, since in addition to contract adjustments, 
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guarantee payments may also occur, which require a direct involvement of the 
intermediary, the activity is included in the analysis as well. Should the goods be 
flawed, the intermediary may be required by law or contract to partially or fully 
refund the purchase price or to cover the repair costs (Tietz 2007, p. 81). Warranty 
processing costs are particularly influenced by the failure rate of the product, legal 
requirements and the required quality standard (e.g. speed). 
3.2.3.6 Summary 
In the previous sub chapters, the activities on the legal-financial level that are 
particularly relevant for market makers, have been discussed in detail. The results 
are summed up in Table 9. 
 
Tab.9: Legal-Financial Activities and Cost Factors, based on: own research. 
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- Failure rate of products
- Required expertise 
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- Required quality standard (e.g. speed)
- Degree of automation / use of ICT
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Just like the informational activities, the costs for performing the activities on 
the legal-financial level are also influenced by a variety of factors as highlighted in 
Table 9. As such, this table also acts as guidance for the analysis of intermediation 
activities. 
3.2.4 Activities on the Physical Level 
The last activity level that has to be examined is the physical level. Activities 
here are only relevant for material goods as opposed to services. The relevant 
activities for intermediaries in the media industry on the physical level are 
highlighted in Table 10. Each of these activities will be discussed in more detail in 
the following sub chapters. 
 
Tab.10: Activities on the Physical Level, based on: own research. 
3.2.4.1 Aggregation  
Aggregation can be understood as the arrangement of products. Aggregation 
can occur in the form of a relatively rigid bundling, e.g. titles on a music CD or 
alternatively, in the form of a rather loose arrangement, e.g. DVDs in a video store. 
In video stores, for example, DVDs are typically arranged according to genre and 
within the genre alphabetically. Through the aggregation of goods in a central 
Aggregation Reproduction 
Transformation Distribution / Repair Processing
Presentation Preservation 
Physical Level
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place, the consumer is given the opportunity to inspect and check the properties of 
the goods before making the purchase (Walter 2007, pp. 87-88). 
Aggregation is identified as an important activity of intermediaries by 
various authors. For example, Hass (2002, p. 26) lists aggregation as a role of 
intermediaries in the media industry and refers to the agents carrying out this 
activity, content bundler. Bundling is identified as a step in several models of the 
media value chain (Hass 2002, p. 19; Schumann and Hess 2014, p. 183). Picard (2011, 
p. 46) does not use the term aggregation, but names “organizing” and “packaging” 
as important functions that are part of the production. Wirtz and Kleineicken (2000, 
pp. 630-631) do not use the term aggregation either, but stress the importance of 
the systematization, classification and packaging of content (Wirtz 2013, pp. 255-
266; Wirtz 2012, p. 79). The aggregation costs are particularly influenced by the 
number of products as well as by their heterogeneity. 
3.2.4.2 Transformation  
From the research on financial intermediation and media management, the 
transformation activity can be derived as another essential activity of 
intermediaries (Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993, p. 8; Bitz and Gunnar 2008, p. 8). 
Transformation describes the adjustment of goods to ensure their suitability in 
regards to their use context. The proximity of transformation to production is 
reflected by Picard (2011, p. 44), who sees transformation as a part of the production 
stage in the value system, where the content is prepared for distribution. In the 
context of this dissertation, however, the primarily difference between production 
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and transformation is, that in the case of transformation the product is not altered 
in its core. Accordingly, transformation is only regarded as an intermediation 
activity, if the product is not altered in its core. 
Transformation can be divided into a content component and a technical 
component. Examples for the content component are summaries, table of contents 
and previews. An accurate description of media products is an important 
prerequisite for the presentation activity and contributes to a reduction in 
identification- and selection costs (Malone et al. 1987, p. 484-486). The content 
transformation is logically very close to production, but, as already discussed, 
differs from production in that the core of the product is not substantially altered. 
Instead, meta-data is extracted, in order to describe the goods. In the case of a 
newspaper article, for example, title, author, and page number in the table of 
contents refer to the actual content. In addition, an article can be supplemented 
with an abstract. For motion pictures, the trailer is the corresponding example. In 
each case, the actual content is reduced to its essential elements in order to attract 
the attention of the potential recipient. The actual product is thereby not changed 
in its essence, but selectively supplemented by describing elements (Walter 2007, 
p. 84). 
The technical transformation, on the other hand, includes format-, 
compression- and resolution adjustments (i.e. versioning), but also the conversion 
from analog to digital media products in general (Gladney 2006, p. 112). Versioning 
refers to the creation of different technical quality levels of the same media product 
to provide it to different target groups at varying price levels (Kahin and Varian 
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2000; Shapiro and Varian 1998, pp. 53-55). Thus, particularly the number of 
different versions required influences the transformation costs. 
3.2.4.3 Presentation 
The presentation activity is important for all markets. However, it is from 
particular importance in media markets due to the immateriality of most media 
products (Walter 2007, p. 94). Presentation incorporates aspects such as the design 
of a DVD cover, a store or a website. Thus, the understanding of presentation in 
this dissertation goes beyond the function described in classic trade literature, 
where it is only considered a non-essential help function (Oberparleiter 1955, pp. 
50-51). Although the term presentation is used in the marketing literature, it is only 
of secondary importance there as well. Nieschlag et al. (2002, p. 444), for example, 
highlight the importance of presentation within the distribution policy and in 
particular the importance of the store design.  
In addition, the literature on media management also examines the 
presentation activity. Picard (2011, p. 50) is convinced that presentation and the 
collection of information will be one of the emerging features of a future media 
company. Wirtz and Kleineicken (2000, pp. 630-631) also highlight the importance 
of the presentation activity. For other authors such as Owers et al. (1998, p. 2) or 
Harries (2002, p. 1) the exhibition stage is one of the significant value added stages 
of the media industry. For Caves (2003, p. 79), promotion in addition to distribution 
is the specialty of media companies such as music publishers. Clement et al. (2009, 
pp. 8-9), who use the music sector as a practical example, argue in a similar manner 
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and point to the marketing function of music labels. The here established 
understanding of presentation merges into, what is often referred to as distribution. 
The term distribution is often used very widely and goes beyond the actual 
shipping in the direction of marketing (Clement et al. 2009, p. 9). Exactly this wide 
understanding in the direction of marketing is logically divided from the 
distribution activity (i.e. logistics, transport) and included in the understanding of 
presentation. The justification for this is the already mentioned particularly high 
importance of the presentation activity due to the immateriality of most media 
products.  
3.2.4.4 Reproduction  
The reproduction is carried out with the aim of ensuring the availability of 
the products and covers the spectrum from simple duplication to mass 
multiplication (Walter 2007, p. 89). It can be easily identified as one of the essential 
activities in media markets. In media management literature, reproduction is often 
combined with the production activity and only rarely explicitly finds its way into 
catalogs of the essential activities of media companies (Hollifield et al. 2015, p. 80). 
Because of their different nature, the primarily technical activity of reproduction is 
included in the activities on the physical level, whereas production is excluded, as 
it is typically a creative activity carried out by producers rather than intermediaries.  
The costs of reproduction include the costs that arise when a copy is created 
from a media product. The effort required to keep the quality difference between 
original and copy low is an important factor contributing to the reproduction cost 
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(Thomas 2002, pp. 83 - 86). Distribution and reproduction together constitute the 
marginal costs of traditional media production (Heinrich 2010, p. 115-149). In the 
case of traditional television, marginal costs are particularly low, because they 
broadcast over radio waves, which equals a simultaneous reproduction and 
distribution nearly free of charge. The media industry in general is characterized 
by a strong fixed cost degression as ratio of one-time costs for the original (first 
copy) and the marginal cost for each additional unit (Linde 2008, p. 22). This 
phenomenon is also known as first-copy-cost effect (Kiefer and Steiniger 2014, pp. 
181-184; Kruse 1996, p. 37). 
3.2.4.5 Distribution / Repair Processing 
Just as the reproduction activity, distribution is also an explicit and essential 
part of most media value systems and is logically located between production and 
consumption (Albarran 2002, p. 14; Hass 2002, pp. 19-20; Owers et al. 1998, p. 2; 
Picard 2011, p. 45; Schumann and Hess 2014, p. 183; Seufert 2004, pp. 64-66; Siegert 
2003, p. 229; Wirtz 2012 p. 79). In literature, distribution is considered to be a classic 
function of the trade through which temporal and spatial distances between supply 
and demand are bridged. The term distribution is often used very broad and goes 
beyond shipping in the direction of marketing, especially when the term 
distribution policy is used (Clement et al. 2009, p. 9). As was already mentioned, 
these two aspects are treated separately in this dissertation, with marketing related 
aspects being considered under the presentation activity. Typical problems 
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associated with the physical distribution are warehousing, returns and limited 
shop space (Clement et al. 2009, pp. 9-12).  
While physical goods are bound to a similarly physical distribution channel, 
the same cannot be said for intangible goods such as financial titles or media 
content. In the past, technical restrictions helped to bind intangible content to a 
fixed medium and thus, could only be distributed from the producer to the 
recipient by physical means. The only exception in classic media markets are 
broadcasters. Here, the content finds its way to the recipient via radio waves as the 
non-physical transmission medium (Walter 2007, p. 93).  
Finally, after completing the distribution, additional logistic activities may be 
required, e.g. if the product must be adjusted or repaired. Accordingly, the activity 
repair processing is included in the scope as well. Repair processing incorporates 
sub tasks such as the roundtrip transportation between intermediary and provider 
(Tietz 2007, pp. 81-82). 
3.2.4.6 Preservation  
The preservation activity refers to the protection and the preservation of 
products. Princeton University (2015, w/o p.) defines preservation as “... the activity 
of protecting something from loss or danger...” Accordingly, the protection of the 
product itself (long term storage) and the protection from abuse (protection of 
rights) can be distinguished. A distinction can also be made between the 
preservation of the original and the preservation of copies (Walter 2007, p. 94).  
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Preservation is seen as a feature of intermediaries, since it does not 
substantially change the product (Meyer 1973, p. 87). For Picard (2011, p. 50) the 
physical and non-physical storage of media products will be a key future task of 
media companies. Caves (2000, p. I)  also highlights the activities “assemble, 
distribute, and store” as essential duties of actors in the media industry. 
In media markets, the durability, which refers mainly to the medium, has a 
strong influence on the preservation activity. The customer is expecting a certain 
durability from the product, e.g. a purchased DVD. However, a DVD (as a carrier 
medium) can get scratched or the paper of the newspaper can deteriorate. 
Broadcast signals on the other hand are fleeting by nature. Thus, the lifetime of 
content is systematically related to the lifetime of the medium (Walter 2007, p. 95). 
Accordingly, the preservation costs are particularly influenced by the durability of 
the medium, the complexity of the preservation and the required quality standard 
(e.g. life span). 
3.2.4.7 Summary 
The results of the preceding analysis of the activities of intermediaries on the 
physical level are highlighted in Table 11. Here the activities, related cost types and 
cost influencing factors are summed up. Unsurprisingly, product characteristics 
such as the heterogeneity of the products or the number of product variations 
impact the costs for performing most physical activities. In addition, the required 
infrastructure (e.g. machinery, trucks or stores) to perform specific activities has a 
particularly strong influence on the costs as well. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERMEDIATION ANALYSIS APPROACH   123 
 
Tab.11: Physical Activities and Cost Factors, based on: own research. 
3.2.5 Intermediation Activity Analysis Tool 
The previous sub chapters discussed the various activities that intermediaries 
in media markets perform. During the analysis different cost types that are 
associated with the performance of the activities have been highlighted and the cost 
influencing factors have been pointed out. The only thing missing now is a 





- Amount of products and transaction partners
- Heterogeneity of the products
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- Required infrastructure
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- Amount of product variations (versions)
- Required expertise 
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- Degree of marketing required
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- Required infrastructure
- Required quality standard
- Degree of automation / use of ICT






- Distance to customers
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- Failure rate of products
- Required quality standard (e.g. speed, security, etc.)
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- Required quality standard (e.g. length)
- Degree of automation / use of ICT
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systematic approach to actually analyze the activities. As highlighted in the 
introduction, the method of comparative statics analysis will be used in this 
dissertation. The generic tool for the comparative statics analysis of intermediation 
activities is visualized in Table 12 below and will be further detailed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
Tab.12: Generic Tool for the Analysis of Intermediation Activities, based on:  
  own research. 
For a comparative statics analysis, the cost for the execution of a specific 
activity (𝐶𝐴𝑛) at two different points in time - before (𝑡0) and after (𝑡1) the 
technological induced changes - have to be compared. From the difference between 
the costs for the execution of a specific activity (∆𝐶𝐴𝑛 = CAn (t1) - CAn (t0)) initial 
results can be derived. Those are likely to effect the intermediary internally. Three 
scenarios can be differentiated: 
1. 𝐶𝐴𝑛(𝑡0)  =  𝐶𝐴𝑛 (𝑡1)  
2. 𝐶𝐴𝑛(𝑡0) >  𝐶𝐴𝑛 (𝑡1)  
Activity (A) Activity Cost (CAn (t0)) Impact of Technological Advancements Activity Cost (CAn (t1))
Activity 1 low
Strong














No change due to …
low
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3. 𝐶𝐴𝑛(𝑡0) <  𝐶𝐴𝑛 (𝑡1)  
 
In regards to the first scenario, if the cost level does not change, the activity 
was not affected by technology and the intermediary will not have to adjust 
internally. In case the second scenario occurs, and the costs after the technological 
induced changes are lower than before, the ability of the intermediary to add value 
by performing this activity may now be limited. Depending on the strength of the 
cost reduction, the up- and downstream companies may decide to carry out that 
specific activity by themselves, if for example the activity can be performed at 
almost zero transaction cost. This in turn would mean that the internal structure of 
the intermediary is impacted, i.e. the intermediary has to reduce its size or 
workforce due to activities becoming obsolete. The opposite is true in the third case, 
should the cost rise. Due to the transaction cost reducing effect of intermediaries, 
this thus gives them the chance to add more value. 
While the comparison of individual activities is interesting and carries some 
value, a complete picture can only emerge when the total costs are examined. The 
total costs for the execution of the activities or cost of intermediation (CI) is the sum 
of the individual costs for performing each activity (𝐶𝐴𝑛). The cost of 
intermediation (CI) before (𝑡0) and after (𝑡1) the technological induced changes can 
be differentiated: 
𝐶𝐼 (𝑡0) = ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑛(𝑡0) = 𝐶𝐴1(𝑡0) + 
𝑥
𝑛=1
𝐶𝐴2(𝑡0) + ⋯ +  𝐶𝐴𝑛(𝑡0) 
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𝐶𝐼 (𝑡1) = ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑛(𝑡1) = 𝐶𝐴1(𝑡1) + 
𝑥
𝑛=1
𝐶𝐴2(𝑡1) + ⋯ +  𝐶𝐴𝑛(𝑡1) 
 
This allows a comparison of the cost of intermediation (CI): 








The difference between the cost of intermediation before and after the 
technological induced changes allows a comparative statics analysis of 
intermediation activities and their changes. Again three scenarios can be 
distinguished: 
1. 𝐶𝐼 (𝑡0) = 𝐶𝐼 (𝑡1) 
2. 𝐶𝐼 (𝑡0) > 𝐶𝐼 (𝑡1) 
3. 𝐶𝐼 (𝑡0) < 𝐶𝐼 (𝑡1) 
 
In regards to the first scenario, if the cost of intermediation do not change, the 
intermediary does not have to expect any substantial changes. In case the second 
scenario occurs, and the costs of intermediation after the technological induced 
changes are lower than before the change, the ability of the intermediary to add 
value may be severely limited. Depending on the specific degree of cost reduction, 
partial or complete disintermediation may be possible outcomes. The opposite is 
true in the third case, should the cost of intermediation be higher after the 
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technological induced changes. This would most likely strengthen the position of 
the intermediary due to the aforementioned transaction cost reducing effect.  
3.2.6 Summary 
The preceding sub chapters were dedicated to the second step of the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach – the analysis of the activities of intermediaries. 
Based on the generic activities and functions of intermediaries that have been 
discussed in Chapter 2 and the specific activities and functions of market 
participants in the sectors of the media industry, the relevant activities of 
intermediaries in media markets have been identified and structured by following 
Tietz (2007, p. 78) suggestion of dividing activities into three activity levels. 
The general nature of each activity has been discussed in the preceding 
analysis and in the course, the factors that influence the costs for performing each 
activity have been highlighted. The analysis showed that there are a variety of 
factors that can have an influence on the costs and as such, the overviews of cost 
influencing factors are helpful guidance in the analysis of the activities. For the 
actual analysis of the activities a generic tool, which allows the conduction of a 
comparative statics analysis, has been developed and described. By combining the 
generic tool with the specific activities of intermediaries in media markets, the 
Intermediation Activity Analysis Tool is created. The tool is visualized in Table 13 
and will be used in the analysis of the motion picture industry in Chapter 4. 
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Tab.13: Intermediation Activity Analysis Tool, based on: own research. 
3.3 STEP 3: THE VALUE OF INTERMEDIARIES 
Now that the general activities of intermediaries in media markets have been 
identified and the tools and guidance for their analysis have been created, the focus 
can shift towards the value that intermediaries provide – the third step of the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach. In this sub chapter, the complex reasons for the 
existence of intermediation will be captured and discussed. As the analysis in 
Chapter 2 highlighted, the contributions on the value provided by intermediaries 
are scattered in various research strands. It thus comes as no surprise that a 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t0) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t1)
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Selection 
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comprehensive, systematic and consistent representation of the value 
intermediaries provide is hardly ever found in literature.35 Even comprehensive 
monographs such as those by Spulber (1999) do not contain all arguments. Spulber 
(1999), for example, does not discuss any competitive strategic reasons for the 
existence of intermediaries at all. However, in order to be able to analyze the impact 
of technological advancements, it is necessary to capture all of the reasons 
systematically in a formal model.  
As previously mentioned and also highlighted by Tietz (2007, p. 83), two 
fundamentally different reasons for the existence of intermediation can be 
distinguished. (1) The creation of value through increased intermediation 
efficiency or -effectiveness. (2) Company-specific incentives to cooperate with 
intermediaries. While the first reason takes a macroeconomic perspective, the 
second reason takes the company specific reasons for the existence of 
intermediation into account. Due to the different nature of these two aspects, they 
will be analyzed separately. The focus in this sub chapter will be on the value 
provided by intermediaries, whereas the following sub chapter (Chapter 3.4) will 
discuss the company specific reasons for the existence of intermediaries.  
In a world without transaction costs or information asymmetries, non-
producing companies such as intermediaries cannot add any value (Churchill and 
Peter 1998, p. 366; Hellwig 1991, p. 35; Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1987, p. 581; 
                                                     
35  Tietz (2007) is the first author who systematically captured the various reasons 
for the existence of intermediaries. 
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Schoder 2000, p. 45; Winkler 1989, p. 300). The only exception to this are transport 
activities as the reduction of transport costs can justify the existence of 
intermediaries in perfect markets. It thus comes as no surprise, that most research 
is based on the fundamental idea that intermediaries can reduce market 
imperfections such as positive transaction costs and information asymmetries. By 
reducing market imperfections, the performance of the market and thus, the market 
result is increased. Based on this observation, Tietz (2007, p. 84) identifies four 
different categories of value provided by intermediaries. These are visualized in 
form of a matrix in Figure 9. 
 








Are production and logistics 
performed efficiently?













Are the transactions performed 
efficiently?
Are the right transactions 
performed?
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The increase of the transaction efficiency and the transaction result was 
already discussed as part of the trade literature, where Schär (1923, p. 194) states 
that an intermediary can carry out the activities either more efficiently and/or more 
effectively. As Tietz (2007, p. 84) points out, the second point relates to the 
effectiveness of transactions (i.e. the transaction result), while the first point 
addresses at what cost and with what efficiency the exchange result is achieved. 
Tietz (2007, p. 84) adds, that in addition to the efficiency and the result of the 
market transactions, production and logistics must be taken into account as well. 
As previously discussed, intermediaries can execute logistical activities on the 
physical level from which an increase in the efficiency of logistics can result. Even 
though intermediaries do not carry out any production activities by themselves, 
they can still have beneficial effects on production (Tietz 2007, p. 84). Weiber (2002, 
p. 146) explains this by pointing to the activities on the informational level of the 
intermediary and the positive effects the sharing of certain information can have 
on the production.  
The objective in the following sub chapters is to match the various sources of 
value provided by intermediaries to each of these four categories. In the course of 
the analysis the positive economic effect will be detailed for each source. This will 
allow the systematical structuring of the findings into a comprehensive tool that 
can be used for the analysis.  
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3.3.1 Increased Transaction Efficiency 
To assess, whether intermediation is beneficial in regards to the transaction 
efficiency, the two structural alternatives, with and without an intermediary, must 
be compared in the tradition of Coase (1937). In general, intermediation is 
beneficial, if the cost savings of buyers and sellers are higher than the entire costs 
of the intermediary (Picot 1986, p. 4). Accordingly, a net efficiency gain must be 
created as shown in Figure 10.  
 
Fig.10: Efficiency Gain through Intermediation, based on: Picot 1986, p. 3. 
A quantification of the net efficiency gain is not possible in practice due to 
the difficult calculation of transaction costs of buyers and sellers. In addition, the 
reduction in transaction costs can also result in savings in effort and time for a 
consumer. The resulting benefit is not only difficult to assess monetarily, but varies 
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between different consumers as well. Due to these difficulties, the advantages and 
disadvantages have to be compared (Tietz 2007, p. 86). 
Lower transaction costs through intermediation arise from the capability of 
intermediaries to perform the transaction activities more efficiently than the buyers 
and sellers can. The basis for the efficiency advantages of intermediaries are the 
Baligh-Richartz-Effect, coordination, standardization, specialization, economies of 
scale and the experience of the intermediary. Other sources of efficiency exist, these 
however are only relevant for market makers, e.g. the reduction of the risk or 
capital cost through risk diversification as well as better access to capital (Tietz 
2007, p. 86). Each of the mentioned sources for efficiency advantages is highlighted 
in Table 14 and will be examined in the following sub chapters.  
 
Tab.14: Value Sources (Transaction Efficiency), based on: own research. 
3.3.1.1 Baligh-Richartz-Effect and Coordination  
The Baligh-Richartz-Effect describes the transaction cost reduction effect of 
an intermediary by reducing the necessary contacts between buyers and sellers as 
was already discussed in Chapter 2. The question arises, what the conditions for 





Scale Effects  Lower Risk Aversion of the Intermediary
Specialization / Experience Lower Capital Cost of the Intermediary
Value Sources (Transaction Efficiency)
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added value is only created, if multiple producers want to contact multiple 
customers, because otherwise no contact reduction is possible (Picot 1986, p. 6). A 
further prerequisite is, that the intermediary is able to aggregate multiple customer-
side transactions to one provider-side transaction and vice versa. To do so, the 
transactions must be sufficiently standardized or in other words, characterized by 
low specificity (Picot 1986, p. 6). In addition, economies of scale must occur during 
this aggregation, i.e. (1) for the intermediary a provider-side contact on behalf of 
two consumers must be less than twice as expensive as two individual contacts and 
(2) for the buyer the contact with the intermediary for the purchase or comparison 
of two goods must be less costly than two single contacts.  
Very similar to the contact reduction and scale-based Baligh-Richartz-Effect 
is the cost reduction that can be achieved through improved coordination. In this 
case, the intermediary does not even have to assume activities at the level of a single 
transaction. For example, it is sufficient if an intermediary initiates and organizes 
markets, so that at certain times and in specific locations potential transaction 
partners can meet (Tietz 2007, p. 88). Examples for this are fairs, festivals, markets 
or malls among others. While this does not result in a contact reduction, the costs 
per transaction are still reduced due to the coordination capacity of the 
intermediary. Despite the conceptual difference of these two effects, the result can 
be very similar in practice (Baligh and Richartz 1967, p. 118; Diamond 1984, p. 407). 
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3.3.1.2 Standardization 
Similar to coordination, standardization can have an efficiency increasing 
effect as well. This is because the setting of standards and rules for the transaction 
process or the form of the traded products can simplify various phases of the 
transaction (Alderson 1954, p. 14; Bosch 2001, p. 7; Picot 1986, p. 5). Comparable to 
coordination, through standardization the costs per transaction are also reduced 
rather than a contact reduction achieved. Ultimately, intermediation is almost 
always connected with standardization as an intermediary is likely to create the 
same processes for the products from multiple vendors (Tietz 2007, p. 89). The 
buyers and sellers become accustomed to these processes and therefore learn to 
efficiently carry out transactions with the intermediary. An interaction with 
different providers would require this learning process every time. An advantage 
may also arise from standardization through technical standards for the exchange 
of information. Protocol standards, for example, reduce transaction costs for the 
communication via the Internet (Tietz 2007, p. 87). 
An advantage through standardization, just as with the Baligh-Richartz-
Effect or coordination, only occurs if customers contact multiple providers or vice 
versa. In contrast to the other two effects though, standardization can add value 
even if the timing of transactions does not coincide. It is sufficient, from the 
perspective of a provider or customer, if transactions occur repeatedly (Tietz 2007, 
p. 89). 
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3.3.1.3 Scale Effects 
While new technologies can increase the efficiency, they are often associated 
with significant initial investment or fixed costs. An intermediary can increase the 
efficiency in both cases. Due to a larger trading volume, these costs can be 
distributed among a higher number of transactions and thus, efficiency is increased 
(Brousseau 2002, p. 358; Gümbel 1985, p. 108; Picot 1986, p. 8). On the informational 
level, information- and communication technologies are relevant examples, on the 
legal-financial level, systems for payment processing and on the physical level, 
storage- and transport technologies. In addition to technologies, the same effect 
occurs with other material resources (e.g. stores) and intangible resources (a brand 
or business relations) as well. An intermediary can only add value here, if buyers 
and sellers cannot achieve economies of scale themselves due to their small size. 
Otherwise the market participants can invest as efficiently in the technology or the 
resources (Tietz 2007, p. 90).  
3.3.1.4 Specialization and Experience 
Similar to the utilization of economies of scale through technology or other 
resources, benefits through specialization or experience increase the efficiency of 
individual transactions as well. However, in this case a particular resource is 
addressed, namely the organizational skills and competences of the intermediary. 
The basic idea has already been outlined as part of the discussion of the competence 
perspective in Chapter 2. Due to carrying out certain activities more often, an 
intermediary builds up special abilities or skills, such as in the interpretation of 
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information, and therefore is able to perform these activities more efficiently 
(Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993, p. 8). 
3.3.1.5 Risk Spreading, Risk Diversification and Risk Avoidance 
Through the buying and selling of goods on their own account, market 
makers assume risks from the producer and hence fulfill an insurance function as 
well (Bitz and Gunnar 2015, pp. 12-13; Brousseau 2002, p. 357; Schmitz 2000, w/o 
p.). The same is also true on the customer-side, because risks can exist for the 
customers as well, e.g. uncertainty whether the expected benefits result from the 
transaction (Sarkar et al. 1995, w/o p.). Through contractual agreement of 
guarantees an intermediary can assume an insurance function. Possible payment 
defaults pose an additional risk, which intermediaries can assume (Resnick et al. 
1995, pp. 289-304). The assuming of risk by the intermediary can result in a 
reduction in risk costs and hence, in an increase in transaction efficiency, since the 
risk costs of market participants can be viewed as part of the transaction costs 
(Bienert 1996, p. 29; Clemons et al. 1993, p. 15). Three sources for risk reduction 
through intermediation can be identified (Tietz 2007, p. 92): 
 Risk spreading. 
 Risk diversification. 
 Lower risk aversion of the intermediary. 
 
An intermediary often trades with a variety of different products or in 
multiple markets. Thus, the spreading of risk is based on the law of large numbers 
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(Alderson 1954, p. 25; Brousseau, 2002, p. 359; Picot 1986, p. 7; Spulber 1999, p. xviii; 
Varian 2011, p. 254; Wimmer et al. 2000, p. 409). The trading of a variety of different 
products or trading on multiple markets can have a risk diversification effect as 
well. This occurs, for example, if there is a negative correlation between the 
demands for various products (Varian 2011, p. 254). In addition, the producer and 
intermediary may have different risk preferences as well (Casson 2001, p. 89). If the 
risk aversion of the producer is more pronounced than the aversion of the 
intermediary, a transfer of risk to the intermediary would result in an improved 
allocation of risk and lower risk costs. This results from work by Blair and 
Kaserman (1978, p. 271; 1983, p. 93), who have derived efficiency advantages of 
vertical integration from the risk aversion of the producers.  
3.3.1.6 Lower Capital Cost of the Intermediary 
The buying and selling of goods on their own account cannot only be 
connected with an insurance function, but also with a financing function. For the 
provider this is the case, if the payment from the intermediary to the provider 
occurs earlier than the payment from the customer to the intermediary (Alderson 
1954, p. 10; Baligh and Richartz 1967, p. 74). Intermediaries can assume a financing 
function on the customer-side as well, i.e. a loan for a car purchase (Myers 1986, p. 
46; Zikmund and D'Amico 2001, p. 320). In order for an efficiency increase to occur 
from the financing by an intermediary, the capital cost of the intermediary must be 
lower than the capital cost of the supplier or the buyer (Tietz 2007, p. 92). 
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3.3.1.7 Summary 
This sub chapter began by pointing out that through intermediation lower 
transaction costs arise. This is based on the ability of the intermediary to perform 
the transaction activities more efficiently than the buyers and sellers can. Each 
source for the efficiency advantages of the intermediary has been analyzed and the 
requirements or influencing factor for each source have been identified. The results 
are summed up in Table 15. 
 
Tab.15: Value Sources (Transaction Efficiency) and Requirements, based on:  
  Tietz 2007, p. 87. 
In addition, other sources of efficiency have been examined as well. These 
however are only relevant for market makers, who purchase and sell goods on their 
own account. The sources for an increase in transaction efficiency through market 
makers as well as the requirements or influencing factors for each source are 
Value Source Value Requirements
Baligh-Richartz-Effect 
Reduction of the number of 
transaction through aggregation
- Large number of providers and customers
- Scale effects through the aggregation of supply and
  demand
- Low number of intermediaries
Coordination
Reduction of the cost per transaction 
through coordination
- Large number of providers and customers
- Large cost reduction per transaction through coordination
- Low number of intermediaries
Standardization
Reduction of the cost per transaction 
through standardization of the 
transaction process
- Large number of providers and customers
- Products / Processes originally differ per provider, but a 
  standardization is possible
Scale Effects
Reduction of the cost per transaction 
through investments in efficiency 
increasing technology or other 
material resources
- High investments or fix cost are required for efficiency
  enhancing technologies or other material resources
- Size of provider and customers is too small to create an 
  efficiency advantage through technology 
Specialization / Experience 
Reduction of the cost per transaction 
through skills and capabilities or other 
immaterial resources
- Skills and capabilities are relevant for the efficiency
- Strong learning effects / high investments are required to
  build up skills and capabilities
- Size of provider and customers is too small to build up
  skills  and capabilities or other immaterial resources
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summed up in Table 16. Similar to the cost influencing factors that have been 
discussed in Step 2, the requirements or influencing factors for each value source 
can also be understood as guidance for the analysis of the value sources in a specific 
use case. 
 
Tab.16: Value Sources (Transaction Efficiency - Market M.) and Requirements,  
  based on: Tietz 2007, p. 87. 
3.3.2 Increased Production- and Logistic Efficiency 
Intermediation may not only increase the efficiency of the transaction, but 
also the efficiency of production and logistics. The relevant value sources, which 
enable intermediaries to increase the efficiency of production and logistics, are 
illustrated in Table 17 and will be discussed in detail in the following sections. 
 
Value Source Value Requirements
Risk Spreading
Reduction of risk costs through the 
distribution of the risk on many 
different products and guarantees 
towards suppliers and customers.
- Specialized suppliers/customers with no possibilities to
   spread the risk
- Suppliers/customers are risk averse
Risk Diversification
Reduction of risk costs through taking 
over of risks for different goods with a 
negatively correlating demand.
- Negative correlation between the demand of different
   goods
- Multiple specialized provider, which cannot practice risk
  diversification as efficient
 Lower Risk Aversion of the 
Intermediary
Reduction of risk costs through the 
transfer of risk from the risk averse 
provider to the less risk averse 
intermediary.
- Risk aversion of provider is higher than the aversion of the
  intermediary
Lower Capital Cost of the 
Intermediary
Reduction of capital cost through 
financing the time between production 
and consumption at lower capital cost
- Capital cost of the provider/customer are higher than the 
   capital cost of the intermediary
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Tab.17: Value Sources (Production- and Logistic Efficiency), based on: own  
  research. 
3.3.2.1 Inter-company Coordination / Market Research 
Although intermediation, by definition, does not include any production 
activities, intermediaries can reduce production costs through inter-company 
coordination and an improved knowledge of the demand. Efficiency benefits in 
production can be achieved through inter-company coordination, e.g. in cases of 
composite demand. Tietz (2007, p. 93) provides an example from the travel 
industry. The two services transport and accommodation must be matched for a 
vacation trip. By organizing the bus transfer between airport and hotel, a package 
tour operator reduces the production costs. This increase in efficiency can be 
achieved without the intermediary carrying out the transfer directly. The efficiency 
increase emerges alone from the coordination capacity of the intermediary. The 
example shows that a trade-off or a substitution relationship between production 
and transaction costs can exist (Gümbel 1985, p. 171). 
An intermediary conducts market research as part of the identification 
activity. Due to size, specialization and experience, the intermediary can often 
perform this activity more effectively than the producers. Should the intermediary 




 Market Research Storage
Value Sources (Production- / Logistic Efficiency)
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optimize production and thus increase the efficiency (Picot 1986, p. 7). It must be 
noted that a forwarding of this information can also occur implicitly through 
buying and selling orders (Tietz 2007, p. 93). 
3.3.2.2 Logistics 
By handling logistics and the associated information processing, an 
intermediary can lower transport costs as well (Gümbel 1985, p. 106; Tietz 1993, p. 
17). This is based primarily on the Baligh-Richartz-Effect in conjunction with 
economies of scale through efficiency-enhancing technologies. Thus, a trade-off 
between the benefits from a contact reduction, on the one hand, and low processing 
time and storage costs, on the other hand, can exist. It should be noted, that the 
reduction of transport costs is difficult, if product-specific means of transportation 
are required and, hence, no standardization is possible (Rangan et al. 1992, p. 73). 
The transport costs can be reduced without the intermediary carrying out the 
logistics activities directly (Gümbel 1985, p. 108). It is sufficient that the 
intermediary coordinates the logistics (Picot and Heger 2001, p. 132). 
3.3.2.3 Storage 
An intermediary can reduce storage costs, if storage activities are performed 
for multiple vendors, and economies of scale can be exploited through the use of 
more efficient technologies by the intermediary (Gümbel 1985, p. 108). However, 
intermediation does not necessary create a reduction in storage costs, because 
additional temporary storage may be required (Baligh and Richartz 1967, p. 46). 
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Whether an increase or a reduction of storage costs results from intermediation, 
therefore significantly depends on the alternative scenario. If, in a world without 
intermediaries, the providers would create interim storages themselves, a 
reduction of storage costs can arise through intermediation. If, however, the 
providers would otherwise do without any interim storage, for example in the 
context of just-in-time production, an increase of storage costs can be expected 
(Tietz 2007, p. 94). 
3.3.2.4 Summary 
An intermediary can reduce production-, transport- and storage costs. Thus, 
intermediation cannot only increase the efficiency of the transaction, but the 
efficiency of production and logistics as well. Table 18 highlights the discussed 
value sources, which can lead to a reduction of production-, transport- and/or 
storage costs. The requirements for each value source are also highlighted.  
 
Tab.18: Value Sources (Production- and Logistic Efficiency) and Requirements,   
  based on: Tietz 2007, p. 87. 
Value Source Value Requirements
Inter-company 
Coordination
Reduction of Production cost
- Inter-company coordination is necessary (e.g. composite
  demand)
- Intermediary has coordination skills and capabilities
 Market Research Reduction of Production cost
- Intermediary conducts market research (more effective)
- Market research is shared with provider 
- Market research is relevant for product development /
  production processes
- High credibility of the communicated information
Logistics Reduction of Transport cost
- High number of providers and customers
- Intermediary employs efficiency-enhancing technologies
- No product specific means of transportation are required
- Intermediary has coordination skills and capabilities
Storage Reduction of Storage cost
- High number of providers and customers
- Intermediary employs efficiency-enhancing technologies
- No product specific means of storage are required
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3.3.3 Increased Transaction Result 
In addition to the increase of the transaction- and production efficiency, an 
intermediary can also improve the result of the transaction, i.e. the exchange result. 
The relevant value sources for this value category are illustrated in Table 19. As a 
criterion for the determination of the optimal exchange result, the allocation 
efficiency as well as the associated evaluation- and information efficiency can be 
used (Tietz 2007, p. 94). However, before it can be discussed how effective 
intermediation can increase allocation-, assessment-, and information efficiency, 
the relationship between exchange result and more efficient intermediation will be 
explained in the following sub chapter.  
 
Tab.19: Value Sources (Transaction Result), based on: own research. 
3.3.3.1 Transaction Efficiency  
There is a close link between the already discussed transaction efficiency and 
the transaction result. Increased transaction efficiency, due to the enabling of cost 
reductions, already represents a value by itself. But, in addition to, or instead of 
reducing transaction costs, can also lead to a higher performance of the market and 
a better exchange result in the sense of allocation-, evaluation- and information 
efficiency (Bienert 1996, p. 31; Peiseler 1990, p. 94). A higher efficiency in the search 
Transaction Efficiency Market Power Reduction
Effective Information Processing 
Value Sources (Transaction Result)
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for information, for example, leads to a higher evaluation- and information 
efficiency and increases the chances of finding the most appropriate transaction 
partners (Tietz 2007, p. 95). 
 
Fig.11: Transaction Efficiency and the Number of Transactions, based on: Tietz 
2007, p. 96. 
If a reduction in transaction costs occurs, either company internal or on the 
customer side, then the reduction generally leads to an increase in the volume of 
trade. In the case of a typical demand curve shown in Figure 11, some transactions 
will always fail due to prohibitive transaction costs. A reduction in transaction costs 
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leads to a reduction in the overall price and thus an increase in the number of 
transactions (Tietz 2007, p. 95).36  
For the failure of transactions due to prohibitive transaction costs, several 
examples can be found. For example, inspection costs can be too high if the product 
is far away. For rare, specific trade objects the search costs to find suitable 
transaction partners may be too high. Food can cause costly waiting costs, if the 
store shelves are empty. In these cases, an intermediary can add value by lowering 
transaction costs (thus reducing the price) and the corresponding increase in the 
number of customers (Spulber 1999, p. 48). 
3.3.3.2 Market Power Reduction / Effective Information Processing  
Improved transaction results can be achieved not only through more 
efficient, but notably through more effective intermediation as well. Although 
more effective intermediation does not increase the efficiency of a transaction, other 
market imperfections are eliminated and thus, the exchange result is improved. 
Two major market imperfections or effects can be differentiated: (1) the 
neutralization of market power as well as (2) the elimination of information 
asymmetries. These are illustrated in Table 20. By reducing or neutralizing market 
power, intermediaries can minimize monopoly rents. Intermediaries do this by 
aggregating demand and exploiting the increased negotiating power when 
                                                     
36  It is assumed, that due to the presence of sufficient competition, the cost 
reduction leads to a corresponding price reduction. 
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purchasing goods (Bailey 1998, p. 36; Bose and Pingle 1995, p. 251). A variety of 
different intermediaries add value this way, particularly market makers such as the 
trade. To conduct a transaction by employing an intermediary is particular 
interesting for buyers with low bargaining power, while market participants with 
high market power will gain no advantage in this respect (Bose and Pingle 1995, p. 
251).  
 
Tab.20: Value Sources II (Transaction Result), based on: Tietz 2007, p. 97. 
In addition to market power, information asymmetries are another cause of 
market failures (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2013, p. 852). The efficient bridging of 
information asymmetries was already examined in Chapter 3.3.1, where the focus 
was on the transaction cost reducing effect of intermediaries. As mentioned before, 
transaction costs can even be prohibitive, so desirable transactions do not take 
place. Although the effect is ultimately similar and a distinction can be difficult in 
practice, it is necessary to separate an additional case: a situation in which 
information asymmetries are not surmountable for providers or buyers, for 
Market Imperfection Description Sources for increased effectiveness
Market Power
Reducing monopoly rents by taking over the 
negotiations
- Aggregation of supply and demand
Preventing adverse selection or hidden 
characteristics through the increased 
effectiveness of the inspection and classification 
activities
Price determination through moderation or the 
buying and selling of goods (market maker)
Reducing hidden intentions through taking over 
of the processing
Preventing moral hazards or hidden 




- Superior skills and capabilities in information 
   gathering through specialization and
   experience
- Higher trust in the communicated information 
   through neutrality, objectivity and reputation
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example due to confidential information. To eliminate the problem of this 
transaction an increase of the efficiency is not sufficient, rather the effectiveness 
must be increased. In order to effectively eliminate information asymmetries, an 
intermediary needs to have two capabilities (Tietz 2007, p. 98): 
 Effective information gathering. 
 Effective communication. 
 
In regards to the first point, an intermediary must be able to gather 
information more effectively than the transaction partners, e.g. through superior 
abilities, skills and knowledge resulting from specialization and/or learning effects. 
In addition, and this addresses the second point, an intermediary needs to be 
capable of communicating this information more effectively as well. This is the 
case, when transaction partners have greater confidence in the information 
received from the intermediary. The higher trust and credibility stems from the 
intermediary’s neutral position and associated objectivity as well as from the 
intermediary’s better ability and higher incentive to maintain and protect his 
reputation. To eliminate information asymmetries, both conditions must be met. 
As will be explained below, an intermediary can thus fix specific information 
asymmetries during a market transaction (Tietz 2007, pp. 98-99): 
 Adverse selection. 
 Transaction aborts. 
 Hidden intentions. 
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 Moral hazard. 
 
An intermediary supports the initiation phase of a transaction through the 
following activities: identification, selection, inspection/classification and 
presentation. Over time, the intermediary can develop special skills in regards to 
all these activities, due to specialization and experience, and thus can increase the 
effectiveness (Casson 2001, p. 88). The important role of intermediaries in regards 
to inspection and classification is often addressed in literature. This is because the 
intermediary can build up skills in quality assurance and thus becomes an expert 
(Biglaiser 1993, p. 212). Furthermore, an intermediary is in frequent contact with 
the same provider and can therefore rate experience goods as well (Biglaiser 1993, 
p. 212; Resnick et al.  1995, p. 290). In addition to the reasons for the more effective 
gathering of the true product features as discussed before, an intermediary can also 
communicate these product features with a larger degree of trust: firstly, due to its 
neutrality37 and secondly through its incentives and its ability to build up 
reputation38 (Bartlett 1981, p. 85; Bailey 1998, p. 39; Biglaiser 1993, p. 212; Picot 1986, 
p. 7). Through the more effective evaluation and more credible communication of 
                                                     
37  The neutrality gives the classifications created by intermediaries more 
credibility as they do not market their own product (Tietz 2007, p. 99). 
38  An intermediary can build up a reputation easier than a producer as the 
intermediary usually has the more intense and longer-lasting customer 
relationships (Tietz 2007, p. 99). 
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the true product quality39, the evaluation- and information efficiency can increase 
and market failure due to adverse selection can be prevented (Bailey 1998, p. 39; 
Biglaiser 1993, p. 212; Garella 1989, p. 395; Leland and Pyle 1977, p. 383; Richter and 
Bindseil 1995, p. 140; Spulber 1999, p. 171).  
With regard to preventing transaction aborts, it has to be noted that on 
imperfect markets, the price determination process can also conclude 
unsuccessfully due to a lack of transparency of supply and demand (Bailey 1998, 
p. 37; Spulber 1999, p. 27).40 This problem can, for example, occur in the context of 
negotiations about unique and customized products as well as information 
products or other products with high fixed costs (Resnick et al. 1995, p. 291). 
Intermediaries can increase the effectiveness of the price determination process, so 
that the conduction of transactions is promoted (Bailey 1998, p. 37; Brousseau 2002, 
p. 362; Spulber 1999, p. 117; Wimmer et al. 2000, p. 409). An intermediary has two 
basic options: (1) supporting negotiations between provider and customer as a 
match maker or (2) the buying and selling on its own account as a market maker. 
As match makers, intermediaries do not perform negotiations by themselves, but 
rather only support them. For this purpose an intermediary can assume the role of 
                                                     
39  In addition to the product properties, the properties of the transaction partner 
can be more effectively revealed as well (Schoder 2000, p. 60). 
40   This is the case, if the maximum willingness to pay of the customer is not 
transparent for the producer and vice versa, the opportunity cost of the producer 
are not transparent for the customer. Both then have an incentive to signal a 
lower willingness to pay or higher opportunity costs, so that an adequate price 
cannot be found and negotiations fail (Spulber 1999, p. 119; Wimmer et al. 2000, 
p. 409). 
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a moderator and thus increase the probability of success of the negotiations (Picot 
1986, p. 7). Similar to the avoidance of adverse selection, the neutrality and 
associated trust of the intermediary also plays an important role in these cases. In 
addition, specific skills are often required as well, e.g. moderation- or translation 
skills. Furthermore, an intermediary can employ price determination mechanisms, 
for example an auction platform such as eBay, that are not always possible when 
buyers and sellers trade directly with each other (Bakos 1998, p. 36; Resnick et al. 
1995, p. 291). A market maker can support the process of price determination 
through the buying and selling of goods on its own account (Spulber 1999, p. 27). 
On the basis of specialization, experience and market knowledge an intermediary 
can often better assess supply and demand, and thus set or negotiate prices 
accordingly (Tietz 2007, p. 100).  
Effective intermediation can also increase the transaction result by mitigating 
hidden intentions, i.e. unknown intentions of the transaction partner. For example, 
it is possible that the provider fails to deliver the contractual performance despite 
already being paid by the customer, or vice versa, the customer doesn't pay a 
performance already rendered. An intermediary may have a specialization or 
experience advantage, if the intermediary collaborates frequently with the same 
suppliers or buyers and therefore knows them better. In these cases, the 
intermediary can communicate the information about the transaction partners 
more credibly (Tietz 2007, p. 100). In addition, an intermediary can also assume a 
fiduciary function. This is the case, when the buyer wants to minimize the risk that 
a paid good is not delivered and thus transfers the amount to the intermediary with 
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the instruction to only arrange the transfer of the money to the provider after the 
goods have been received. This only works if both, seller and buyer, have 
confidence in the intermediary (Schoder 2000, p. 57). In addition to the problem of 
non-performance, additional problems may arise through hidden intentions, 
which can also be solved by intermediation. For example, there may be the risk that 
the transaction partner improperly uses or shares information, such as credit card 
information, that was disclosed during the transaction (Schoder 2000, p. 61). An 
intermediary can act as a trusted third party and also minimize the risk by taking 
over the information processing. 
Finally, an intermediary can help to avoid moral hazards. Moral hazards are 
created by hidden action and hidden information. They can be addressed by an 
intermediary by increasing the effectiveness of monitoring and reporting 
(Diamond 1984, p. 393; Spulber 1999, p. 256). The reasons, why an intermediary can 
perform the monitoring of the transaction partners more effectively, are based on 
the same argumentation in regards to the more effective gathering and 
communicating of information as was already previously discussed.  
3.3.3.3 Summary 
In addition to improving the transaction efficiency, the improvement of the 
transaction result through intermediation is often discussed in literature as well. 
The sources of value that can lead to an increased exchange result are visualized in 
Table 21. Just as before, the requirements or influencing factors for each value 
source are displayed as well. 
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Tab.21: Value Sources (Transaction Result) and Requirements, based on: own  
  research. 
3.3.4 Increased Production Result 
Tietz (2007, p. 101) highlights that the discussion of the value added by 
intermediaries through efficiency and effectiveness requires to take an 
improvement of the production result into consideration as well. He identifies two 
potential effects: (1) increased quality pressure and (2) improved identification of 
customer needs. These are illustrated in Table 22 and will both be explained in the 
following two sub chapters.  
 
Tab.22: Value Sources (Production Result), based on: own research. 
 
Value Source Value Requirements
Transaction Efficiency Increased Exchange Result 
- A reduction in transaction costs leads to a reduction in the




Increased Exchange Result 
- Intermediary must be able to gather information more
  effectively than the transaction partners
- Intermediary must be capable of communicating 
  this information more effectively
Market Power Reduction Increased Exchange Result 
- Intermediary must reduce or neutralize market power of
   provider / customer
- Aggregation of demand / supply for increased bar gaining
  power
- Market participants with low market power cooperate 
  with the intermediary
Increased Quality Pressure Improved Identification of Customer Needs
Value Sources (Production Result)
FLORIAN WROBEL  154 
3.3.4.1 Increased Quality Pressure 
As discussed in the previous section, adverse selection can be avoided 
through intermediation, because an intermediary is better able to identify and 
communicate the true product properties. This in turn, results in an increased 
incentive for the provider to offer high quality products, thereby increasing the 
average quality of the goods offered in the market (Biglaiser and Friedman 1994, p. 
510; Tietz 2007, p. 101). 
3.3.4.2 Improved Identification of Customer Needs 
In particular the marketing literature on intermediation highlights that 
intermediaries typically conduct market research (Churchill and Peter 1998, p. 367; 
Kotler and Armstrong 2012, p. 466). As already mentioned, an intermediary can 
often better identify customer needs due to the higher number of customer 
contacts, in particular, if the producer is small or distributes the products on a 
variety of heterogeneous markets. Should the intermediary share the information 
regarding the customer preferences with the producers, they can optimize their 
production not only in terms of efficiency, but in regards to the result as well (Picot 
1986, p. 7; Tietz 2007, p. 102). 
3.3.4.3 Summary 
The preceding sub chapters looked at the improvement of the production 
result as the final category of value provided by intermediaries. While value of this 
kind usually receives little attention in literature, two relevant value sources have 
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been identified. These are highlighted in Table 23 as well as their influencing factors 
or requirements.  
 
Tab.23: Value Sources (Production Result) and Requirements, based on: own 
  research. 
3.3.5 Conflicts between Categories 
The previous discussion has shown that the value through more efficient or 
more effective intermediation can be visualized in a matrix with four categories. It 
should be noted that trade-offs arise. Some of those trade-offs have already been 
mentioned in the previous sub chapters, additional trade-offs can be identified as 
well. The key trade-offs will thus be discussed further in the following sections. 
3.3.5.1 Convenience vs. Intermediation Cost  
Uncertain demand creates a substitution relationship between the logistics 
costs (especially storage costs) and the waiting costs of the customer as for the 
immediate availability of products, these must be stored in close proximity to the 
customer (Demsetz 1968, p. 35; Spulber 1999, p. 48). This trade-off is a prominent 
Value Source Value Requirements
Increased Quality Pressure Increased Production Result
- Intermediary must be able to gather information more
  effectively than the transaction partners
- Intermediary must be capable of communicating 
  this information more effectively
Improved Identification of 
Customer Needs
Increased Production Result
- Small producer or products distributed on a variety of
  heterogeneous markets
- Intermediary conducts market research (more effective)
- Market research is shared with provider 
- Market research is relevant for product development /
  production processes
- High credibility of the communicated information
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example of a basic trade-off, namely between a minimum transaction duration or 
high convenience from the point of view of one transaction partner and the lowest 
possible monetary intermediation costs. The reduction of time and effort for the 
transaction partners requires additional efforts on the part of the intermediary 
(Tietz 2007, pp. 103-104). The bundling of products can, for example, increase the 
convenience for the consumer, but also requires additional activities. An 
assessment of this trade-off is difficult, because, apart from the already difficult 
monetary valuation of time and effort, the assessment differs between various 
market participants as well. Not every transaction partner is equally willing to 
incur higher costs for a reduction in the waiting period or for an increase in 
convenience. The actual product in question plays a role as well. A consumer is 
generally more likely to be willing to wait for a piece of furniture than for food. 
However, this also means that depending on the respective willingness to pay for 
increased convenience, a certain form of intermediation is only advantageous in 
specific customer or product segments (Tietz 2007, p. 104). 
3.3.5.2 Lower Transaction Cost vs. High Effectiveness of Intermediation  
Another fundamental conflict can be identified between the efficient and 
effective performance of intermediation activities. This conflict has already been 
mentioned during the discussion of the relationship between transaction efficiency 
and improved exchange results. An increase in the effectiveness often requires a 
more intensive execution of activities or even additional activities, so that 
additional costs such as costs for the disclosure of private information or for 
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building up a reputation can occur. Thus, the benefits of an increased effectiveness 
must be compared with the additional transaction costs. Again, a quantitative 
comparison proves difficult as the same problem arises: the increased effectiveness 
does not create the same benefit for all customers (Tietz 2007, p. 104). 
3.3.5.3 Transaction Efficiency vs. Production Efficiency and -Effectiveness 
The goal of low transaction costs cannot only be in conflict with a high 
transaction efficiency, but also with efficient and effective production and logistics 
(Tietz 2007, p. 104). As described in previous sections, an intermediary can increase 
the production efficiency or effectiveness through certain coordination activities, 
e.g. the identifying and forwarding of customer needs. These additional activities 
are not for free, so that another trade-off might occur (Gümbel 1985, p. 171). 
3.3.5.4 Transaction Efficiency vs. Parallel Intermediation Structures  
Previous discussions revealed that intermediation may only represent an 
advantage for certain market participants, such as when several customers have 
different degrees of bargaining power or increased convenience produces a 
different benefit among different consumers. Standardization is another example, 
since the standard introduced by the intermediary may not necessarily reflect the 
preferences of each customer. The examples show that with heterogeneity of 
demand, there is no intermediation structure that is optimal for all market 
participants. This is an argument for the creation of several different parallel 
intermediation structures. Each transaction partner can then select the option that 
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suits them the best. It is important to note that in those cases some advantages, such 
as those based on the Baligh-Richartz-Effect, would be reduced, because an optimal 
structure consists of only a few intermediaries and ideally, only one (Picot 1986, p. 
6). Parallel structures usually incorporate a duplication of activities. Thus, there is 
a trade-off between a high transaction efficiency on the one hand, and the benefits 
of the differentiation of intermediation structures on the other hand (Tietz 2007, p. 
105). 
3.3.6 Efficiency and Effectiveness Disadvantages 
In the previous sections the focus has been on the positive effects of 
intermediation in the sense of a more efficient and more effective intermediation. 
However, there may be significant disadvantages from intermediation, which must 
be taken into account and compared to the benefits to obtain a holistic picture (Tietz 
2007, p. 105). Some arguments can be derived from the theory of the firm, especially 
from New Institutional Economics and the competence perspective, as these 
approaches have developed some arguments for vertical integration and thus 
potential arguments against intermediation. Some disadvantages, such as higher 
storage costs, have already been implicitly analyzed as part of the discussion of 
trade-offs. Other important disadvantages are highlighted in Figure 12 and will be 
discussed in the following sections.  
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Fig.12: Efficiency and Effectiveness Disadvantages of Intermediation, based on: 
Tietz 2007, p. 106. 
3.3.6.1 High Market Power of the Intermediary  
An intermediary often has the opportunity to build up a high market power. 
Often a natural monopoly occurs, as the efficiency gain through intermediation is 
the greatest in industrial structures with exactly one intermediary (Demsetz 1968, 
p. 42; Gehrig 1993, p. 113; Peiseler 1990, p. 110; Picot et al. 2003, p. 378). Through 
the matching of supply and demand, significant network effects can also occur, 
such as when an increase in the number of participants corresponds with an 
increase in the benefits. Due to the market entry barriers thus created, the market 
leaders gain market power. In addition, significant switching costs can arise for the 
customers of an intermediary, because trust and reputation would have to be built 
with another intermediary or a producer from scratch. The customers adapt to the 
specific processes of the intermediary as well so that when a switch occurs, 
additional learning costs arise. This is particularly relevant for intermediaries, 
because due to the often wide product offering, they can build a loyal customer 
base especially well. Once an intermediary has built up market power, the power 
Transaction Efficiency
- Insufficient transfer of relevant 
   information or skills
- Failure of transactions due to the
  risk of "Hold up" 
Transaction Result
- Due to interface problems, demand 
   information are not sufficiently taken 
   into account (e.g. quantities, times, etc.)
Production- / Logistic Efficiency
- Customer preferences are not sufficiently 
   taken into account during the product
   development or product innovation fail
   due to interface problems
Production Result
- High monopoly rents for the intermediary
- Interfaces not working as intended
- Duplication of activities
- Agency-Cost (e.g. for monitoring)
- Increased effort for contract design- Market Power of the Intermediary
- Insufficient Transfer of Knowledge/Skills




FLORIAN WROBEL  160 
can be used to increase profits, thus monopoly rents and suboptimal transaction 
efficiency are created (Tietz 2007, p. 106). 
3.3.6.2 Insufficient Transfer of Knowledge and Skills  
Intermediation increases the number of cross-company interfaces along the 
vertical view of the value system. Across these interfaces, information, knowledge 
and skills are transferred. The transfer of knowledge such as product know-how is 
essential for the functioning of the marketing and sales channel (Alderson 1954, p. 
23). Vice versa, the transfer of market knowledge from the intermediary to the 
producer is of crucial importance for the production (Alderson 1954, p. 23.). A 
coordination of all relevant participants of the value system can also be essential 
for the introduction of product- or process innovations. Should issues arise at the 
interface between producer and intermediary or customer and intermediary, the 
advantages of intermediation can be reduced (Tietz 2007, p. 106). This concerns the 
transaction efficiency41 as well as the production efficiency and the production 
result.42 In addition, due to coordination issues, the innovation or technological 
                                                     
41  Since the transfer of information and knowledge across enterprise boundaries 
can be more complex than a company-internal transfer, increased transaction 
costs and thus a lower transaction efficiency may occur (Tietz 2007, p. 106). 
42  If a producer has no direct customer access and there is a lack of transfer of 
information about the demand from the intermediary to the producer, the result 
can be an inefficient production and ineffective product development (Fell 2001, 
p. 111; Jallat and Capek 2001, p. 56). 
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progress and thus the production result, can suffer, since during the introduction 
of an innovation, the provider and intermediary must cooperate.43 
3.3.6.3 Duplication of Activities  
Although intermediaries assume certain activities from sellers and buyers, 
this must not necessarily mean that these activities become completely obsolete in 
the organization of the seller or buyer. This is especially the case when direct sales 
and intermediation co-exist. In this case, a provider must continue to perform a 
variety of intermediation activities such as sales and marketing. If the execution of 
the corresponding activities is connected with high fixed costs, the efficiency 
advantages of intermediation are reduced (Tietz 2007, p. 107).44 
3.3.6.4 Incentive Problems 
The collaboration between the provider and intermediary (or buyer and 
intermediary) can also be understood as a principal-agent relationship (Schmitz 
2000, w/o p.; Spulber 1999, p. 319). The provider tasks the intermediary with the 
distribution of his products. A provider or customer can, however, only observe 
the behavior of the intermediary to a certain extent and therefore cannot be sure 
                                                     
43  Accordingly, the higher innovation ability is often referred to as an advantage 
of vertical integration (Grant 2012, pp. 300-306). 
44  In the case of market makers some intermediation activities are always 
duplicated, such as the negotiation of the price and the payment processing. In 
addition to direct transaction activities, both match maker and market maker, 
usually duplicate indirect transaction activities such as general management 
functions (Tietz 2007, p. 108). 
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that the intermediary executes the delegated tasks as desired (Blair and Kaserman 
1983, p. 37; Fell 2001, p. 109). This may result in increased agency costs, thus 
reducing the efficiency of the transaction. This is because the delegation of tasks to 
the intermediary creates monitoring and control costs for the provider, and on the 
part of the intermediary costs for signaling to the supplier or buyer (Tietz 2007, p. 
108). Incentive problems are to be expected, especially for sales of complex and 
specific products as well as for the provisioning of services such as installations or 
customer service, especially when the delegated activities are complex and poorly 
controlled (Sharma and Dominguez 1992, p. 6). 
3.3.6.5 Hold-up Risk 
In the context of New Institutional Economics, in particular the transaction 
cost approach by Williamson (1990), the risk of a hold-up was highlighted as one 
of the reasons for vertical integration. Thus, the question arises whether through 
intermediation the risk of a hold-up does also occur (Tietz 2007, p. 108). This is the 
case, if intermediation is associated with transaction-specific investments. On the 
part of the intermediary transaction-specific investments cannot be ruled out, 
although, they are likely to occur rather rarely. This is because, as has already been 
previously discussed, the efficiency benefits through intermediation are often 
based on the aggregation of transactions and the presence of many buyers and 
sellers, so that internal processes will usually not be specific to a certain transaction 
partner. On the part of the provider or customer, transaction specific investments 
are conceivable, such as investments in training courses for the staff of the 
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intermediary (e.g. for complex products) or proprietary, inter-company 
information and communication systems, which are designed solely for the 
cooperation with a particular intermediary. In this case, there is a risk of a hold-up, 
which can result in increased transaction costs due to a more expensive contract 
design, or result in disadvantages, i.e. when the investment is not made, because of 
the remaining risk. Thus intermediation may not occur despite the economic 
benefits (Tietz 2007, p. 109). 
3.3.7 Intermediation Value Analysis Tool 
The preceding sub chapters highlighted the many different ways in which 
intermediaries can add value. In the course of the analysis the various value sources 
have been discussed and the requirements or value influencing factors have been 
highlighted. Just as with the activities of intermediaries, the question is how to 
actually analyze the change in value provided by intermediaries. Consequently, for 
the value that intermediaries provide, a comparative statics analysis will be 
conducted as well. The generic tool for the comparative statics analysis of the value 
provided by intermediaries is illustrated in Table 24. 
Individual value sources (V), such as the Baligh-Richartz-Effect are examined 
regarding their strength (𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛). The strength will be determined in qualitative 
terms and compared at two distinct points in time, before (𝑡0) and after (𝑡1) the 
technological induced changes. The Baligh-Richartz-Effect is a good example: The 
number of suppliers, customers and intermediaries have been highlighted as 
influencing factors. Thus, if before the changes (𝑡0) only a few intermediaries exist 
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and after the changes (𝑡1) their number has increased, then the effect or the value 
source strength would be reduced. 
 
Tab.24: Generic Tool for the Analysis of Intermediation Value, based on: own 
  research. 
By looking at the difference (∆𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛 = 𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛(𝑡1) − 𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛(𝑡0)) the impact on an 
individual value source can be assessed. Again, there different scenarios can be 
identified:  
1. 𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛(𝑡0)  =  𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛 (𝑡1)  
2. 𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛(𝑡0) >  𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛 (𝑡1)  
3. 𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛(𝑡0) <  𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛 (𝑡1)  
 
From the perspective of the intermediary, the third scenario would be the 
desired outcome – an increase in the strength of the value source. To use the same 
example as before, this situation would occur, if the number of suppliers and/or 
customers has increased or the number of intermediaries decreased. The reduction 
Value Sources (V) Value Strength (VS Vn (t0)) Impact of Technological Advancements Value Strength (VS Vn (t1))
Value Source 1 low
Strong
Value increase due to …
high
Value Source 2 medium
Low
No change due to …
medium
Value Source 3 high
Strong




Value Source n low
Low
No change due to …
low
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in contact costs is thus greater, which should strengthen the intermediary. 
However, just as before, a complete picture can only emerge when the total value 
strength (TVS) is examined. The total value strength (TVS) is the sum of the 
individual value strengths at a specific point in time: 
𝑇𝑉𝑆(𝑡0) = ∑ 𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛(𝑡0) = 𝑉𝑆𝑉1(𝑡0) + 
𝑥
𝑛=1
𝑉𝑆𝑉2(𝑡0) + ⋯ +  𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛(𝑡0) 
𝑇𝑉𝑆(𝑡1) = ∑ 𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛(𝑡1) = 𝑉𝑆𝑉1(𝑡1) + 
𝑥
𝑛=1
𝑉𝑆𝑉2(𝑡1) + ⋯ + 𝑉𝑆𝑉𝑛(𝑡1) 
 
This allows the examination of the difference in total value strength: 








Through the comparative statistics analysis of the total value strength the 
impact of technological advancements on the ability of the intermediary to add 
value can be determined. Again three scenarios can be distinguished: 
1. 𝑇𝑉𝑆(𝑡0) = 𝑇𝑉𝑆(𝑡1) 
2. 𝑇𝑉𝑆(𝑡0) > 𝑇𝑉𝑆(𝑡1) 
3. 𝑇𝑉𝑆(𝑡0) < 𝑇𝑉𝑆(𝑡1) 
 
Should the total value strength be higher after the technological induced 
changes (scenario 3), then the position of the intermediary is strengthened. 
Whereas in the opposite case (scenario 2), the position is likely threatened. 
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Depending of the severity of the reduction in total value strength, it may make no 
sense for up- or downstream companies to cooperate with the intermediary at all. 
3.3.8 Summary  
The focus in the preceding sub chapters was on the value provided by 
intermediaries. The sources that enable intermediaries to add value can be divided 
into four categories: (1) increased transaction efficiency, (2) increased production- 
and logistic efficiency, (3) increased transaction result and (4) increased production 
result. 
 Each category and corresponding value source has been examined in detail 
in the preceding analysis. In the course of the analysis, for each value source, 
relevant requirements or influencing factors have been pointed out. These will act 
as guidance for the actual analysis of the value provided by intermediaries.  
Similar to the analysis of the activities of intermediaries, and for the value 
they provide, a generic tool that allows a comparative statistics analysis has been 
developed and explained in detail. By combining the generic tool with the relevant 
value sources, the Intermediation Value Analysis Tool is created. The tool is 
visualized in Table 25 and will be used in the analysis of the motion picture 
industry in Chapter 4. 
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Tab.25: Intermediation Value Analysis Tool, based on: own research. 
3.4 STEP 4: INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES TO COOPERATE 
In the previous section the variety of reasons for the existence of 
intermediaries have been discussed from a macroeconomic perspective. However, 
intermediaries can only exist if the corresponding up- and downstream companies 
support and cooperate with intermediaries. The primary goal of these companies 
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is usually not the increase of welfare, but instead, the maximization of their own 
profits. Accordingly company specific consideration to cooperate with 
intermediaries must be taken into account as well. 
The value added by intermediaries can behave congruent, neutral, or be in 
conflict with the aforementioned goal of profit maximization. A high transaction 
efficiency, production efficiency and production effectiveness is also in the interest 
of the up- and downstream companies, because all three effects allow the creation 
of competitive advantages over competitors and a higher producer surplus. The 
improvement of the result of the transaction, however, is not always to the benefit 
of the companies involved (Tietz 2007, p. 109). This is particularly evident in the 
fact that an intermediary can be tasked with reducing the market power of the 
upstream company through the aggregation of demand. Needless to say, this is not 
in the interests of the respective upstream company. The elimination of information 
asymmetries or an increase of the information- and evaluation efficiency is not 
necessarily in the interest of upstream or downstream companies either. For 
example, a producer, who offers products with inferior quality or not competitively 
priced, has no interest in perfect transparency. The same is also true for markets 
with hidden intentions (Tietz 2007, p. 109). 
In conclusion, the objective of improving the transaction result can be in 
conflict to the goal of profit maximization and represents a disadvantage of 
intermediation from the perspective of the respective up- or downstream company. 
There are many additional arguments for and against a cooperation with 
intermediaries from a business perspective. Marketing literature provides some 
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input in this respect, as it deals with the arguments for or against the use of 
intermediaries for the distribution of the products from the producer’s point of 
view. Additionally, some advantages and disadvantages can be derived from 
findings on vertical integration, as intermediation is a vertical phenomenon as 
well.45 The key incentives and disincentives to cooperate with intermediaries are 
summarized in the following sub chapters. It is assumed that companies have the 
freedom of choice between cooperating with intermediaries and executing the 
intermediation activities themselves.46  
3.4.1 Incentives to cooperate with Intermediaries 
The analysis will start by examining the incentives for market participants to 
cooperate with intermediaries. The relevant incentives are highlighted in Table 26 
and will be analyzed in more detail in the following sub chapters. 
                                                     
45  In the context of the principles of Industrial Economics that were analyzed in 
Chapter 2, the incentives to vertical integration were discussed as well. 
However, only in terms of efficiency. At this point, the non-efficiency-oriented 
reasons for vertical integration are relevant. 
46  This is not necessarily always the case, as in some markets establishing an own 
sales organization is difficult or not possible at all, i.e. due to legal or cultural 
conditions (Churchill and Peter 1998, p. 385; Kotler and Armstrong 2012, pp. 
344-350; Zikmund and D'Amico 2001, p. 331). 
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Tab.26: Cooperation Incentives, based on: own research. 
3.4.1.1 Increased Transaction- and Production Efficiency/-Effectiveness 
As described earlier, an increased transaction efficiency, production 
efficiency and production effectiveness, and sometimes also increased transaction 
effectiveness, represent competitive advantages that could enable a higher 
profitability. Accordingly, incentives for a producer to cooperate with 
intermediaries exist, if the distribution through intermediaries is more efficient and 
effective. In cases where direct sales and intermediation exist in parallel, i.e. a 
complementary cooperation with intermediaries, these efficiency benefits are likely 
reduced, because activities will be a duplicated (Tietz 2007, p. 111). 
3.4.1.2 Higher Degree of Flexibility / Lower Market Exit Cost  
An important criterion in assessing various distribution structures represents 
the flexibility of the producer to adjust the sales structure to meet new conditions 
(Kotler and Armstrong 2012, pp. 572-574). Vertical integration can reduce this 
flexibility (Grant 2012, p. 309). Similarly, this flexibility is generally higher when 
collaborating with intermediaries instead of building up an internal sales 
organization. An important example of this flexibility is the ability to withdraw 
Increased Transaction- and Production Efficiency/-
Effectiveness
Improved Price Differentiation/ Discrimination 
Higher Degree of Flexibility / 
Lower Market Exit Cost 
Improved Utilization
Faster Market Entry and Penetration
Incentives
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from the market at low cost after entering a new market or launching a new product 
(Picot 1991, pp. 38-39).  
3.4.1.3 Improved Price Differentiation / Discrimination  
Price discrimination exists when the same product is sold at different prices 
(Tirole 1995, p. 291; Varian 1989, p. 598).47 For price differentiation, a delineation of 
various market segments is required, which can be achieved through the use of 
different sales channels or customers. It must be ensured, however, that the 
customer with the more favorable conditions does not resell the goods to other 
buyers (Carlton and Perloff 2005, p. 301; Varian 1989, p. 599).  
Vertical integration with one of the customers can stop this arbitrage trading 
(Blair and Kaserman 1983, p. 120; Fell 2001, p. 113; Perry 1989, p. 193). These 
considerations lead to the conclusion that through cooperation with an 
intermediary price differentiation can occur, if the intermediary targets a different 
customer segment than the direct distribution (Brousseau 2002, p. 362). An 
arbitrage trade can be excluded in this case due to having control over the direct 
distribution channel. This is, however, more difficult, if price differentiation is 
sought through cooperation with several intermediaries. Purchasing and selling 
prices are not identical for market makers, price discrimination is thus not as 
obvious as in the case of direct sales or match makers. This is also the case when a 
                                                     
47  This definition is simplified, Tirole (1995, p. 291) as well as Varian (1989, p. 598) 
provide more nuanced definitions. 
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market maker bundles multiple products and the price of the individual 
components is no longer transparent (Bailey 1998, p. 38). It is also possible that the 
intermediary does not reveal the name of the producer or the producer uses a 
different brand name for the distribution through intermediaries (Brousseau 2002, 
p. 362). Multiple sales channels must coexist to conduct price differentiation - either 
multiple intermediaries or one intermediary plus direct sales. Therefore, price 
differentiation may conversely be an argument for building up a direct sales 
capability, if goods were previously only sold through intermediaries.  
3.4.1.4 Faster Market Entry and Higher Market Penetration 
It is conceivable that, due to entry barriers, certain intermediation activities 
can only be built up in the medium to long term, e.g. in situation where a small 
provider would face significant capital expenditures. In this case, a provider must 
initially rely on intermediaries (Churchill and Peter 1998, p. 380; Kotler and 
Armstrong 2012, pp. 341-356). In addition, a high market penetration can be 
achieved faster by using intermediaries and direct sales together (Churchill and 
Peter 1998, p. 380). 
3.4.1.5 Improved Utilization 
When working with an intermediary, the producer faces the risk of becoming 
a victim of rationing when demand is uncertain. Conversely, an intermediary can 
also help the producer deal with uncertain demand more successfully, namely, if 
the producer can turn to the intermediary as an additional distribution channel, 
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e.g. in cases of temporary utilization difficulties or production surpluses. This 
allows the provider to optimize the utilization (Tietz 2007, p. 112).  
3.4.1.6 Summary 
The preceding analysis examined the incentives of up- and downstream 
market participants to cooperate with intermediaries. Five incentives have been 
identified and discussed in detail. Just as before, the relevant requirements or 
influencing factors have been identified as well. These are highlighted in Table 27 
and will act as guidance for the application of the analysis approach in Chapter 4. 
 
Tab.27: Cooperation Incentives and Requirements, based on: own research. 
3.4.2 Disincentives to cooperate with Intermediaries 
 The incentives of cooperating with intermediaries must be compared to the 
disincentives. From a business perspective, six disincentives can be identified. 
These are displayed in Table 28 and will be discussed in more detail in the 
following sections. 
Incentives (I) Requirements
Increased Transaction- and Production 
Efficiency/-Effectiveness
- The distribution through intermediaries is more efficient and
   effective from the producer's point of view
Higher Degree of Flexibility / 
Lower Market Exit Cost 
- Producer requires a high degree of flexibility
- High Market Entry Cost
- New Product Launch Scenarios
Improved Price Differentiation/ 
Discrimination 
- Multiple sales channels coexist
- The intermediary targets a different 
  customer segment than the direct distribution 
Faster Market Entry and Penetration
- High market penetration is desired faster
- High market entry barriers
Improved Utilization
- Uncertain demand 
- Temporary utilization difficulties
- Production surpluses
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Tab.28: Cooperation Disincentives, based on: own research. 
3.4.2.1 Market Power of the Intermediary 
 As described earlier, intermediaries have the opportunity to increase their 
market power. An intermediary could exploit this market power in the context of 
setting and negotiating prices in order to maximize profits at the expense of buyers 
and sellers (Anderson et al. 1997, p. 60). Producers therefore have an incentive to 
not let the power of an intermediary grow substantially. If the intermediary already 
has substantial market power, the providers can attempt to circumvent the 
intermediary, for example, through direct sales (Fingleton 1997, p. 554; Neumann 
1994, p. 282). However, if the intermediary has already built market power, the 
supplier is usually dependent on the intermediary, at least in the short - or 
medium-term. This gives the intermediary the opportunity to punish any 
disintermediation activities by suppliers or customers. The intermediary can thus 
prevent or at least delay disintermediation, even though it would be desirable from 
the perspective of one transaction partner (Fingleton 1997, p. 555; Sarkar et al. 1995, 
w/o p.; Sarkar et al. 1998, p. 219; Westerfield 1915, p. 127). 
 
Market Power of the Intermediary Disclosing of sensitive Information 
Rationing and Discrimination
Limited Tax Reductions /
Avoidance of Regulation
Strengthening Potential Competition Cannibalization of Direct Sales
Disincentives
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3.4.2.2 Rationing and Discrimination 
When there are uncertainties about supply or demand and the price is not the 
only criterion for the allocation of resources, rationing can occur. This creates for 
some market participants the risk of not obtaining access to required resources. In 
literature, this risk is one of the arguments for vertical integration, because the risk 
of rationing can thereby be eliminated (Blair and Kaserman 1983, p. 85; Carlton and 
Perloff 2005, p. 403; Perry 1989, p. 206).  
Even though this is most often regarded as an argument for a backward 
integration, it also applies in cases of forward integration, namely, if the access to 
distribution channels is not permanently ensured (Tietz 2007, p. 113). This 
reasoning can be applied to intermediation and represents a reason against the 
cooperation with intermediaries. Because, in the event of a decline in demand, it is 
likely that an intermediary will stop working with specific producers. If the 
affected producer depends on the intermediary, this represents a high risk. In 
addition, it also represents a form of rationing, if the intermediary prefers a certain 
producer or specific products in his marketing and sales activities. Lastly, it is also 
possible that the intermediary does not include a product in the portfolio at all 
(Kotler and Armstrong 2012, pp. 344-350). Due to the risk of rationing and 
discrimination, the provider has an incentive to build up direct sales, at least in 
addition to the cooperation with intermediaries, in order to limit the risk. 
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3.4.2.3 Strengthening Potential Competition 
When cooperating with intermediaries, buyers and sellers need to disclose 
information and knowledge about their own business to the intermediary. This can 
cause the intermediary to increasingly become a potential competitor, who may 
threaten to enter the industry of the supplier or buyer (Anderson et al. 1997, p. 61). 
Thus, through the cooperation with intermediaries, the market entry barriers for 
the intermediary can be reduced (Blair and Kaserman 1983, p. 43; Fell 2001, p. 65; 
Scherer and Ross 1990, p. 526; Shepherd 1997, p. 275). This can be explained by the 
observation that potential entrants into the market can occur, without the new 
entrants having to carry out the activities of the intermediary at the same time. This 
is connected with lower expense and capital requirements compared to a situation 
where a simultaneous entry into both value system stages is required (Tietz 2007, 
p. 113). In addition, intermediaries can also facilitate the market entry, if the sector 
of the intermediary is connected with higher entry barriers than the sector of the 
supplier. In a vertically integrated industry structure without intermediaries, the 
high entry barrier for intermediaries would spread to the value system stage of the 
supplier (Blair and Kaserman 1983, p. 43; Scherer and Ross 1990, p. 526). 
Accordingly, from the perspective of buyers and sellers, any cooperation with 
intermediaries should be rejected, because the parallel existence of a direct sales 
can hardly mitigate this risk. 
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3.4.2.4 Disclosing of sensitive Information  
The previous section already highlighted that when companies cooperate 
with intermediaries, they have to disclose information and knowledge about their 
own business to the intermediary. This might be critical and sensitive information. 
A disclosure of this information not only creates the risk of creating a potential 
competitor, but also, that this information falls into the hands of a competitor, e.g. 
due to not being treated confidentially by the intermediary (Tietz 2007, p. 114).  
3.4.2.5 Limited Tax Reductions / Avoidance of Regulation 
The literature on vertical integration also covers some legal aspects. The 
following three positive effects of vertical integration represent disadvantages of 
intermediation: (1) avoidance of price regulation, (2) avoidance of profit regulation 
and (3) tax optimization through profit shifting (Carlton and Perloff 2005, pp. 404-
405; Fell 2001, p. 114). Since only inter-company transactions are subject to price 
regulations, these can be bypassed by internalizing the transactions, i.e. through 
vertical integration. An internalization of transactions also provides the ability to 
move profits from one business unit to another through a corresponding 
adjustment of transfer prices (Carlton and Perloff 2005, p. 404). If one of these 
business units is subject to earnings regulation, the company can maximize the 
profits by moving the surpluses generated in this unit to another unit. Finally, 
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based on the optimum setting of transfer prices, the overall tax burden of a 
vertically integrated company can be reduced (Carlton and Perloff 2005, p. 405).48  
3.4.2.6 Cannibalization of Direct Sales 
A complementary cooperation with intermediaries carries the risks that 
transactions move unintentionally from the direct sales channel to the intermediary 
and thus, from the perspective of the provider, direct sales are being cannibalized 
by the intermediary. This is a disincentive when direct sales are more profitable or 
more beneficial in other ways, i.e. through the direct contact with customers. The 
risk of cannibalization is the flip side of the benefits that result from a better 
workload optimization and a faster market penetration (Tietz 2007, p. 115). 
3.4.2.7 Summary 
The preceding analysis highlighted that a variety of reasons exist why 
companies may choose not to cooperate with intermediaries. The six previously 
discussed disincentives to cooperate with intermediaries are highlighted in Table 
29 alongside the relevant influencing factors. 
                                                     
48  This is for example possible, if different business units are located in different 
countries and are subject to different tax rates (Carlton and Perloff 2005, p. 405).  
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Tab.29: Cooperation Disincentives and Requirements, based on: own research. 
3.4.3 Intermediation Incentives Analysis Tool 
Similar to the analysis of the value of intermediaries, the incentives and 
disincentives of up- and downstream companies to cooperate with intermediaries 
will be analyzed using comparative statics analysis as well. The generic tool for the 
analysis of incentives is illustrated in Table 30 and the tool for disincentives in Table 
31. 
 
Tab.30: Generic Tool for the Analysis of Intermediation Incentives, based on: 
own research. 
Disincentives (DI) Requirements
Market Power of the Intermediary
- Intermediary exploits high market power
- Producers have no or limited direct distribution
Rationing and Discrimination
- Producers have no or limited direct distribution
- Access to distribution channels is not permanently ensured
Strengthening Potential Competition - Market entry barriers for the intermediary are reduced
Disclosing of sensitive Information - Critical and sensitive information has to be disclosed
Limited Tax Reductions /
Avoidance of Regulation
- Avoidance of price / profit regulations is desired
- High tax burden
Cannibalization of Direct Sales
- Producers have direct distribution
- Direct sales are more profitable or more beneficial 
Incentives (I) Incentive Strength (ISIn (t0)) Impact of Technological Advancements Incentive Strength (ISIn (t1))
Incentive 1 low
Strong














No change due to …
low
FLORIAN WROBEL  180 
Following the same logic as before, individual incentives (I) or disincentives 
(DI) can be analyzed regarding their incentive strength (𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑛) or disincentive 
strength (𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑛) respectively. It is important to highlight again, that not the 
intermediary, but rather the up- or downstream company is examined. The 
(disincentive) cannibalization of direct sales provides a good example. A 
downstream company does not have direct sales before the technological induced 
changes (𝑡0), however, after the changes (𝑡1) the company does have its own direct 
sales, i.e. in form of an Internet shop. Accordingly, the disincentive strength (𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑛) 
of the aforementioned disincentive is low or not relevant before the technological 
changes and is relevant and strong after the changes. 
 
Tab.31: Generic Tool for the Analysis of Intermediation Disincentives, based 
on: own research. 
Just as before, through the difference, the impact on individual incentives 
(∆𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑛 = 𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑛(𝑡1) − 𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑛(𝑡0)) and individual disincentives (∆𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑛 = 𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑛(𝑡1) −
 𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑛(𝑡0)) can be determined. Consequently, not only the strength of individual 
incentives and disincentives can be examined, but more importantly the total 
Disincentives (DI) Disincentive Strength (DSIn (t0)) Impact of Technological Advancements Disincentive Strength (DSIn (t1))
Disincentive 1 low
Strong














No change due to …
low
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incentive strength (TIS) and the total disincentive strength (TDS) as well. The total 
incentive strength (TIS) is the sum of the strengths of the individual incentives:  
𝑇𝐼𝑆(𝑡0) = ∑ 𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑛(𝑡0) = 𝐼𝑆𝐼1(𝑡0) + 
𝑥
𝑛=1
𝐼𝑆𝐼2(𝑡0) + ⋯ +  𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑛(𝑡0) 
𝑇𝐼𝑆(𝑡1) = ∑ 𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑛(𝑡1) = 𝐼𝑆𝐼1(𝑡1) + 
𝑥
𝑛=1
𝐼𝑆𝐼2(𝑡1) + ⋯ +  𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑛(𝑡1) 
 
The total disincentive strength (TDS), on the other hand, is the sum of the 
strengths of the individual disincentives: 
𝑇𝐷𝑆(𝑡0) = ∑ 𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑛(𝑡0) = 𝐷𝑆𝐷1(𝑡0) + 
𝑥
𝑛=1
𝐷𝑆𝐷2(𝑡0) + ⋯ +  𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑛(𝑡0) 
𝑇𝐷S(𝑡1) = ∑ 𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑛(𝑡1) = 𝐷𝑆𝐷1(𝑡1) + 
𝑥
𝑛=1
𝐷𝑆𝐷2(𝑡1) + ⋯ +  𝐷𝑆𝐷𝑛(𝑡1) 
 
The difference in the total strength of incentives and disincentives allows the 
comparative statics analysis of the impact of technological advancements: 















For a complete picture, both total incentive and total disincentives strength 
then have to be compared with each other. An increase in total incentives strength 
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is only beneficial for the intermediary, when the total disincentive strength remains 
flat or is reduced. Otherwise, the advantages and disadvantages may equal each 
other out.  
3.4.4 Summary 
The preceding analysis focused on the up- and downstream market 
participants and their incentives and disincentives to cooperate with 
intermediaries. The analysis showed that an exclusive collaboration with 
intermediaries carries significant risks, especially due to the potentially high 
market power of the intermediary. A cooperation with intermediaries is thus only 
a sensible approach, if either the efficiency or effectiveness advantages of the 
intermediary are very high compared to direct sales or, if a high degree of flexibility 
and the option of a low-cost market exit need to be preserved. Many of the 
disadvantages are eliminated, if the cooperation with intermediaries is only 
complementary to direct sales or when the cooperation with intermediaries is only 
temporary.  
Following the logic from the previous analysis steps, the relevant influencing 
factors have been determined for the incentives and disincentives to cooperate with 
intermediaries as well. In addition, a generic tool for the comparative statics 
analysis of incentives and disincentives has been developed. Table 32 shows the 
combination of the generic tool with the discussed incentives.  
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Tab.32: Intermediation Incentive Analysis Tool, based on: own research. 
Table 33 on the other hand, shows the combination of the generic tool with 
the discussed disincentives.  
 
Tab.33: Intermediation Disincentive Analysis Tool, based on: own research. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
 In this chapter the extensive results from the literature review presented in 
Chapter 2 have been systematically structured. In the process the Intermediation 
Analysis Approach was created and the first research objective achieved. The 
analysis approach consists of four steps. Each step has been detailed in the 
Incentives (I) ISIn (t0) Impact of Technological Advancements ISIn (t1)
Increased Transaction- and Production 
efficiency/-effektiveness
Higher Degree of Flexibility / 
Lower Market Exit Cost 
Improved Price Differentiation/ 
Discrimination 
Faster Market Entry and Penetration
Improved utilization
Incentives (I) ISIn (t0) Impact of Technological Advancements ISIn (t1)
Increased Transaction- and Production 
Efficiency/-Effectiveness
Higher Degree of Flexibility / 
Lower Market Exit Cost 
Improved Price Differentiation/ 
Discrimination 
Faster Market Entry and Penetration
Improved Utilization
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preceding analysis. The development of each step resulted in a variety of tools and 
guidance that together are the core elements of the Intermediation Analysis 
Approach and can be understood as the comprehensive theoretical contribution on 
intermediation in media markets of this dissertation. In the following paragraphs 
each step will be briefly recapped and the created tools and guidelines will be 
highlighted. A summary of the results is shown in Figure 13. 
 
Fig.13: Analysis Steps, -Tools and -Guidance, based on: own research. 
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Step 1 is dedicated to the analysis of general industry characteristics. Most 
importantly, the analysis of the value added structure and the identification of 
intermediaries. For this purpose, and due to the limitations of existing methods, 
the Enhanced Value System Model was introduced as the first tool of the analysis 
approach. 
Step 2 focuses on the first facet of intermediation: the various activities 
intermediaries perform. The activities of intermediaries in media markets have 
been identified based on the literature review and organized according to the 
suggestion by Tietz (2007 p. 79). For the actual analysis of the activities a cost 
framework was established and the corresponding Intermediation Activity 
Analysis Tool created. The tool allows a comparative statics analysis of the 
qualitative costs for performing the activities at two distinct points in time. In order 
to aid in the application of the tool, guidance in the form of cost influencing factors 
has been developed as well. 
The third step is concerned with the value that intermediaries provide. The 
various value sources that intermediaries can take advantage of have been 
identified and organized in four different value categories according to the 
suggestion by Tietz (2007 p. 102). The same comparative statics logic is applied here 
as well. This is reflected in the Value Analysis Tool, which allows a comparison of 
the strength of certain value sources at different points in time. To assist in the 
application of the tool, additional guidance has been created as well.  
The same approach was followed for Step 4, where the incentives and 
disincentives have been discussed. The Intermediation Incentive Analysis Tool was 
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created for the comparative statics analysis of the strength of the incentives or 
disincentives and guidance for the determination of the strength has been 
developed as well. 
A strategic conclusion can be drawn once the previous steps have been 
completed. While a strategic conclusion can of course only be drawn in a specific 
use case, first generic observations on the impact of technological advancements on 
intermediation can still be made. Disintermediation, for example, is only likely to 
occur, if the value and the company specific incentives to cooperate with 
intermediaries largely disappear. This in turn, is unlikely to happen, if the activities 
traditionally performed by intermediaries do not become obsolete or change 
substantially as well. Even if technological advancements eliminate the justification 
for the existence of intermediaries, the company specific incentives to cooperate 
with intermediaries still have to be taken into account. A prerequisite for 
disintermediation is ultimately that up - or downstream companies actually seek 
and enforce disintermediation. There are, however, arguments that this does not 
necessarily occur. For up - and downstream companies, change costs or risks may 
be associated with such a restructuring. For a successful disintermediation, the 
producer would have to perform the activities of the intermediary. The producer 
thus would have to build up the necessary resources as well. This may also include 
aspects like building up a brand or reputation. In addition, capital and certain skills 
would also be required. Accordingly, entry barriers exist. 
It also has to be taken into account that existing intermediaries, due to their 
market power, can punish those companies that seek disintermediation, 
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(Westerfield 1915, p. 127). It is also conceivable that a provider does not seek 
disintermediation due to fears of a potentially higher price competition in the 
industry as a whole. These and any other relevant change barriers must be 
identified in the application of the analysis approach as well. In addition, it must 
be assessed whether up - and downstream companies are willing and able to 
overcome these barriers and enforce disintermediation. If this is not the case, it is 
possible that intermediation at least temporarily persists despite a lack of 
justification for its existence. Despite these general observations, the actual impact 
of technological advancements can only be assessed when the approach is applied 
to a specific industry. The approach will thus be applied to the motion picture 
industry in the next chapter where an ex-post analysis, using the tools and 







4 EX-POST ANALYSIS OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 
Now that the Intermediation Analysis Approach has been developed and the 
tools and guidance for the thorough analysis of intermediaries in media markets 
are available, the focus can shift towards the practical research objective of this 
dissertation. In order to demonstrate the applicability of the developed analysis 
approach, it will be used for the analysis of intermediaries in the motion picture 
sector. It was already highlighted in the introduction of this dissertation that the 
motion picture sector has witnessed numerous technological advancements in the 
past and is thus perfectly suited for an ex-post analysis of the last fifteen years. Due 
to the comparative statics nature of the Intermediation Analysis Approach, the 
status quo of intermediaries in 1999 will be compared with their current status or 
the status in 2014. In order to provide a better understanding for the significance of 
this particular time span, an overview of selected49 (technology driven) events is 
given in Table 34.50  
                                                     
49  Other relevant technological advancements, which are not explicitly discussed 
in this dissertation are convergence, decreasing prices and increasing 
performance of computing- and storage capacity (Pagani 2003, p. 5; Yoffie 1997, 
pp. 7-8) as well as the increase in bandwidth (Szyperski et al. 1996, p. 3; Katz 
2004, pp. 31-61). 
50  For a detailed timeline of the evolution of online distribution of motion pictures 
refer to Cunnigham and Silver (2012a, p. 189-194). 
FLORIAN WROBEL  190 
 
Tab.34: Selected Events in the Motion Picture Industry (1999-2014), based on: 
 own research. 
These developments will be further discussed throughout Chapter 4. In 
regards to the selected time frame, however, the birth of digital cinema still has to 
be highlighted. As pointed out by Hawkins and Vickery (2008, p. 76), the arrival of 
digital cinema may be “the single most significant new stimulus to the evolution of 
the value system”. The first screens in the U.S. have been equipped with digital 
projectors in 1999. By December 2000, 31 screens have converted to digital in North 
America (MPA 2003, p. 24). Fast forward to 2015, where as of March 2015, 38.719 
screens out of a total of 39.789 screens (more than 97%) have been converted to 
digital (NATO 2015, w/o p.). The conversion in the exhibition segment thus 
basically started and ended in the selected time frame. While many authors have 
Year Event Overview
1995 DVD is born
1995: The first DVD specification is announced
1997: The first DVD players and discs are available in the United States
1998: The first DVD players and discs are available in Europe
2001: DVD sales in the US outpace rentals by more than four to one in dollar terms
2003: DVD sales and rentals topped those of VHS
2003: Major U.S. retailers Circuit City and Best Buy stop selling VHS tapes
1997 Netflix is born
1997: Netflix is founded 
1999: Start of the subscription business model of flat-fee unlimited rentals
2006: Video on demand via the Internet is introduced with the same subscription model




1998: Digital Light Processing (DLP) projector technology is demonstrated for the first time 
1999: Texas Instrument's DLP Cinema projector is demonstrated on four screens in the U.S.
2000: There are 31 digital cinema screens in North America
2002: The Digital Cinema Initiative (DCI) is founded
2005: DCI released Version 1.0 of its Digital Cinema System Specification
2015: 38.719 screens (97% of a total screens) in the U.S. have been converted to digital 
2003
iTunes Store is 
born
2003: iTunes store launches and quickly becomes the largest music vendor
2005: iTunes Store starts offering short videos




2010: Amazon Studios starts operation
2012: Amazon Studios has received more than 10,000 feature screenplay submissions
2013: 23 movies and 26 television series are in active development
2015: Amazon acquires Spike Lee's new movie Chi-Raq  as its first Amazon Original Movie
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written about the possible impact of digital cinema,51 there is no contribution that 
captures and explains how intermediaries have actually been affected. This 
dissertation will thus directly close this gap. 
As established in Chapter 3, the analysis will start by examining relevant 
industry characteristics (Step 1). As such, the following sub chapter will act as the 
introductory chapter to the motion picture industry as well. During the analysis of 
the value added structure, the magnitude of intermediaries involved in the 
production and distribution of motion pictures will be highlighted. Each of these 
intermediaries will then be examined in more detail in the proceeding sub chapters. 
Their role in the motion picture value system will be explained in detail and the 
tools for the analysis of their activities (Step 2), their value (Step 3) and the 
incentives to cooperate with them (Step 4), will be applied.  
4.1 STEP 1: ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
During the development of the analysis approach it was already highlighted 
that an understanding of the industry structure is important for the analysis of the 
same (Giaglis et al. 2002, p. 240). Thus, in a first step, the general characteristics of 
the motion picture industry have to be examined. This includes product 
characteristics, the demand structure as well as the value added structure as these 
                                                     
51  Examples for authors discussing the possible impact of digital cinema include 
Eliashberg et al. (2006), Finney (2010), Hawking and Vickery (2008), Ulin (2013), 
Vogel (2015) and Wirtz (2012). 
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factors influence the structure of intermediation (Bailey 1998, p. 54; Giaglis et al. 
2002, p. 240; Scott 2000, w/o p.). Accordingly, each of these characteristics and their 
change in the last fifteen year will be examined in the following sub chapters. 
Before the analysis of the industry characteristics can begin, it is important to have 
a common understanding of the object of investigation. Therefore a demarcation of 
the term motion picture industry is necessary.  
4.1.1 Demarcation 
According to Vogel (2015, p. 84), a motion picture or movie can be described 
as a sequence of sounds and pictures stored on a medium or image, which creates 
the impression of a moving picture. The market demarcation and corresponding 
determination of the product-market combination can be made in varying degrees 
of concretion. At the highest level, markets can be differentiated by using general 
product-related criteria. The result of such a demarcation for the motion picture 
industry is the factual determination of the market of the motion picture industry 
as a sector of the entertainment industry with the movie as the central element of 
differentiation (Wirtz 2012, p. 316). 
Küng (2008, pp. 6-7) points out that this understanding of the motion picture 
industry as a sector of the entertainment industry is uncharacteristic for Europeans, 
because they tend to view the sectors of the media industry more narrowly and 
only include the broadcasting sector (radio and television), the print sector 
(newspapers, magazines, journals and books), the motion picture sector and the 
recorded music sector. Their U.S. peers, on the other hand, also include additional 
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sectors such as gaming, sports and theme parks, and when these sectors are 
included, the term shifts from media industry to entertainment industry (Küng 
2008, p. 7; Aris et al. 2009, pp. 1-2).  
This more narrow understanding of the motion picture industry as a sector 
of the media industry is illustrated in Figure 14. Here the various sectors of the 
media industry are plotted according to content type and function.  
 
Fig.14: Sectors of the Media Industry, based on: Küng 2008, p. 7. 
The focus in this dissertation is on feature movies, i.e. movies intended for 
the initial screening in movie theaters. Accordingly, the term motion picture 
industry refers to those individuals and companies that are involved in the 
development, production, distribution and exploitation of motion pictures 
(Hawkins and Vickery 2008, p. 15). From a geographical perspective, the focus is 
on the U.S. motion picture sector. This is justified by the observation that U.S. 
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movie productions dominate the box office around the globe (Silver 2007, pp. 70-
88). It has to be acknowledged that locally made movies (in Europe) have been able 
to increase the commercial success in their home markets in the last decade, 
however, their share is still comparatively low. In Germany for example, the share 
of local productions of the total German box office was 12.5% in 2000 and rose to 
16.8% in 2010 (Wirtz 2012, p. 322). Likewise, in Spain, the share of local productions 
of the total Spanish box office amounted to 10% in 2000 and rose to 16% by 2009 
(Cunnigham and Silver 2012, pp. 34-35). 
4.1.2 Product Characteristics 
In regards to product characteristics, the first thing that has to be highlighted 
is that the theatrical motion picture is not a typical product such as a car or 
toothbrush. Wirtz (2012, p. 315) for example points out, that motion pictures play 
a significant and varied role in today's society. Movies are cultural goods, 
entertainment goods and economic goods at the same time. This observation is 
important and is also highlighted by Crissey (2010, p. 4), who points out that 
movies have product traits, because they are manufactured, marketed and sold to 
customers, who have a desire to buy entertainment. However, a motion picture 
exhibits many of the characteristics of a work of art as well. While a commercial 
product is made to satisfy the needs of a customer, a work of art is often made to 
satisfy the needs of the artist. Consequently, customer requirements as well as 
traditional  business  attitudes  in  regards to competition  and delivering a  return  
on  investment are  frequently  not  considered relevant in these situations. The fact 
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that all motion pictures exhibit both types of traits distinguishes a movie from most 
other industrial products (Crissey 2010, p. 4).  
4.1.2.1 Product Segments 
While the focus of this dissertation is on movies, which are intended for an 
initial theatrical release, the revenues from the box office do not represent the only 
source of income for the motion picture industry. It is thus important to discuss the 
performance spectrum of the motion picture industry as whole and identify the 
relevant product segments. On the highest level the product segments of the 
motion picture industry can be divided into four areas: (1) theatrical exploitation, 
(2) home entertainment, (3) TV exploitation and (4) merchandising (Vogel, 2015, 
pp. 150-154; Wirtz 2012, p. 341). These segments are illustrated in Figure 15 and 
will be further discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Fig.15: Product Segments of the Motion Picture Industry, based on: Wirtz 2012, 
p. 341. 
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The first segment, the theatrical exploitation, includes public screenings in 
movie theaters. Due to the different designs of theaters, multiplex cinemas, 
individual theaters and event cinemas can be distinguished (Vogel 2015, pp. 145-
147). The movies themselves can be distinguished on the basis of their content. In 
addition to the classic differentiation between mainstream and special interest, they 
can be distinguished according to their genre as well (Wirtz 2012, p. 341). It has to 
be highlighted that the theatrical exploitation is very important in order to signal 
the quality of a movie. Through the number of tickets sold, the preferences of 
consumers are revealed, but its proportion of the overall revenues of the motion 
picture industry has declined from a share of 50% in 1980 to less than 15% in 2008 
(Dessy and Gambaro 2010, p. 207).  
The second product segment includes the various movie specific offerings in 
the home entertainment sector. Albarran (2002, p. 123) notes that revenues from 
this sector can often surpass box office revenues. The products offered in this 
segment can be divided on the basis of their usage rights into limited and unlimited 
offerings. The limited use of the movie takes place in the context of rentals from 
video stores, pay per view channels and video on demand. In the sell through 
business, on the other hand, the consumer acquires the permanent usage right of 
the movie, so it can be viewed when and as often as the consumer wants (Ulin 2013, 
pp. 196-198). In terms of content, the products in the home entertainment sector can 
be further divided into three subgroups: (1) theatrical version of the movie, (2) 
additional movie material, i.e. audio commentary and (3) alternative movie 
material, i.e. a Director's cut with additional scenes (Wirtz 2012, p. 342). 
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The third product segments includes the various offerings in the TV 
landscape. A general differentiation can be made between Free TV and Pay TV. The 
latter can be further divided into varying business models including pay per 
channel, pay per view and video on demand (Ulin 2013, p. 272; Wirtz 2012, p. 427). 
Finally, the fourth product segment includes multiple merchandising 
products. In this segment a wide range of consumer goods and services can be 
found (Ulin 2013, pp. 445-446). Due to the diversity and heterogeneity of 
merchandising products a further differentiation is not feasible. However, some 
general product categories can be identified as highlighted in Figure 15. As this 
point it has to be noted that due to the very different nature of this segment, it will 
be excluded from the analysis.52 
4.1.2.2 Windowing 
The various product segments previously discussed are not all served at the 
same time. As Vogel (2015, p. 138) points out, movies are normally first distributed 
to the market that generates the highest marginal revenue over the least amount of 
time. They then cascade in order of marginal revenue contribution down to markets 
that return the lowest revenue per time unit. This has historically meant theatrical 
                                                     
52  This dissertation is concerned with intermediation, a vertical phenomenon. The 
cooperation with companies from different industries, as it is usually the case in 
the merchandising segment, relates more closely to the diagonal dimension  (as 
opposed to the vertical dimension) and is accordingly not in the scope of this 
analysis. Refer to Hagenhoff (2004, pp. 10-11) for an overview of the various 
dimensions. 
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release, followed by licensing to home entertainment distributors, pay cable 
program distributors, television networks, and finally local television syndicators. 
Distribution as Ulin (2013, p. 37) thus notes: “is all about maximizing discrete 
periods of exclusivity”. It has to be noted that in the United States and in most other 
countries, windows are negotiated between parties and are freely moveable. 
However, a few countries regulate windows to create order and to protect the local 
motion picture industry. France is the best known example as the windows for 
video, Pay- and Free TV exploitation are all set by law relative to the theatrical 
release (Ulin 2013, p. 38). Figure 16 shows how these periods have traditional been 
structured, when freely negotiated between parties.  
 
Fig.16: Traditional Windows of Exploitation (1999), based on: Ulin 2013, p. 41. 
However, because the amount of capital invested in features has become so 
large, and the pressure for faster recoupment so great, a trend towards earlier 
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opening of all windows53 could be witnessed in the past fifteen years. The 
introduction of various forms of video on demand and the digital sell through 
business brought additional changes to the windowing structure (Ulin 2013, pp. 
39-42). These changes are illustrated in Figure 17 and highlighted in red. 
 
Fig.17: Modern Windows of Exploitation (2014), based on: Ulin 2013, p. 41. 
As Litman (2000, p. 99) points out, the windowing strategy can be attributed 
to the application of the model of second-degree price discrimination.54 Consumers 
are segmented according to their different demand elasticities, in order to then be 
able to take full advantage of their individual willingness to pay. Consumers, who 
                                                     
53  In the motion picture and television sector the term window refers to the period 
of time in which contracts permit exclusive exhibition of a product (Vogel 2015, 
p. 611). 
54  This is essentially the same effect that has been discussed in Chapter 3.4.1.3, 
where price discrimination was highlighted as an incentive to cooperate with 
intermediaries from the producer’s point of view. 
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want to watch a movie shortly after its theater premiere, are willing to pay a higher 
amount, than those who wait until the movie is available for rent or will be shown 
on Free TV. With increasing duration of the exploitation phase and the movie going 
through the individual distribution channels, the recipient’s willingness to pay 
decreases. This is outline in Figure 18.  
 
Fig.18: Price of Movie Consumption across the Exploitation Chain, based on: 
Wirtz 2012, p. 375. 
Wirtz (2012, pp. 374-375) predicts in this context that through the 
digitalization of motion pictures, an additional sales potential (digital potential) 
can be developed. For example, movies could appear before or in parallel to their 
regular theatrical release in the form of a video stream at additional cost. It has to 
be pointed out, that while some producers experimented with a simultaneous 
digital and theatrical release, those releases have been very limited. The large 
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cinema chain operators will generally elect to not show movies that are 
simultaneously released online. A popular example is the African war drama Beasts 
of No Nation (2015),  the latest movie acquired by Netflix in a $12 million deal.  
Netflix debuted Beasts of No Nation (2015) in theaters and on its streaming service 
in 2015. However, since the largest circuits in the United States remain opposed to 
playing movies that are debuting simultaneously elsewhere, Beasts of No Nation 
(2015) was only shown in 200 to 250 independent theaters (McClintock 2015, w/o 
p.). This was not the first time that Netflix and exhibitors have found themselves at 
odds. In September 2014, Netflix and IMAX announced a deal whereby the sequel 
to Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000) will debut day and date on Netflix and in 
select IMAX theaters. However, circuits that operate IMAX venues, including AMC 
and Regal, immediately said they wouldn't play the movie. Sony faced a similar 
challenge with The Interview (2015), which ended up being offered digitally and in 
theaters simultaneously, however, only independent cinemas played the movie 
(Setoodeh 2015, w/o p.). In conclusion, the digital potential as envisioned by Wirtz 
(2012) has not materialized yet. 
4.1.2.3 Blockbusters vs. Niche Releases 
Another important product characteristic that has to be highlighted is the 
differentiation between mainstream products and niche products. It was already 
highlighted that a motion picture can be differentiated based on content as well as 
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by their artistic form (e.g. camera angels and editing).55 Content and form in turn 
determine the level of the artistic value, the entertainment value and ultimately, the 
mass suitability of the movie (Wirtz 2012, p. 371). 
By taking these criteria into account, mainstream productions can be 
differentiated from niche products. While large studios produce expensive movies 
with well-known stars, smaller companies often focus on cheaper productions with 
a higher artistical value. In this context, the blockbuster strategy represents a 
production strategy of particular importance (Aris et al. 2009, pp. 84-85; Gomery 
2004, p. 198). The aim of this strategy is to create and market movies with mass 
appeal. The whole process, from the initial idea to the production of the movie, 
differs significantly between a blockbuster and a conventional production (Wirtz 
2012, p. 371). The main differences will be briefly outlined in the following 
paragraphs. 
As Wirtz (2012, p. 372) points out, conventional and low-budget movies are 
usually initiated by independent producers, who want to produce a movie 
according to their own interests. In contrast, major studios, which produce mostly 
costly blockbusters, continuously perform market research (e.g. about the 
productions of competitors) as part of their strategic project planning. In parallel to 
this, market research institutions are also evaluating the requirements and desires 
                                                     
55  The analysis of the evolution of these artistic elements is not in the scope of this 
dissertation. Nevertheless, Selva (2012, p. 18) highlights that changes (i.e. an 
increase in close-ups and camera movements) have occurred in U.S. motion 
picture productions.  
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of the customer (e.g. preferred genre or favorite actor) using focus group analyses. 
This basic information provides the basis for the selection of potential ideas and 
screenplays. When several movies are planned or produced in parallel, then the 
content, the available resources and the release strategy have to be coordinated 
over the entire portfolio. The so-called blockbuster strategy pursued since the 1980s 
by the big Hollywood studios has the following characteristics (Wirtz 2012, p. 372): 
 Reduced annual production output, in order to market fewer products 
more intensively.56 
 Increased production of so-called event movies that are based on stars or 
well-known properties and characterized by high marketing costs.  
 Generating a high share of revenues within a very short period (e.g. the 
opening weekend).57 
 
Evidence of the persistence of the blockbuster strategy throughout the time 
frame examined in this dissertation can be found in the data collected for the Top 
100 domestic motion picture releases for each year from 1999 to 2014. The following 
graphic shows the percentage of the worldwide revenue the Top 10 (blue bar) and 
Bottom 10 (red bar) releases have achieved. This is compared to the percentage of 
the total production cost each group of 10 created (green and purple bar). 
                                                     
56  The number of releases by MPAA studios is down from 200 motion picture 
releases in 1999 to 136 releases in 2014 (Wrobel 2016, p. 126). 
57  In some cases, up to 50% of total sales are achieved at the premier weekend box-
office (Pascal 2002, p. 104). 
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Fig.19: Share of Worldwide Revenue and Production Cost (1999-2014), based on: 
Information courtesy of Nash Information Services (http://www.the-
numbers.com). 
In the past fifteen years, the Top 10 movies more or less consistently 
contributed roughly one third of the worldwide revenue the Top 100 releases 
generated in total. They do however, account for one fifth to one fourth of the total 
production cost of all one hundred movies examined in each year. As clearly visible 
in Figure 19, while the share of revenue remained more or less stable in the last 
fifteen years, the share of the production cost has risen noticeably. In 1999 for 
example, the Top 10 accounted only for 12.5% of the total production cost of the 
best one hundred domestic releases in that year. That number has since doubled 
and peaked in 2007, 2012 and 2014 when the share reached 25.93%, 25.17% and 
25.43% of the total production cost respectively.   
Unsurprisingly, the opposite picture emerges when the bottom of the Top 
100, the 91st to 100th highest grossing domestic releases, are examined. Both, in 1999 
as well as in 2014, the share of worldwide revenue for the Bottom 10 was below 2%. 
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The share peaked in 2006 with 4.5%. The only time in the last fifteen years in which 
the share exceeded the 4% mark. The share usually remained relatively constant 
between 2% and 3%. While the revenue contribution of the Bottom 10 is low, they 
do account for quite a bit of the production cost. In 2000 for example, the Bottom 
10 contributed 3.21% of worldwide revenues while accounting for 7.3% of the total 
production cost. While the cost share decreased in the following years, to around 
5% in the years 2006 to 2010 and to just over 3% in the last years, its remains 
comparatively high. In 2014 for example, the Bottom 10 contributed 1.82% of 
worldwide revenues while accounting for 3.18% of the total cost. 
The preceding analysis is to a certain agree able to quantify some of the 
aspects that have been highlighted before and the importance of blockbusters for 
creating large revenues becomes obvious. However, these large revenues come at 
the expense of considerable production cost. Finally, the analysis also showed, that 
the blockbuster strategy persisted in the last fifteen years. This may be unsurprising 
for some. After all, the strategy has been pursued by studios since at least the 
1980s.58 It is therefore necessary to highlight, that the strategy itself didn’t receive 
much attention from practitioners and academics alike until 2013. Even more 
astonishing, for the most part of the last fifteen years, the long tail theory, which 
directly contradicts the blockbuster strategy, dominated the discussion. 
Understanding the difference between both approaches is crucial for a detailed 
                                                     
58  Universal’s Lew Wasserman is typically credited for pioneering the blockbuster 
strategy with the release of Jaws (1975) in June 1975 (Gomery 2004, p. 198). 
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understanding of the unique product features of motion pictures, which is the focus 
of this sub chapter. The following paragraphs will therefore also briefly discuss the 
long tail theory and explain, why the discussion is relevant for the analysis of 
intermediaries in the motion picture industry. 
The long tail theory was formulated by Chris Anderson, editor of Wired 
magazine, and received widespread attention with the release of his best-selling 
book, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More, published in 
2006. Anderson (2008, p. 52) argues that culture and economy are increasingly 
shifting away from a focus on a relatively small number of hits (mainstream 
products and markets) at the head of the demand curve toward a huge number of 
niches in the tail. For him, the Internet can make narrowly targeted goods and 
services as economically attractive as mainstream products, because constraints of 
physical shelf space and other bottlenecks of distribution are removed. In other 
words, when consumers can find and afford products more closely tailored to their 
individual tastes, they will migrate away from hit products. Accordingly, it would 
be smart for companies to stop to rely on blockbusters and focus on the profits to 
be made from the long tail, i.e. niche offerings that cannot be offered profitably 
through bricks-and-mortar channels. Anderson (2006, pp. 95-104) concludes that 
the companies that will prosper, will be those that switch out of lowest-common-
denominator mode and figure out how to address niches. His ideas are best 
summed up by the six themes he identifies for the long tail age. These are illustrated 
in Table 35. 
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Tab.35: Anderson’s Six Themes of the Long Tail Age, based on: Anderson 2008,  
 p. 53. 
It is important to note that Anderson’s (2006) idea caught on with many 
industry insiders. For example, Google’s then chief executive officer, Eric Schmidt 
claims on the cover of Anderson’s (2006) book, that “Anderson’s beliefs influence 
Google’s strategic thinking in a profound way” (Schmidt quoted in Anderson 2006, 
w/o p.). Another example is Netflix, which in the past took pride in calling itself a 
long-tail company (Elberse 2013, p. 157). Lastly, many of the authors who examined 
the media industry and/or motion picture industry in the years after 2006, explicitly 
base some of their assumptions on Anderson’s (2006) ideas. For example, Finney 
(2010a, p. 17) as well as Bloore (2009, p. 17) predict disintermediation to occur in 
the value system of the motion picture industry. Their prediction is based on the 
idea that technological advancements will facilitate a closer communication 
# Theme / Prediction
1
- There are far more niche goods than hits in virtually all markets.
- This ratio is growing exponentially larger as the tools of production
   become cheaper and more ubiquitous.
2
- The costs of reaching niches are falling dramatically.
- This is driven by digital distribution, powerful search technologies and a critical mass of
   broadband penetration
- Online markets are resetting the economics of retail
- It is now possible to offer a massively expanded variety of products.
3
- Simply offering more variety, does not shift demand by itself.
- Filters that  can drive demand down the tail include a range of tools and techniques
  (e.g. recommendations and rankings).
4
- With massively expanded variety and filters to sort through it, the demand curve flattens.
- Hits will become relatively less popular while niches will become relatively more popular.
5
 - All those niches add up. 
- The many niche products can collectively comprise a market rivaling the hits.
6
- Once all of this is in place, the natural shape of demand is revealed.
- Undistorted by distribution bottlenecks, scarcity of information and limited shelf space. 
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between producers and consumers. They also expect that niche audiences can be 
served effectively. They argue that by being able to distribute a movie to thousands 
of potential consumer with the click of a mouse button, traditional intermediaries 
typically tasked with the distribution of movies would be eliminated.   
One of Anderson’s (2006) observations cannot be disputed – the observation 
that online businesses can offer much more variety than their analog counterparts. 
When transaction cost decrease and physical constraints on selection disappear, 
merchandise assortments can grow exponentially. This can easily be seen in 
practice: Amazon, for example, offers hundreds of thousands of music albums, the 
largest offline music store on the other hand, typically stocks only ten thousand 
titles. Similarly, whereas Netflix’s DVD title count is in the six figures, traditional 
video stores usually stock no more than a couple of thousand DVDs (Anderson 
2008, p. 23; Elberse 2013, pp. 157-158). 
In contrast, Anderson’s (2006) predictions about how demand is evolving, 
turned out to not reflect the reality and is therefore heavily criticized by Elberse 
(2013) 59. As previously highlighted, Anderson (2008, pp. 52-57) argues that online 
channels will actually change the shape of the demand curve. He believes that 
consumers value niche products geared to their particular interests more than they 
value products designed for mass appeal. As the Internet enables consumers to find 
                                                     
59  To clarify, Elberse (2008, pp. 88-96) started to question the long tail theory as 
early as 2008, however, her research didn’t receive a lot of attention until the 
release of her book Blockbusters in 2013. Noam (2010, p. 59) is another author, 
who challenged Anderson’s findings early on. 
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more niche products, their purchasing will change accordingly. In other words, 
consumption will shift from the head to the tail of the demand curve. In addition, 
Anderson (2008, p. 52-57) predicts that the tail will steadily grow longer, as more 
obscure products are made available, and it will also become fatter, as consumers 
discover products better suited to their tastes. This will eventually lead to a 
situation in which obscure products will erode the huge market share traditionally 
enjoyed by a relatively small number of hits (Anderson 2008, p. 53).  
As becomes obvious by now, the changes Anderson (2008, p. 53) predicts 
would have meant trouble for any producer relying on a blockbuster strategy. This 
is where Elberse (2013, p. 159) comes in to point out that “fortunately, for those 
betting on hits rather than niches, actual data on how markets are evolving tells a 
much different story than what Anderson has predicted.” Elberse (2013, pp. 159-
163) describes that with the shifting of demand from offline retailers to online 
channels, the sales distribution is not getting fatter in the tail. The contrary is the 
case, as time goes on and consumers buy more goods online, the tail is getting 
longer, but decidedly thinner. In regards to the blockbuster strategy, her findings 
indicate that the importance of individual bestsellers is not diminishing over time, 
instead, it is growing.  
While Elberse (2013) examines multiple sectors of the entertainment industry, 
her examples from the recorded music sector are the most astonishing and 
therefore perfectly suited to bring her point across. One of these examples is 
illustrated in Table 36, which provides an overview of the distribution of individual 
digital music track sales on the iTunes Store in the U.S. in 2011. 
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Tab.36: Recorded Music Digital Track Sales (2011), based on: Elberse 2013, p.  
 161. 
These numbers impressively demonstrate, how the possibility for artists to 
be in direct contact with the consumer ends up in practice. In the head, 102 songs 
(a mere 0.001% of the eight million tracks) sold more than one million units each 
and thus accounted for 15% of total sales. In regards to the tail, consumer didn’t 
find much interest in niche offerings. More than 7.5 million tracks, which amounts 
to 94% of the total tracks, sold fewer than 100 units each and accordingly only 
accounted for 5% of total sales. Even more astonishing, more than 2.5 million tracks 
(32% of all tracks) sold only one copy each (Elberse 2013, pp. 159-161). 
Elberse (2013, p. 163) highlights that these statistics for the recorded music 
industry are no coincidence. As already mentioned, she analyzed other sectors of 
the media industry as well, including the motion picture sector. Her research on 
# of titles selling at least one copy % of sales # of copies sold
102 titles selling 1.000.000 copies or more 15% 189.758.000 copies sold
1.412 titles selling 100.000-999.999 copies 25% 318.473.000 copies sold
13.492 titles selling 10.000-99.999 copies 29% 374.827.000 copies sold
74.246 titles selling 1.000-9.999 copies 17% 212.571.000 copies sold
382.720 titles selling 100-999 copies 9% 111.117.000 copies sold
1.620.959 titles selling 10-99 copies 4% 48.687.000 copies sold
5.927.729 titles selling fewer than 10 copies 1% 15.722.000 copies sold
8 million titles selling at least one copy 100% 1.271 billion copies sold
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video rentals and sales,60 however, yields the same patterns: Rather than a shift of 
demand to the long tail, an increased level of concentration in the market for digital 
entertainment goods can be witnessed. Instead of following Anderson’s (2006) long 
tail logic, the entertainment industry is moving more and more toward a winner-
take-all market (Elberse 2013, p. 163). This is illustrated in Figure 20 below. 
 
Fig.20: Long Tail Theory versus Winner-Take-All Theory, based on: Elberse 
2013, p. 163. 
                                                     
60  The research on video stores and video sales was conducted by Elberse and 
Oberholzer-Gee (2007) as well as Elberse and Schweidel (2009). 
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As highlighted by Elberse (2013, pp. 163-166) the whole discussion takes on 
an even greater meaning, when the behavior of individual consumers is taken into 
account.61 It becomes obvious, that it is important for manager to understand who 
is responsible for the volume of the business in the head and in the tail. In this 
regards, two old laws of consumer behavior first articulated by the sociologist 
William McPhee (1963) in his book Formal Theories of Mass Behavior, have to be 
highlighted. While McPhee (1963) explored his theories in settings that typically 
provided fewer than a dozen alternatives, Elberse (2013, p. 164) shows that his 
findings also hold true for enormous assortments consumers now find online.62 
McPhee (1963) identifies two important principles. First, he notes that a 
disproportionately large share of the audience for popular products consists of 
relatively light63 consumers, while a disproportionately large share of audiences for 
obscure products consists of relatively heavy64 consumers. In other words, obscure 
products are chosen by people who are familiar with many alternatives, popular 
products on the other hand are chosen by those who know of few alternatives. 
McPhee (1963, pp. 126-133) calls this phenomenon a “natural monopoly” because 
                                                     
61  While some of the previous points as well as the following discussion are more 
akin to demand characteristics rather than product characteristics, these aspects 
are still discussed here as they directly relate to the blockbuster vs long tail 
debate. 
62  Unsurprisingly, many of McPhee findings are at odds with Anderson’s thinking 
about the long tail (Elberse 2013, p. 164) 
63  The term light consumers refers to consumers who buy a particular type of 
product infrequently (McPhee 1963, pp. 126-133). 
64  The term heavy consumers on the other hand refers to consumers who purchase 
a particular type of product often (McPhee 1963, pp. 126-133). 
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it seems that hit products monopolize light consumers. It thus comes a no surprise 
that when Apple proudly announced it had amassed a hundred thousand iPhone 
apps in its App Store, over 98 percent of iPhone users had at the time shown no 
interest in any of the ninety-nine thousand least popular apps. As Elberse (2013, p. 
164) highlights: “Most people are perfectly content with the most popular products. 
(The wide appeal of these top titles is, of course, what makes them popular in the 
first place).” 
In regards to the second principle, McPhee (1963) also shows that consumers 
of obscure products generally appreciated those products less than they appreciate 
popular products. McPhee (1963, p. 134) labels this concept as “double jeopardy” 
because niche products have a double disadvantage: (1) they are not well known 
and (2) when they become known, it is by people, who actually prefer the popular 
products (McPhee 1963, pp. 134-140). Elberse (2013, p. 164) points to Netflix, whose 
niche titles receive significantly lower ratings than its hit titles, as an example for 
this phenomena. Many people intuitively believe that the obscure movie or book is 
at least a delight to those who find it. In reality, however, as Elberse (2013, p. 164) 
points out, the more obscure the title, the less likely it is to be appreciated. 
Unsurprisingly, Elberse’s book had quite an impact on the industry and 
encouraged researchers and practitioners alike to pay more attention to the 
importance and the economics of blockbusters. This is probably best exemplified 
by the following comments of Google’s Eric Schmidt, who had a change of heart 
about the long tail. Schmidt now acknowledges that “the tail is very interesting” 
but at the same time also highlights that “the vast majority of revenue remains in 
FLORIAN WROBEL  214 
the head”. He points out further that businesses can have a long tail strategy, but 
they better have a head as well, “because that’s where all the revenue is”. Finally, 
Schmidt also recognizes that “it is probable that the Internet will lead to larger 
blockbusters” (Schmidt quoted in Elberse 2013, pp. 165-166). 
Schmidt’s statements describe what can be witnessed in the motion picture 
industry today. The key take away from this sub chapter is the observation that the 
blockbuster theory is and has been the dominant strategy in the motion picture 
industry. Its dominance will continue as the motion picture industry continues to 
move more and more towards a winner-take-all market. This does not only help in 
providing an understanding about the product and its development over the years, 
it is highly relevant for the core topic of this dissertation as well. This is because a 
producer cannot execute a blockbuster strategy alone, instead he has to rely on 
intermediaries. For example, even highly vertical integrated media conglomerates 
will have to cooperate with (external) intermediaries at some point. For example, 
for the local distribution in remote places, i.e. countries in which the distributor has 
yet to establish its own operation. 
4.1.2.4 Innovation and Variation 
The last product characteristics that have to be highlighted are aspects of 
innovation and variation. A motion picture usually only runs in theaters for four 
to twelve weeks before other movies supplant it (Swani et al. 1999, p. 352). Due to 
these permanent changes of the movie program, movies can be described as new 
products or product innovations with varying degrees of innovation (Hennig-
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Thurau and Wruck 2000, p. 243; Wirtz 2012, p. 373). On the one hand, the degree of 
innovation can be determined in regards to the novelty of the content. Here, the 
production of proven concepts (Fast and Furious 7 (2015)) and the production of 
new concepts (Interstellar (2014)) can be distinguished. In this regard, it has to be 
highlighted, that industry insiders and various media outlets are increasingly 
pointing to a decrease in novelty in Hollywood (Obst 2013; Bond 2013; Eller and 
Wallenstein 2015). Obst (2013, pp. 36-41) for example argues that the decline of the 
DVD business led to a situation, in which studios are now heavily dependent on 
foreign markets for profits. This dependence, in turn, directly influences the type 
of motion pictures that are being produced, because it is easier to market movies, 
which have well known stars attached to them or are based on established 
properties. 
However, the analysis of 1.500 movies of the last fifteen years has yielded no 
statistical evidence to support the claim that the novelty has decreased. To the 
contrary, the data shows that the importance of foreign box revenues has not 
altered the product in any significant way in the past fifteen years. The majority of 
motion pictures produced in any given year are based on original screenplays. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of movies are neither sequels nor part of a franchise. 
While the actual number of franchises or sequels in any given year varies widely, 
the number is in no correlation with the growth and importance of the foreign box 
office (Wrobel 2016, pp. 130-133). 
On the other hand and in addition to the novelty, technological 
advancements are responsible for the degree of innovation of movies as well (Wirtz 
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2012, p. 373). Technical innovations in the production process and the digitalization 
of the movie material have driven innovation in the motion picture industry in the 
last decade. These advancements have enabled producers to create sequences, 
which previously have been considered impossible. This is particular the case in 
new digital 3D productions.65 
While the previous two points covered aspects of innovation, aspects of 
variation have to be examined as well. Product variations can be achieved by 
versioning, which refers to producing movie versions that differ from the original 
and thus have different benefits for the recipient (Shapiro and Varian 1998, p. 110). 
The versioning of movies has traditionally been particular relevant in the home 
entertainment segment. As previously discussed, consumers are able to buy a 
premium product (Director's cut version), a standard version of the movie and also 
an inexpensive variant (e.g. a DVD with no additional audio tracks or 
supplementary content). However, with the rise of digital cinema and other 
technologies, the importance of versioning has also increased sharply in the 
theatrical segment. Table 37 gives an overview on the different versions of the 
movie Transformers: Age of Extinction (2014) from which consumers could choose 
from. It is important to highlight, that these versions only differ in regards to the 
different sound options that have been offered to consumers. 
                                                     
65  Avatar (2009) and its use of digital 3D technology or The Hobbit: An Unexpected 
Journey (2012) and the introduction of HFR are examples for such technological 
product innovations. 
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Tab.37: Theatrical Sound Versions (Transformers 2014), based on: own research. 
When different picture and sound options are combined, the variety becomes 
even more pronounced. Consumers first faced this dilemma with the release of The 
Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey (2012). The movie was offered in an unprecedented 
number of versions as highlighted in Table 38.  
 
Tab.38: Theatrical Movie Versions (The Hobbit 2012), based on: own research. 
HFR refers to high frame rate and the corresponding increase of the frame 
rate to 48 frames per second. This creates smoother action, more depth in the 
images, and less strain on the eyes if the movie is playing in 3D. D-Box takes it a 
step further and changes how the movie actually feels. The theater’s seats 
themselves vibrate and sway in synch with the movie. IMAX, D-Box and Dolby 
Atmos all require their own uniquely-constructed theaters, consumers are thus not 
likely to see these formats cross paths.  
Datasat Dolby Atmos
Dolby Digital Auro 11.1
Dolby Surround 7.1
Theatrical Movie Versions (Sound)
Transformers: Age of Extinction (2014)
Film (35mm) HFR 3D
Digital 2D HFR 3D D-Box
Digital 3D HFR 3D Dolby Atmos
IMAX 3D IMAX HFR 3D
Theatrical Movie Versions
The Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey (2012)
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4.1.2.5 Summary 
The preceding analysis highlighted the unique characteristics of motion 
pictures. The analysis started out by highlighting that a motion picture is not a 
typical product, while it has product traits, it also exhibits many of the 
characteristics of a work of art (Crissey 2010, p. 4). The analysis continued by 
examining various product features, which yielded the following results: 
 Products from the motion picture industry can be divided into four product 
segments. 
 These segments are not served simultaneously, the objective is to maximize 
revenues from discrete periods of exclusivity. This is manifested in the 
windows of exploitation. 
 While technological advancements had an impact on the windowing 
structure, the fundamental principle of maximizing revenues from discrete 
periods of exclusivity still remains valid.  
 The blockbuster strategy is and has been the predominant production 
strategy of Major studios and is characterized by unique processes and 
economics. 
 The importance of the blockbuster strategy will remain, as the motion 
picture sector, just as the entertainment industry as a whole, is moving more 
and more toward a winner-take-all market (Elberse 2013, p. 163). 
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 Technology has particular driven product innovations in the motion picture 
industry. At the same time, the ability of studios to produce novel content 
has not decreased. 
 Due to technological advancements in digital cinema projection and sound 
systems, the importance of versioning has increased in the theatrical 
segment. Motion pictures are now offered in a variety that has increased 
considerably in the last years. 
 
Unsurprisingly, all these aspects are directly or indirectly relevant for the 
analysis of intermediation. The different product segments and the resulting 
windows of exploitation (and accordingly also price discrimination) provide 
insights into what to expect when the distribution of movies is examined in detail. 
For example, producers would either need to have multiple direct sales channels 
to address all segments or they would have to cooperate with intermediaries in 
order to achieve the desired effect. Likewise, technological product innovations 
and more variety, come at a cost. This already gives an indication that technology 
not necessarily has a cost reducing effect. Finally, the blockbuster strategy is also 
important as its execution typically requires the cooperation with intermediaries.  
4.1.3 Demand Characteristics 
In addition to the previously discussed product characteristics, it is also 
important to examine the demand characteristics. The next sub chapter will start 
with a discussion of general demand features such as demand cycles and seasonal 
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demand patterns. The remaining sub chapter will then highlight how the actual 
demand for motion picture has changed in the past fifteen years. This includes data 
from the global box office as well as data from the domestic box office. 
4.1.3.1 Admission Cycles 
In regards to general demand cycles and seasonal demand patterns, some 
interesting observations have been made in the past. Vogel (2015, pp. 92-94) for 
example points out, that the movie business has somewhat contra-cyclical 
characteristics. This is often derived from the depression-resistant performance of 
ticket sales. The same observation has been made by Nardone (1982) in the past. 
Nardone (1982) carried out an extensive study of cycles in demand and his study 
shows that the motion picture industry acts contra-cyclically to the economy 87.5% 
of the time in peaks and 69.3% of the time in troughs. In addition, there are also 
suggestions that both a four and ten year cycle in movie admission may be present. 
However, the statistical evidence in this regard is inconclusive.66  
Another aspect that has to be highlighted are the seasonal demand patterns. 
Vogel (2015, pp. 92-94) points out that these seasonal demand patterns are not as 
sharply defined as they used to be, for which he makes the large number of 
multiplexes scattered around the United States responsible. However, these 
seasonal demand patterns can still be distinguished and interpreted. Families in 
                                                     
66  Hofler (2009) provides an overview on the conducted tests on cyclical 
movement. Additional studies can be found in Gottmann (2009), Hamilton 
(1994) and Koopsmanns (1974). 
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the United States find it most convenient to see movies during vacation periods 
such as Thanksgiving, Christmas and Easter. During the summer month, children 
are out of school and have time to frequent the theaters. In fall, however, school 
begins again, new television programs are introduced and elections are held. This 
does not leave much time for going to the movies. The industry thus tends to 
concentrate most of its important releases within just a few weeks of the year. This 
makes the competition more expensive than it would be if audience attendance 
patterns were not as seasonally skewed (Vogel 2015, p. 94).  
4.1.3.2 Global Box Office 
Now that some of the general demand characteristics have been discussed, 
the remaining sub chapters will highlighted how the demand for motion pictures 
at the box office has changed in the past fifteen years. The focus in this sub chapter 
is on the global box office, which includes all motion pictures released worldwide, 
regardless of distributor or country of origin (MPAA 2015, p. 4). 
The development of the global box office is shown in Figure 21. A 
differentiation is made between domestic revenues (USA and Canada) and 
international or foreign revenues (all other markets). The numbers at the bottom 
(blue) represent the grosses that have been made at the domestic box office in the 
past fifteen years whereas the top row (red) highlights the international grosses. 
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Fig.21: Global Box Office Revenues (1999-2014), based on: MPA (2006), pp. 4-5; 
MPA (2003), p. 4; MPAA (2015), p. 4; MPAA (2010), p. 3. 
As illustrated in Figure 21, the global box office reached a new all-time high 
in 2014 with revenues of $36.4 billion.67 Compared to the $15.2 billion reached in 
1999, this represents an increase of 139% in the last fifteen years and an average 
annual growth rate of 9.2% (MPA 2003, p. 4; MPAA 2015, p. 4). For a more nuanced 
picture, the development of domestic and foreign grosses has to be examined 
separately (Wrobel 2016, pp. 123-124). 
In 2014 the foreign box office reached revenues of $26.0 billion and accounted 
for 72% of global box office revenues (MPAA 2015, p. 4). In 1999, foreign box office 
revenues reached $7.8 billion, which was only slightly higher than the domestic 
box office with $7.4 billion in revenues. Accordingly, the foreign box office only 
accounted for 51% of the global box office revenues in that year (MPA 2003, p. 4). 
                                                     
67  An increasing number of academic papers have investigated the factors that are 
contributing to the success of motion pictures at the box office. Noteworthy 
studies include those of Chang and Ki (2005), Collin et al. (2002), De Vany and 
Walls (1999), Elberse and Eliashberg (2003), Elliott and Simmons (2008), Ravid 
(1999) as well as Reinstein and Snyder (2005). 
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These numbers show that the share of foreign revenues of the global box office 
increased by 21% in the last fifteen years, while the share of domestic revenues is 
consequently down from 49% in 1999 to 28% in 2014 (Wrobel 2016, p. 124).  
When comparing the foreign box office growth rate with the global box office 
growth rate, it becomes evident that the foreign box office revenues are the growth 
driver for the global box office. This is clearly visible in Figure 21 as well. Compared 
to 2013, foreign box office revenues in U.S. dollars68 are up 4% in 2014, compared 
to 2009 they are up 24% and compared to 1999 they are up 233%. Global box office 
revenues, on the other hand, are only up 15% (2009) and 139% (1999) respectively 
(MPAA 2015, p. 4; Wrobel 2016, p. 124).  
The domestic box office on the other hand did only grow slightly in the past 
fifteen years, from $7.4 billion in 1999 to $10.4 billion in 2014. The number from 
2014 is actually down 5% from the $10.9 billion achieved in 2013. The next sub 
chapter will therefore examine the development of the domestic box office more 
closely, including the development of ticket sales and ticket prices. 
4.1.3.3 Domestic Box Office, Admissions and Ticket Prices 
The previous sub chapter already highlighted that the domestic box office in 
2014 ($10.4 billion) was actually down 5% from $10.9 billion in 2013. 2014’s number 
also represents a decrease when compared to the $10.6 billion reached in 2009 and 
                                                     
68  Vogel (2015, pp. 98-103) provides an overview on the impact of swings in 
foreign-currency exchange rates on the profitability of U.S. studios.  
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an increase of 41% when compared to the $7.4 billion reached in 1999. Thus, while 
domestic revenues grew 41% over the last fifteen years, foreign revenues grew by 
233% in the same time frame (MPAA 2015, p. 4; Wrobel 2016, p. 124). This dire 
situation of the domestic box office is also reflected in ticket sales, which are 
illustrated in Figure 22 below. 
 
Fig.22: Domestic Ticket Sales (1999-2014), based on: MPA (2006), p. 6; MPAA 
(2015), p. 9. 
As highlighted in Figure 22, domestic admissions or tickets sold peaked in 
2002 with 1.59 billion tickets sold and are on a downward trend since then. The 1.27 
billion tickets sold in 2014 is the lowest number of admissions in the last fifteen 
years. Admissions declined by 6% in 2014 when compared to the 1.34 billion tickets 
sold in 2013 and are down by 13% when compared to 1.44 billion tickets sold in 
1999 (MPA 2006, p. 6; MPAA 2015, p. 9; Wrobel 2016, p. 125). 
In order to be able to put the decrease in ticket sales into perspective, the 
development of the average ticket price has to be examined as well. The 
development is shown in Figure 23. In the last fifteen years the average ticket price 
increased by $3.09 or 61%. In 1999 the average price for an admission was $5.08 
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(MPAA 2009, p. 4), while in 2014 a ticket cost $8.17 on average. When compared to 
2013, the average ticket price only increased by 4 cents (less than 1%) in 2014, which 
is less than the 2% increase in inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) (MPAA 2015, p. 9). However, when looking at all fifteen years, the average 
yearly increase in domestic tickets prices is around 4%. Nevertheless, the ticket 
price increase cannot mitigate the decrease in admissions (Wrobel 2016, p. 125). 
 
Fig.23: Average Domestic Ticket Price (1999-2014), based on: MPA (2006), p. 6; 
MPAA (2015), p. 9. 
4.1.3.4 Foreign Box Office Importance 
As highlighted during the demarcation of the motion picture industry, the 
focus in this dissertation is on U.S. movie productions. The previous sub chapters 
highlighted, that the domestic box office revenues are only slowly growing and 
even decreased from 2013 to 2014. It thus comes as no surprise that Hollywood 
studios are increasingly marketing movies to foreign territories, where the demand 
is stronger and the growth potential higher. This sub chapter will thus take the 
viewpoint of a Hollywood studio and examine how relevant foreign demand is for 
the overall performance of a movie. 
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The 100 highest domestic grossing movies for each year from 1999 and 2014 
have been examined in regards to the distribution of the revenues. The result is 
illustrated in Figure 24, which shows the domestic and foreign box office revenues 
as a percentage of total box office revenues for the Top 100 domestic releases in 
each of the last fifteen years. The bottom row (blue) represents the percentage of 
domestic revenues and the top row (red) the percentage of foreign revenues. 
 
Fig.24: Distribution of Box Office Revenues (1999-2014), based on: Information 
courtesy of Box Office Mojo (http://www.boxofficemojo.com). 
As highlighted in Figure 24 above, the share of foreign revenues for the Top 
100 domestic movies has grown over the past fifteen years and since 2010, foreign 
revenues account for roughly half of the total revenues.69 In comparison, in 1999, 
the Top 100 domestic motion pictures still grossed 61.45% of their total revenue 
domestically, with the remaining 38.55% being contributed by foreign markets. 
                                                     
69  This is not a new observation. Vogel (2015, p. 147) confirms that “the top 100 
films of any year have been consistent in drawing more than half of their total 
box-office income in foreign markets”. 
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That number increased to over 50% for the first time in the past fifteen years in 2013 
(Wrobel 2016, p. 128). 
The growth of foreign markets has two aspects that have to be considered 
from the perspective of Hollywood studios: (1) access to more countries and (2) 
access to more screens per country.70 The first point can be examined by using the 
data collected for the 100 highest domestic grossing pictures for each of the last 
fifteen years. Figure 25 shows the number of countries the widest release of each 
year opened in (blue bar on the left) and the average number of countries the Top 
100 motion pictures opened in (red bar on the right). 
 
Fig.25: Widest Release and Average Width of Top 100 Releases (1999-2014), 
based on: Information courtesy of IMDb (http://www.imdb.com). 
The results of the analysis of the widest releases are somewhat surprising: 
Star Wars: Episode I - The Phantom Menace (1999) opened in 75 different countries 
                                                     
70  Evidence for the organic growth can be directly derived from industry reports. 
The Chinese box office for example increased 34% in 2014 and became the first 
international market to exceed $4 billion in box office revenues (MPAA 2015, p. 
5).  
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around the globe. That is the same number of countries Godzilla (2014) opened in. 
These numbers suggest that blockbusters with mass appeal could open in dozens 
of different countries fifteen years ago, just as they do today. The widest released 
motion picture of 2014 was released in 92 countries, a moderate 22.6% increase, 
when compared to the widest release from 1999 (Wrobel 2016, p. 128). 
However, when looking at the average number of countries the 100 highest 
domestic grossing motion pictures of a given year have been released in, a clear 
trend can be identified. While in 1999 the Top 100 movies were released in 32 
countries on average, they were released in 57 different countries on average in 
2014, an increase of 78.1%. This suggests that especially mid-budget motion 
pictures have gained an increased exposure in recent years, being seen in 25 more 
countries - on average - than in 1999 (Wrobel 2016, pp. 127-129). 
4.1.3.5 Summary 
In the preceding sub chapters the demand characteristics have been 
examined. The analysis showed that demand for motion pictures has somewhat 
contra-cyclical characteristics and that the industry tends to concentrate most of its 
important releases within just a few weeks of the year (Vogel 2015, p. 94). The later 
aspect has been explained by seasonal demand patterns. The analysis then shifted 
towards the actual demand for motion pictures and the changes in the past fifteen 
years. The findings can be summed up as follows: 
 The demand for motion pictures has been growing faster in the rest of the 
world than in the United States and Canada.  
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 By 2014, revenues from markets outside North America accounted for more 
than 70% of the global box office. 
 From the perspective of a U.S. based studio, the importance of revenues 
from foreign markets has increased over the last 15 years. Foreign box office 
revenues currently account for roughly half of the total revenues. 
 Accordingly, foreign markets represent a tremendous growth opportunity 
for Hollywood studios. They grow faster than the domestic market and U.S. 
studios have not yet been able to increase their foreign share at a similar 
growth rate. 
 
While the discussion of the general demand characteristics is helpful to 
understand how the industry works, these aspects only have a limited influence on 
the analysis of intermediation. The analysis of the global and domestic box office 
and its evolution in the past fifteen years, however, further highlights the 
importance of global hits and global stars, which was previously discussed as part 
of the blockbuster strategy. Likewise, global distribution involves intermediaries 
as it is unlikely that a producer or distributor can serve every country or territory 
without assistance. 
4.1.4 Value Added Structure and Market Participants 
With the relevant product and demand characteristics discussed, the focus 
will now shift towards the value added structure of the industry. In the next sub 
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chapter the value added structure of the motion picture industry will be discussed 
and visualized by using the Enhanced Value System Model that was developed in 
Chapter 3. In the course of the analysis the actual value added process from idea to 
consumption will be examined and the involved market participants will be 
pointed out.  
4.1.4.1 Value System of the Motion Picture Industry  
The value chain model has emerged as a prominent analysis method in the 
media industry over the last ten years. It is used for the analysis of individual 
sectors, such as the motion picture sector, as well as for the analysis of the media 
industry as whole. In both cases, usually the essential steps of the value creation 
process are identified and structured in order to derive recommendations for the 
practice. For the media industry as a whole, various value chain models with 
varying steps can be identified. A selection of these models is illustrated in Table 
39.  
As becomes evident from Table 39, all authors see production and 
distribution as essential steps. There is however no unity in regards to where the 
value added process starts and ends. Some authors include acquisition and 
consumption as essential steps, while others do not. The various authors also do 
not agree whether there is an intermediate step (bundling, aggregation, etc.) 
between production and distribution or not. 
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Tab.39: Value Added View of the Media Industry, based on: Albarran 2002, p. 
  14; Hass 2002, pp. 19-20; Owers et al. 1998, p. 2; Picard 2011, p. 45;  
  Schumann and Hess 2014, p. 183; Siegert 2003, p. 229; Wirtz 2012, p. 77. 
 The same observation can be made in regards to the application of value 
added concept to the motion picture sector. Table 40 provides an overview of 
popular and often referenced value added concepts for the motion picture sector. 
As becomes evident, the degree in variation is even more pronounced. 
Production, distribution and exhibition/exploitation are the only value added steps 
that have been identified by all authors. Some authors identify dozens of additional 
steps, creating many different views on the value added structure. All 
contributions, follow the questionable practice of using value chain terminology, 
even though the structure at the industry level is discussed. This approach is 
questionable as it is debatable, whether all participants in the system in which a 
production company operates in, always work towards a common purpose. 
Additionally, the producer often has minimal influence over the processes in other 
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chains in the wider system. Both assertions, however, are key assumptions used in 
value chain phraseology (Crissey 2010, pp. 5-6). Therefore, contrary to 
contemporary usage, this dissertation will continue to draw a distinction between 
a value chain and a value system. 
 
Tab.40: Value Added View of the Motion Picture Industry, based on:  
  Eliashberg et al. 2006, p. 639; Hawkins and Vickery 2008, p. 63; Küng  
  2008, p. 71; Bloore 2009, p. 8;  Finney 2010a, p. 7; Wirtz 2012, p. 344. 
As already highlighted in Chapter 3, this dissertation will also not follow 
contemporary practice in regards to the visualization of the value added structure. 
The majority of the approaches highlighted in Table 39 and Table 40 follow the 
questionable practice of using arrows going from left to right. The shortcomings of 
this practice have already been discussed. This dissertation will instead use the 
Enhanced Value System Model developed in Chapter 3 to visualize the value 
Author Year Value Added View of the Motion Picture Industry
Eliashberg et al. 2006 Production, Distribution, Exhibition, Consumption
Hawkins and Vickery 2008
Pre-Production, Production, Post-Production, Market 
Research, Marketing, Duplication, Distribution, Exhibition, 
Auxiliary Exploitation 
Küng 2008
Acquisition / Development, Production, Licensing, Marketing, 
Distribution, Exhibition
Bloore 2009
Development, Financing / Pre-Sales, Production, International 
Sales / Licensing, International Distribution, Exhibition / 
Exploitation, Consumption
Finney 2010
Development, Financing, Pre-Sales, Production, Sales / 
Licensing, Distribution,  Exploitation
Wirtz 2012
Acquisition / Pre-Production, Production / Post-Production, 
Licensing, Exploitation
EX-POST ANALYSIS OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 233 
added structure of the motion picture industry. Figure 26 shows the result and 
illustrates the traditional value added structure of the motion picture industry.  
 
Fig.26: Traditional Motion Picture Value System (1999), based on: Wrobel 2014, 
p. 76. 
Through the application of the model developed in Chapter 3, the complex 
value added structure of the motion picture industry becomes evident. Even more 
importantly, the magnitude of different intermediaries involved in the various 
stages of the model becomes obvious. These intermediaries are highlighted by the 
golden (match maker) and orange (market maker) boxes. Match makers play an 
important role in the Development and Production Stage whereas market makers 
are especially important in the Licensing, Distribution and Marketing Stage. 
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The Motion Picture Value System Model is divided into three large stages: (1) 
Development and Production, (2) Licensing, Distribution and Marketing as well as 
(3) Exploitation and Consumption. In each stage a variety of activities are carried 
out that all add value in one or the other way. Once one stage has been completed, 
the project moves to the next stage. The producer or the production company is 
seen as the center of the value system, this is indicated by the blue box. To use 
Porter’s nomenclature: Actors, service providers, investors, etc. represent the 
supplier value chains for the production company, while sales agencies, 
distributors, exhibitors, etc. represent the channel value chains (Wrobel 2014, p. 75).  
 It is important to note, that the focus of the model is not on the individual 
market participants and their value added configuration. Instead, the focus is on 
the main activities required to produce and market a motion picture to the 
consumer. These main activities are the headlines included in each outer box in the 
model, such as coordination, matching or release planning. Examples for players 
that are commonly carrying out said activity are displayed in the inner boxes. This 
is not to suggest that these players cannot carry out other activities as well. The 
model should be seen as flexible and adjustable, as in theory, any player can 
perform any activity or group of activities (Wrobel 2014, p. 75). Now that the core 
design features have been discussed, the focus can shift towards the modern value 
added structure, which is illustrated in Figure 27. 
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Fig.27: Modern Motion Picture Value System (2014), based on: Wrobel 2014, p. 
76. 
From this industry level point of view, the value added structure of the 
motion picture industry changed less than might have been expected. 
Unsurprisingly, the distribution of movies to consumers over the Internet 
enhanced the home entertainment segment and ultimately brought additional 
intermediaries into the system. Beside this obvious change, other changes are less 
apparent. The following sub chapter will therefore examine each stage of the 
motion picture value system in detail. The general activities in each stage will be 
discussed and the intermediaries will be pointed out. Finally, the relevant changes 
in the past fifteen years will be discussed for each stage as well.  
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4.1.4.2 Development and Production Stage 
The production of motion pictures has project similar characteristics and 
since movies are of singular and non-reproducible guise, the production processes 
differ from case to case. However, the principal succession of the three steps (1) 
development / pre-production, (2) shooting / production and (3) post-production 
can be found in any movie production (Wirtz 2012, p. 365). These three steps are 
detailed in Figure 28 and also visualized in the motion picture value system.  
 
Fig.28: Stages of the Movie Production Process, based on: Wirtz 2012, p. 366. 
The chronological starting point for any motion picture production is the 
development / pre-production phase. It includes all activities surrounding the 
initial concept or story idea, the acquisition of that idea, the screenwriting process, 
the raising of finance and the initial stage of production planning (Bloore 2009, p. 
8). It has to be noted that the visualization of this stage in the motion picture value 
system does not accurately account for its complexity. The initial idea stage alone 
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is loosely structured and there are numerous different routes71 an idea can take 
towards a full screenplay commission (Finney 2010, p. 23). 
One of the most important tasks of the producer is to secure financing for the 
movie, which can involve various institutions with very different objectives. Finney 
(2010, p. 25) points out private equity funds, banks and public subsidy funds as 
typical examples of such institutions. The motion picture value system only shows 
some of the possible parties involved in movie financing.72 These have to be 
adjusted on a project by project basis. 
Other pre-production activities include the development of the property, 
which refers to finalizing the screenplay and transferring it into storyboards that 
set out the dialogue and scene structure as well as the selection and contracting of 
key creative personnel such as actors and directors. The producer typically does 
this with the help of talent agencies, the first intermediary highlighted in the 
motion picture value system. Lastly, creative and administrative personnel have to 
be contracted to design, realize and organize all aspects of the production (Hawkins 
and Vickery 2008, p. 64). For some major productions, the process of selecting 
actors and extras may often require specialized staff. In those cases a casting 
                                                     
71  Finney (2010, p. 24) provides an overview on the various routes an idea can take 
towards a full screenplay commission. 
72  Finney (2010, pp. 61-74) discusses the financing of independent productions in 
details. Vogel (2015, pp. 128-134) provides an extensive analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages as well as the economics behind various 
financing options.  
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director is in charge of most of the daily work involved in this pre-production 
process. 
The actual production begins only after these preparatory activities have 
been completed. In this phase the motion picture is shot, which refers to the 
photographing and recording of live action and background sequences. This stage 
usually lasts a few months. During the shooting most of the intangible personality 
and look-and-feel value is added by various creative professions (Wrobel 2014, p. 
82-83). After the movie material has been created, it goes through quality control 
and, when necessary, a brief period of additional shooting could follow (Wirtz 
2012, p, 366). Once the shooting is completed, the motion picture enters post- 
production. This is where the negatives are processed and any required special 
effects are produced and incorporated into the negative. Additionally, voice-overs, 
sound effects and music are created, recorded and added to the negative. This 
represents the final level of creative value added within the Development and 
Production Stage (Hawkins and Vickery 2008, p. 65).  
In regards to relevant changes in the Development and Production Stage, a 
variety of aspects have to be highlighted. The blockbuster strategy is 
unsurprisingly responsible for two changes: (1) new entities entering the 
production segment and (2) rising production cost. In regards to the first point, it 
comes as no surprise that other entities also realized that a few hits still go a long 
way. Netflix, traditionally an intermediary in the Licensing, Distribution and 
Marketing Stage, was one of the first to enter the content production business. 
Instead of the long tail company it once seemed intent on becoming, Netflix started 
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to act like an old-school television network and spend millions on its first original 
content (Elberse 2013, p. 168). Other player that traditionally have not been 
involved in the production of content followed suit. Especially noteworthy is 
Amazon, which founded Amazon Studios in 2010 with the goal to develop 
commercially viable feature movies (Fritz 2010, w/o p.; Ulin 2013, pp. 369-380). 
What is interesting about Amazon Studios is that it attempts to use technology to 
completely alter the development and production processes. Amazon Studios 
offers a platform to which anyone can upload a script. Other users can then review 
the script and provide feedback to the author. Amazon also encourages directors 
and producers to pick up one of the available scripts and produce a test movie. 
Accordingly, a whole lot of new possibilities emerge for consumers and creative 
talent to interact with each other. At the same time, Amazon Studios retains the 
exclusive right to buy the script and release a motion picture based on it as a 
theatrical feature (Wrobel 2004, p. 115). 
This development of new players emerging in the production segment comes 
as no surprise. Finney (2010, p. 211) argued as early as 2010 that technology 
companies as well as global aggregators, such as Google and Apple, will also 
become involved in the production of content in order to drive their respective 
platforms. Finney (2010a, p. 18) goes on to predict, that this in turn will cut out third 
party distribution completely. 
While Finney (2010) has been correct with his prediction that many new 
entities will get involved in the production of motion pictures. His is wrong in his 
assumption that third party distribution (i.e. intermediaries) will be cut out 
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completely. Based on the basics of the blockbuster strategy, these new players 
realized the importance of owning the content. However, the fundamental 
principles of maximizing discrete periods of exclusivity and generating a high 
share of revenues within a very short period are equally still valid. This explains 
for example why Netflix, the intermediary that also started to produce, licensed its 
first series to other intermediaries on international markets.73  
In addition to the increase of players in the production segment, the increase 
in production costs has to be pointed out as a relevant change as well. This increase, 
as previously highlighted, can to a large degree be attributed to the blockbuster 
strategy (Noam 2010, pp. 65-66). It is nowadays not uncommon for stars to ask for 
$20 million to star in a movie (THR 2014, w/o p.). The cost for actors are however 
not the only aspect that have to be taken into account when looking at production 
cost. Production costs are the sum of all costs incurred in all three phases: (1) the 
cost incurred in the pre-production phase, such as the costs for the acquisition of 
the story rights or for the production planning, (2) the cost for the actual shooting 
of the movie as well as (3) the cost that result from post-production. In addition, 
insurance costs and, in cases of vertically integrated companies, the studio 
overhead can also contribute towards the production costs or the so-called negative 
                                                     
73  In Germany, for example, Netflix didn’t establish its own operations until 2014. 
Accordingly, when it produced and released House of Cards (2013), it licensed 
the exclusive rights to Sky Atlantic HD (Eckardt and Klode 2014, w/o p.).  
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cost.74 As indicated, these cost have risen in the past fifteen years. Figure 29 shows 
the development of the average negative costs for MPAA75 studios in the years from 
1999 to 2007.76  
 
Fig.29: MPAA Studios Average Negative Cost (1999-2007), based on: MPA 2003, 
p. 20; MPAA 2008, p. 7. 
As highlighted in Figure 29 the average negative cost for MPAA studios 
increased from $51.5 million in 1999 to $70.8 million in 2007, an increase of $19.3 
                                                     
74  Vogel (2015, pp. 133-135) provides a detailed overview of the negative cost 
components. 
75  Member studios include: Walt Disney Studios, Paramount Pictures, Sony 
Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal and Warner Bros. (MPAA 2015, p. 
21). 
76  MPAA studios changed their reporting standard. 2007 was the last year in which 
the MPAA studios made negative as well as print and advertising costs (P&A) 
public. By 2010, the average production cost exceeded $80 million for some 
studios (Gerbrandt 2010, w/o p.). 
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million or 37.5%.77 It is important to note that these are the average negative cost 
for MPAA studios for one motion picture. MPAA studios typically release around 
15-20 motion pictures a year, less than a handful of these will be marketed as 
blockbusters or event movies, which accordingly have much high production 
budgets than the average number suggests. Finally, in regards to the increase in 
negative cost, the increasing importance of digital editing in the post-production 
phase has to be highlighted as well. Nowadays, hardly any motion picture 
production that is aimed at the masses can be produced without the use of 
computer technologies. Since the quality of the produced images is dependent on 
the performance of the hardware and software, there is often a need to use state-
of-the-art technologies. Otherwise the quality of the picture would result in 
competitive disadvantages. This is especially of major importance when digital 3D 
technology is used (Wirtz 2012, p. 335). Accordingly, additional cost occur that 
push the negative cost even higher. 
In addition to the previously discussed changes, one additional aspect has to 
be highlighted, namely, the changes that result from the conversion from analog to 
digital processes in the production and post-production phases.  Eliashberg et al. 
(2006, p. 645) point to improved efficiency as about 85% of the film shot at 
                                                     
77  The average negative costs rose dramatically in the years before 1999 as well. In 
1980 the average negative cost was $8.5 million, by 1990 that number had 
reached $26.8 million. The number increased again in 1996 to $39.8 million and 
made another big jump the following year when the average negative cost 
amounted to $53.4 million (Albarran 2002, p. 121). 
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production is not used. They also highlight the greater control digital technology 
gives to producers and how it transforms this typically linear process into a non-
linear process. Digital technology enables producers to transfer scenes from one 
location to the other almost instantaneously. Negatives no longer have to be 
chemically processed, visual- and sound effects can be prepared in advance and 
integrated with a great deal of flexibility. Digital technology has also given 
producers more control over the environment in which they tell their story. That is 
perhaps best exemplified by the use of computer generated imagery (CGI). CGI is 
nowadays increasingly used to create a completely virtual environment or to create 
virtual characters that interact with a real environment as well as the production of 
stand-ins for real actors in scenes requiring dangerous or impossible stunt work 
(Eliashberg et al. 2006, pp. 645-646). 
Finally, Hawkins and Vickery (2008, p. 99) point out, that regardless of 
whether the production environment is digital or analog, many of the same tasks 
in the movie production process remain. For example, it doesn’t matter how the 
images are captured, live action productions retain all of the mechanical trades. 
Likewise, a production still requires a film editor, sound editor and composer. In 
other words, although the production environment has transformed, many of the 
now required tasks remain directly tied to human skills.78 This also explains, why 
                                                     
78  Hawkins and Vickery (2008, p. 99) provide an overview on how the required 
skills have evolved due to the conversion from analog to digital production 
processes. 
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technological advancements did not have a cost reducing effect on this particular 
stage of the value system. 
4.1.4.3 Licensing, Distribution and Marketing Stage 
Once all post-production activities have been completed, the project enters 
the Licensing, Distribution and Marketing Stage. In this stage the producer has to 
secure the distribution of the motion picture and the distributors prepare to deliver 
the motion picture to their respective buyers. A differentiation can be made 
between Major studio productions and independent productions. For Major 
studios the distribution is typically handled by a subsidiary of the studio and many 
international sales are handled through automatic output deals (Bloore 2009, p. 10). 
Independent productions on the other hand, have to find a distributor first. Sales 
agencies, an additional intermediary in the value system mediating between 
producers and distributors, usually assist with this task. In this regards, festivals, 
yet another intermediary, are also from particular importance. They provide 
independent producers with a market place to highlight their movies and to get in 
contact with potential buyers (i.e. distributors). 
Once the producer has secured distribution, the actual distribution and 
marketing activities start. As Bloore (2009, p. 10) points out, each distributor has to 
prepare the delivery of the motion picture to their respective buyers (e.g. the theater 
owner, the video store, etc.). This includes activities such as sales, reproduction and 
transformation as well as the delivery of the movie to the respective buyers, such 
as a film print, DVDs, or a television master. Distributors are intermediaries as well 
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and play a very important role in the motion picture value system. Additionally, 
distributors typically cooperate with laboratories, which carry out many of the 
previously mentioned physical activities. 
For each category of media, the distributor has to address how the motion 
picture is consumed and monetized. This includes setting the price, deciding where 
and how the motion picture is sold or rented, how many units are being made and 
how the inventory is managed (Ulin 2013, p. 497; Wrobel 2014, p. 86).  
Unsurprisingly, technological advancements brought some fundamental 
changes to this particular stage of the motion picture value system. As those 
directly concern the intermediaries, they will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
4.2. Nevertheless, one of the profound changes should still be mentioned again at 
this point. It was already highlighted as part of the discussion of the windows of 
exploitation that the introduction of various forms of video on demand over the 
Internet as well as the digital sale through business created additional windows. 
Accordingly, the Distribution, Licensing and Marketing Stage has become more 
complex in the last fifteen years. Through the various forms of online offerings, 
new media was created for which an exclusive license could be granted. Thus, new 
players emerged with whom the distributor has to negotiate. Additionally, the 
distributors have to figure out, how these new windows of exploitation fit into the 
overall strategy of maximizing discrete periods of exclusivity.  
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4.1.4.4 Exploitation and Consumption Stage 
In the Exploitation and Consumption Stage the motion picture is presented 
to and consumed by the consumer. This stage is full of market makers. The cinema 
operator, for example, adds value by exhibiting the movie in locations that are 
convenient for potential audiences and in surroundings that are conducive to 
promoting motion picture attendance. This includes the provision of high-
technology sound and projection systems (Hawkins and Vickery 2008, p. 66). 
In the home entertainment segment, DVDs and Blu-Rays are made available 
for consumers to purchase or to rent at various retailers. Additionally, different 
online distribution options are provided by various digital distributors including 
on demand streaming, downloads and peer-to-peer technologies (Bloore 2009, p. 
10). Finally, various TV networks add value by providing an additional outlet for 
the public distribution of motion pictures. This includes Pay TV and Free TV 
(Hawkins and Vickery 2008, p. 66). Since the changes in this sector also directly 
relate to the intermediaries, they will likewise be discussed in Chapter 4.2. 
In regards to the inclusion of the consumer in the motion picture value 
system, three arguments have to be highlighted. Two of them are highlighted by 
Bloore (2009), who points out two key value-related functions of the consumer. (1) 
The consumer purchases the product and thus allows financial value to return 
down the system. (2) The response of the consumer to the product influences the 
long term value and reputation of the motion picture (Bloore 2009, p. 11). The last 
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arguments is provided by Porter (2004, p. 34), who points out that “the ultimate 
basis for differentiation is a firm and its product’s role in the buyer’s value chain”.79  
4.1.4.5 Major Studio Sector 
The previous sub chapters examined each stage of the motion picture value 
system in detail and explained, how a motion picture is created, distributed and 
marketed. While the focus still is on the value added structure and the market 
participants, this sub chapter will detail one aspect that has been mentioned 
throughout Chapter 4, but has not been explained so far  - Hollywood’s Major 
studio system. 
 The Major studios are part of highly vertical integrated corporate 
conglomerates. They have dominated Hollywood for more than a century and, 
while the past fifteen years saw mergers, acquisitions and cooperations among 
those six, their dominant position has not changed.80 The power of their oligopoly 
can most easily be seen in the activities of their trade association: the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA). It deals with common concerns from rating 
motion pictures to smoothing the way for international distribution to protecting 
copyrights around the world (MPAA 2010a; 2015a).81 
                                                     
79  Refer to Brack (2003, pp. 80-83) on how the individual gross benefit from media 
products for consumers can be classified.  
80  For a detailed overview on the history of the motion picture industry and the six 
major studios refer to Kreuzer (2009, pp. 16-18). 
81  A poll in 1996 ranked the MPAA the 18th most powerful lobby in Washington, 
D.C. (Gomery 2004, p. 197). 
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Due to the high degree of vertical integration, these studios unite almost all 
resources from producers, investors, distributors, retail stores and TV networks 
under one corporate umbrella. Accordingly, they almost cover the entire value 
system (Wirtz 2012, p. 319). This is illustrated in Figure 30. 
 
Fig.30: Vertical Integration in the Motion Picture Value System (2014), based 
on: own research. 
In order to highlight the degree of vertical integration, all entities that can be 
part of a large media conglomerate are visualized with a blue box. It has to be 
noted, that not every conglomerate covers all highlighted entities. For example, 
only Disney has its own Disney Store retail chain (Vogel 2015, p. 111). Likewise, 
only Paramount had a stake in video stores. It purchased Blockbuster in 2004 as it 
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feared to lose access to this distribution channel. Despite those differences, the 
general structure remains the same and is true for all six. They have sufficient 
capital to finance and produce their own motion picture projects. Even more 
importantly, they can also retain control of their projects thanks to their vast sales, 
distribution and marketing network. This is further exemplified in Table 41, which 
provides an overview of selected media assets of the Time Warner conglomerate 
(to which Warner Bros. belongs). 
 
Tab.41: Selected Media Assets of Time Warner, based on: Warner Bros. (2015,  
 w/o p.). 
Assets worth pointing out are the Warner Bros. Studio Facilities. These are 










Warner Bros. Pictures International 
Warner Bros. Pictures Domestic Distribution





Warner Bros. Domestic Television Distribution
Warner Bros. International Television Distribution
New Line Home Entertainment
Free TV
Warner Bros. Television











Warner Bros. Consumer Products
Time Warner Cable (TWC)
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to the main studio lot is the Warner Bros. Ranch, a 32-acre facility which houses 
five additional soundstages and various exterior sets. Noteworthy are also the 
offices in more than 30 countries of Warner Bros. Pictures International, which 
releases movies in over 120 international territories, either directly to theaters or in 
conjunction with partners and co-ventures (Warner Bros. 2015a, w/o p.). 
This distinction between the production and distribution capabilities is 
important. Most look at studios as super producers with the financial muscle to 
create a large range of products. Ulin (2013, pp. 4-5) and Noam (2010, p. 64) argue, 
however, that the greatest power that the studio brings to a movie is not producing. 
Rather, studios are financing and distribution machines that bankroll production 
and then dominate the distribution channels to market and release the movies they 
finance.82 This view is shared by Gomery (2004, p. 199), who points out that 
“worldwide distribution has long been the very basis of Hollywood’s power”. He 
goes on to highlight that “no other national motion picture industry has ever been 
so far reaching”. He explains this by pointing out that “the motion picture industry 
of Hollywood proved the vast and important advantages of globalizing, with its 
considerable power from economies of scale, long before the term global media was 
ever invented” (Gomery 2004, p. 200).   
                                                     
82  Noam (2010, p. 64) adds in this context that “the Major studio’s share in actual 
production of the motion pictures they distribute keeps declining, and is 
probably less than 20 percent now”. 
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Ulin (2013, p. 4) highlights that distribution is how studios make most of their 
revenue and is the unique facet that distinguishes a studio from a studio look-a-
like. He adds that there are various entities that want to invest in movies and that 
any company, studios included, can arrange financing. The difference with studios, 
however, is that they will not invest in a motion picture without obtaining and 
exercising distribution rights. This is because they are first and foremost marketing 
and distribution organizations, not banks. While studios do buy properties, hire 
stars and finance the movies they elect to make, Ulin (2013, p. 5) argues that this 
can be viewed as the pretext of controlling which properties they distribute and 
own.  
4.1.4.6 Summary 
In the preceding sub chapters, the value added structure of the motion 
picture industry has been analyzed. This was the last aspect of the first step of the 
analysis approach, but also one of the most important. Due to the questionable 
practice in the application of traditional value added concepts and the 
shortcomings of existing value added models, the model developed in Chapter 3 
was used for the visualization of the value added structure of the motion picture 
industry. The Motion Picture Value System Model is based on Porter’s value 
system approach, but has some unique characteristics:  
 Different value added constellations on company level are included to 
accurately reflect the activity logic of the value system participants. 
 Intermediaries are highlighted with a golden and orange color coding. 
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 The value system participants are described by their major activity. 
 The model is further divided into three distinct stages. 
 
The analysis revealed the complex value added structure of the motion 
picture industry and also highlighted, how the structure has changed in the last 
fifteen years. Furthermore, the Motion Picture Value System Model illustrated the 
magnitude of intermediaries that are involved in the production, distribution and 
exploitation of motion pictures.  
Finally, the Major studio sector was discussed in detail as well. The Major 
studios were introduced as parts of highly vertical integrated corporate 
conglomerates, which have dominated Hollywood for more than a century. The 
degree of vertical integration was highlighted by adjusting the motion picture 
value system and providing an overview on the various media assets of the Time 
Warner Conglomerate. Lastly, the importance of the distinction between the 
production and distribution capabilities of studios was highlighted. While most 
look at studios as a super producer, the most defining element of a studio is its 
distribution arm. This is how studios make most of their revenue and is the unique 
facet that distinguishes a studio (Ulin 2013, pp. 4-5). 
4.1.5 Summary  
As envisioned in Chapter 3, the previous sub chapter started the analysis of 
the motion picture industry by applying the first step of the Intermediation 
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Analysis Approach. What appeared to be a relatively easy and straightforward step 
during its development, turned out to be quite complex and comprehensive during 
the application. However, because of this, the first step was also perfectly suited as 
the introductory chapter to the motion picture industry. 
The analysis started out with the demarcation of the object of investigation, 
the motion picture sector, which was introduced as part of the media or 
entertainment industry, with the movie as the central element of differentiation 
(Wirtz 2012, p. 316). The analysis continued by examining the unique product and 
demand characteristics. These characteristics covered are broad range of topics, 
which have a direct or indirect impact on intermediation. In regards to the 
objectives of this dissertation, the analysis of the product characteristics revealed: 
 Motion pictures are unlike any other product. 
 Motion picture are exploited in different product segments. 
 The exploitation of motion pictures is characterized by a high degree of 
price discrimination. 
 Technology enabled product innovations and increased the variety. 
 Blockbusters are important products that require the cooperation with 
intermediaries. 
 
After the product characteristics, the focus shifted towards the demand for 
motion pictures and its unique facets. While the discussed admission cycles and 
seasonal demand patterns have no direct influence on the topic of this dissertation, 
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the analysis of how demand for motion pictures has evolved in the past fifteen 
years yielded additional insights: 
 The importance of global hits and global stars, which was previously 
discussed as part of the discussion of the blockbuster strategy, was further 
highlighted. 
  Due to an increase in the number of countries movies get released in, the 
number of intermediaries likely increased as well. 
 
Finally, the value added structure of the motion industry was examined in 
detail by using the model that has been developed in Chapter 3. In the course of 
the analysis the various market participants and intermediaries have been 
highlighted and the Major studio sector has been explained. In regards to the 
intermediaries, the discussion showed that intermediaries are involved in all stages 
of the motion picture value system and their number has increased in the last fifteen 
years. The analysis thus directly contributed to research objectives of this 
dissertation and provided the answer to the first research questions. The two-
folded questions asked, who the intermediaries in the industry are and which 
intermediaries have appeared or disappeared in the last fifteen years. By 
comparing the intermediaries in the traditional value system with the 
intermediaries in the modern value system, the answer to these questions can be 
derived. This is illustrated in Table 42.  
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Tab.42: Intermediaries in the Motion Picture Industry (1999 vs. 2014), based on:  
 own research. 
As highlighted in Table 42, the year 1999 counted nine different types of 
intermediaries, with the majority of them being active in the Exploitation and 
Consumption segment. This number has increased to ten different types of 
intermediaries in 2014, with the increase primarily being explained by the rise of 
the Internet as a new distribution channel. The only other change that has to be 
highlighted is the observation that film laboratories, in their traditional incarnation, 
do not play a role in the modern motion picture value system any more. Instead, 
their activities have been taken over by a digital-enabled intermediary. While this 
high-level view on the value added structure does answer the first research 
question and provides a helpful overview of the changes that have occurred, it is 
not sufficient, nor can it explain any of these developments. Accordingly, the 
remainder of this dissertation will solely focus on the previously identified 
intermediaries and their analysis. 
Value System Stage 1999 2014
Development and 
Production
Talent Agencies Talent Agencies















Video Stores (Sales & Rent)
Free TV & Pay TV
Theaters
Video Stores (Sales & Rent)
Free TV & Pay TV
Digital Distributor (VOD & Sales)
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4.2 ANALYSIS OF INTERMEDIARIES  
In order to be able to explain the changes identified during the application of 
the first step of the Intermediation Analysis Approach, the following sub chapters 
will examine each previously identified intermediary in more detail. The 
intermediaries will be examined in order of their appearance in the motion picture 
value system. The analysis of each intermediary will begin by highlighting the 
position of the particular intermediary between demand and supply in the motion 
picture value system. In addition, it will be pointed out, whether the examined 
intermediary is a match- or market maker. Then, the role of the intermediary will 
be discussed and relevant developments will be highlighted. This will provide an 
additional foundation for the application of the Intermediation Analysis Approach 
that will follow once the intermediary has been introduced. Once one intermediary 
has been completely analyzed, the analysis will move to the next intermediary until 
all intermediaries have been examined.  
4.2.1 Talent Agencies 
In the Development and Production Stage talent agencies have been 
identified as the first intermediaries in the motion picture value system. Their 
position between demand (production companies) and supply (creative talent) is 
highlighted in Figure 31.  
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Fig.31: Agencies in the Development and Production Stage, based on: own 
research. 
The California Labor Code defines an agent as a “person or corporation who 
engages in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to 
procure employment for artists” (McDonald 2007, pp. 167-168). As indicated by the 
golden box, talent agencies are match makers as they do not buy and sell goods on 
their own account. Accordingly, the activities on the legal-financial and physical 
level recede to the background. As highlighted by the definition from the California 
Labor Code, the main activity of talent agencies is to procure employment for their 
clients. This has been summed up under the headline matching in the motion 
picture value system.  
As pointed out by Zelenski (2003, p. 979): “Hollywood is an impersonal, 
uncaring and unforgiving place”. Accordingly, artists need the sophisticated 
assistance of third parties to help them locate employment. This is where talent 
agents step in. They try to put creative talent and producers together to make a 
match (Levy 2000, p. 223).  Their job is to get the artists they represent as much 
work as possible. They negotiate the deals between talent-sellers and talent buyers 
on behalf of the talent-sellers (Claire 1999, p.  28). It has to be pointed out that most 
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of these deals are short-term and project-related. Instead of establishing enduring 
career relationships with regular employers, actors, writers or directors typically 
move from employer to employer and from production to production. It is the job 
of their talent agency to move them from production to production and to secure 
for them the best deals in the process (Weiler and Myers 2011, p. 757). 
For their services, talent agencies are typically paid in form of a contractual 
commission of their clients’ gross earnings. Accordingly, they are only paid if they 
actually get their clients work (Weiler and Myers 2011, p. 758). Unsurprisingly, 
agents have thus a financial incentive to represent large numbers of clients and to 
procure for them as much work as possible. As highlighted by Zelenski (2003, p. 
981), two problems or conflict of interest arise from this commission-payment 
scheme: (1) agents might act out of pure self-interest and not consider adequately 
what their clients actually want. Instead, they might procure whatever 
employment first comes along simply in order to guarantee themselves quick 
commissions.83 (2) Since agents receive commissions only if they successfully 
procure employment, they have a profit motive to represent only established 
clients, who have a bankable reputation. As a result, many agents are reluctant to 
engage unexperienced actors or industry newcomers, who have unproven track 
records (Weiler and Myers 2011, p. 758). Although these up-and-comers can 
attempt to procure their own employment, their likelihood of success is slim. Most 
                                                     
83  In order to remedy some of these problems, talent agents are regulated by state 
statutes and entertainment guilds (Zelenski 2003, p. 981). 
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lack the industry contacts necessary to get their feet in the doors of producers. 
Moreover, even if they were to get that far, they likely lack the ability to negotiate 
sophisticated employment contracts successfully (Zelenski 2003, p. 981). 
Lastly, it has to be pointed out that in the last two decades, talent agencies 
started to do more than the traditional model assumes. They started to become deal 
packagers for their clients (Claire 1999, p.  28). A trend that can still be witnessed 
today. Deal packaging closely resembles producing, and although agents have 
historically been prohibited by guild franchise agreements84 from acting as 
producers, they have not been prohibited from putting packages together (Zelenski 
2003, p. 999). Talent agencies act as packagers when they put together teams of 
clients, for example, writers, directors and actors, and sell those teams to employers 
for percentage fees instead of commissioning each client’s deal individually. 
Typically, the package fee is 10% of the production’s entire budget rather than 10% 
of each client’s individual salary (Weiler and Myers 2011, p. 757). This practice 
resembles producing in two ways. First, it enables agents to earn producer-sized 
fees. Second, it enables agents to exercise control over production development. As 
long as talent agencies represent bankable artists whom employers want to hire, 
they can force those employers to hire less-bankable artists as part of the package 
deal (Birdthistle 2000, p. 504). Packaging agents, in other words, come to the 
negotiation table with substantial bargaining power, and they can leverage that 
                                                     
84   The SAG-ATA franchise agreement expired in January 2002 and as of 2015 no 
new agreement has been be reached (McNary 2015, w/o p.).  
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bargaining power into a final say over which artists get hired. Essentially, agents 
get to make the decisions that traditionally have been made by employers. 
However, because these agents effectively act as their clients employers, they 
necessarily face conflicts of interest. For example, they might procure for their 
clients only the work that they can package (Zelenski 2003, p. 999). 
In the United States the largest agencies by size are Creative Artists Agency 
(CAA), William Morris Endeavor (WME) and United Talent Agency (UTA). These 
three have dominated the industry alongside the Major Studios for the last decades. 
This is accurately summed up by Compaine and Gomery (2000, p. 360), who point 
out that “Hollywood is a small community—there are only six big movie studios, 
four big TV networks, and three big talent agencies. The people who own and run 
these organizations talk to one another every day. They confide, they feud, they 
forgive, they do business and they vacation together.” 
4.2.1.1 Step 2: Activities of Talent Agencies 
Now that a general understanding of the role of talent agencies has been 
established, the focus can shift towards the formal analysis of the activities of talent 
agencies and their change in the last fifteen years. As previously highlighted, talent 
agencies are match makers. Accordingly, only the activities on the informational 
level are of relevance.  
By using the Intermediation Activity Analysis Tool and the guidance 
developed in Chapter 3, the impact on the activities can be assessed. The result is 
illustrated in Table 43. Here, the cost for executing the activities in 1999 is compared 
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to the cost for their execution in 2014. From this, the impact of technological 
advancement is derived.  
 
Tab.43: Impact on Informational Activities (Talent Agencies), based on: own 
 research. 
 Given the very nature of the activities of talent agencies, it comes as no 
surprise that technological advancements did not have a cost reducing effect on the 
activities on the informational level. In order to identify, select, inspect (and 
package) talent, talent agencies cannot rely on automation or the sole use of ICT. 
Scripts and novels still have to be read and evaluated by experienced personnel, 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in transaction partners (more buyers and sellers)
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in transaction partners (more buyers and sellers)
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in transaction partners (more buyers and sellers)
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
- High quality standard (depending on production)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Complexity of deals and contracts increased
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in the amount of information  
- Increased security concerns (quality standard)
- Limited degree of automation
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Limited transparency
- Increased complexity of deals and more transaction partners
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likewise performances by actors have to be observed by humans in order to identify 
potential clients. On the contrary, technological advancements indirectly led to a 
cost increase for the execution of those activities. While the identification, selection 
and inspection of actors, writers and directors traditionally involved watching 
tapes or DVDs, going to the theater or watching movies at festivals, the rise of the 
Internet created many more sources from which the next star could emerge.85 This 
cost increase is reflected in Table 43. 
A similar argument can be made for the activity negotiation support, which 
is likewise an activity that cannot be automated and whose costs increased as well. 
Negotiations require personnel with extensive expertise and experience. In 
addition, the deals and contracts that the talent agency is negotiating on behalf of 
the client have become more complicated in the past fifteen years. For example, the 
question of revenue participation from new ancillary markets has emerged as well 
as the question of the involvement of the actor in marketing the movie (i.e. whether 
the actor has to tweet to his followers about the movie or not). 
With more talent and increased complexity of deals and contracts, also comes 
an increase of information that has to be processed. While ICT makes a lot of the 
processing easier, E-mails and mobile phones have been used in 1999, just as they 
are today. However, due to the increased amount of information as well as 
                                                     
85  Sun (2015, w/o p.) points out that new (digital) talents bring new potential 
pitfalls as well. These range from plagiarism claims to political incorrectness to 
more serious charges such as sexual misconduct.  
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increased security concerns, the infrastructure expenditures for information 
processing have increased as well. 
Talent agencies also monitor the performance of the contract and report the 
results to the transaction partners. Just like the previous activities, this is an activity 
that cannot be automated. It requires the personal involvement of the talent agency, 
for example in the form of driving out to the set to ensure that the contractual 
obligations are met for the client. Following the same logic, an increase in talent 
with very limited involvement of automation / ICT, the cost for monitoring and 
reporting increased as well. 
4.2.1.2 Step 3: Value of Talent Agencies 
Now that the activities of talent agencies and their change have been 
discussed, the focus can shift towards the value provided by talent agencies. As 
highlighted in Chapter 3, a quantification of the added value is problematic, 
accordingly an indirect analysis of the relevant value sources and their relative 
strength will be carried out. For this the Value Analysis Tool and corresponding 
guidance will be used. From the onset, two categories of value can be ruled out. As 
talent agencies to do not perform inter-company coordination or any logistic and 
storage activities, they cannot enhance the production- and logistic efficiency. 
Likewise, given the early stage of the value system, they also do not increase the 
production result by increasing the quality pressure or identifying consumer needs.  
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Talent agencies do, however, increase the transaction efficiency and the 
transaction result. In regards to the transaction efficiency, Table 44 illustrates the 
corresponding value sources and their change in the last fifteen year. 
 
Tab.44: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Efficiency (Talent Agencies),  
 based on: own research. 
In regards to the Baligh-Richartz-Effect, it has to be pointed out that talent 
agencies reduce the number of contacts. They mediate between thousands of 
talents and multiple producers or production companies. If each artist or writer 
were to contact each producer directly, without using the talent agency as an 
intermediary, the number of contacts and therefore transaction costs would 
increase. Due to the increase in the number of talents, the strength of this value 
source increased in the past fifteen years. Compared to other areas of the value 
system, however, where the number of contacts are even larger, the value strength 
is comparatively low. 
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- Increase in transaction partners (more buyers and sellers)
- Number of talent agencies remained comparatively low
No direct or indirect impact
- Processes differ per transaction, but only limited standardization
  possible
- Degree of standardization remained comparatively low
No direct or indirect impact
- Required investments in immaterial resources remained  
  (Business relationships, brand, reputation)
- Individual talent is too small to create an efficiency advantage
No direct or indirect impact
- Required skills, capabilities and experience remained high
- Required investments to build up skills and capabilities
  remained high
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As previously highlighted, intermediation is almost always connected with 
standardization. This is true for talent agencies as well, who, to a certain degree, 
establish standardized processes. The buyers (the production companies) and 
sellers (the talent) get used to these processes and therefore learn to efficiently carry 
out transactions with the talent agency. An interaction with different providers 
would require this learning process every time. However, given the individuality 
of each talent and the varying nature of each motion picture project, the strength of 
this value source is and remained comparatively low. 
Scale effects are relevant for talent agencies as well. Rather than scale effects 
through technology though, the scale effects particularly result from intangible 
resources. In case of the large three talent agencies in the U.S., the importance of 
the brand and business relations of these agencies have already been highlighted. 
Scale effects also occur in regards to highly qualified personnel ranging from talent 
scouts, to lawyers and account managers. Due to their small size, individual talent 
would not be able to achieve economies of scale themselves and therefore cannot 
invest as efficiently in these resources. 
Finally, the specialization or experience of talent agencies increases the 
efficiency of individual transactions as well. As talent agencies continuously 
procure employment for various clients, they build up special abilities and skills, 
such as the gathering and the interpretation of information. They are therefore able 
to perform these activities more efficiently. Talent agents are typically aware of any 
new scripts, uncasted roles, productions in trouble and movies that are about to go 
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into development or production. Individual talents would not be able achieve this 
as efficient as talent agencies. 
 
Tab.45: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Result (Talent Agencies), based  
 on: own research. 
 In addition to the increase in transaction efficiency, talent agencies also 
improve the transaction result. This is highlighted in Table 45. They, for example, 
add value by reducing the market power of producers and are thus minimizing 
any monopoly rents. This is most evident, when the agency packages multiple 
talents as previously discussed. Through the aggregation of supply, talent agencies 
come to the negotiations table with substantial bargaining power. As individual 
talents usually have a much lower bargaining power by themselves, it is particular 
interesting for them to conduct a transaction by using the talent agency.  
Finally, the more effective information processing also has to be mentioned 
as a relevant value source that increases the transaction result. All criteria 
established in Chapter 3 are met. Between talent and producer a situation can occur 
in which information asymmetries are not surmountable at all. Talent agencies can 
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- The ability to reduce transaction costs increased slightly
- Due to lower transaction cost, more transactions take place
No direct or indirect impact
- Ability of talent agencies to reduce information asymmetries
  remained
- Importance of a talent agency's reputation remained
No direct or indirect impact
- Market power of individual talent remained low
- Talent agencies increase their market power through the
  aggregation of supply (especially when packaging)
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gather information more effectively than the transaction partners, e.g. through 
superior abilities, skills and knowledge resulting from specialization advantages. 
Talent agencies are capable of communicating this information more effectively as 
well. This is because both transaction partners have greater confidence in the 
information received from the talent agency. The higher trust and credibility 
especially results from the talent agency’s strong incentive to maintain and protect 
its reputation.  
4.2.1.3 Step 4: Incentives to cooperate with Talent Agencies 
Finally, the incentives and disincentives for talent and producers to cooperate 
with talent agencies have to be examined as well. Thus, the analysis now also takes 
competitive strategic aspects into account. During the development of the Incentive 
Analysis Tool it was highlighted that the assumption is that there is freedom of 
choice. The previous discussion revealed that this is not necessary the case for talent 
agencies. In practice, the cooperation with talent agencies is neither optional for 
talents, nor for the production companies. Nevertheless, two incentives and three 
disincentives can be identified. The incentives are illustrated in Table 46 along with 
the assessment of the incentive strength.  
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Tab.46: Impact on Cooperation Incentives (Talent Agencies), based on: own  
 research. 
As the previous discussion revealed, talent agencies increase the transaction 
efficiency in a variety of ways. From the point of view of individual talents as well 
as from the point of view of production companies, the cooperation with talent 
agencies is therefore beneficial. Without talent agencies, the transaction between 
producers and talents would not be as efficient and effective. In addition, from the 
point of view of individual talents, the cooperation with talent agencies allows 
them to enter the market (i.e. find employment) faster and also to penetrate the 
market wider (i.e. being presented to more producers). 
There are however, a variety of disincentives as well, i.e. arguments against 
a cooperation with talent agencies. These are illustrated in Table 47. While talents 
can benefit from the high bargaining power of (some) talent agencies, it also 
represents one of the main arguments against cooperating with them, i.e. to avoid 
further increasing the talent agencies power. The large talent agencies in the U.S. 
practically act as an additional gate keeper. While it is almost impossible for 
individual talents to procure a job opportunity by themselves, it is just as difficult 
Incentives (I) ISIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements ISIn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- The efficiency and effectiveness provided by talent agencies increased
  slightly
- The cooperation with talent agencies is more efficient and effective
  from the talent's point of view
No direct or indirect impact
- High market entry barriers remained
- When initially cooperating with talent agencies, talents find job
  opportunities faster
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to find meaningful representation. As discussed, talent agencies have a profit 
motive to represent only established clients, who have a bankable reputation. This 
makes it especially hard for newcomers and aspiring talents. 
 
Tab.47: Impact on Cooperation Disincentives (Talent Agencies), based on: own  
 research. 
Likewise, the risk of discrimination is another strong disincentives for talents 
to cooperate with talent agencies. However, due to the lack of alternatives, as direct 
procurement of jobs is not realistic in the majority of cases, its relevance is highly 
debatable. Nevertheless, discrimination can occur on both sides: talent agencies can 
limit the access of talent to certain producers and, vice versa, limit the access of 
producers to certain talents. This chapter already mentioned many of the motives 
a talent agency might have to infer with the job opportunities of their clients. 
The talent-agent relationship naturally requires the disclosing of sensitive 
information. These range from simple personal data such as the name and the date 
of birth to more sensitive data including medical records. Again, due to the lack of 
alternatives, this argument is arguable irrelevant for most talents as well. In 
addition, the reputation, especially of the well-known talent agencies, likely 
mitigates this disincentive for most talents. 
Disincentives (DI) DSIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements  DSIn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- Talent agencies retained a high market power
- Dependence on talent agencies to get in contact with producers
  remained
No direct or indirect impact
- Access to producers is not permanently ensured
No direct or indirect impact
- Critical and sensitive information has to be disclosed
Low
Market Power of the 
Intermediary
Medium
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4.2.1.4 Summary 
Talent agencies, mediating between talents and producers, have been 
introduced as the first intermediaries in the motion picture value system. The 
preceding sub chapters examined talent agencies in detail by using the tools and 
guidance developed in Chapter 3. Table 48 provides a summary of the results of 
the preceding analysis. 
 
Tab.48: Summary - Impact on Talent Agencies, based on: own research. 
 Based on these results, the practical research questions can be answered in 
respect to talent agencies. The second research question asks, in how far and why 
the activities of intermediaries in the motion picture sector have changed in the last 
fifteen years. The analysis of talent agencies revealed that the activities in their core 
have not been affected by technological advancements. They remain personnel 
intensive and require a great amount of experience and specialization.  
Nevertheless, technology increased the number of talents and, as such, the cost for 
performing the majority of the activities increased as well.  
This, however, is in the interest of talent agencies. If talent agencies would 
not perform the activities, then the production companies and individual talents 
would have to carry out the activities themselves. With the cost for their execution 
increasing, both, producers and talents have strong incentives to not do so. While 
CI (t1999) CI (t2014) TVS (t1999) TVS (t2014) TIS (t1999) TIS (t2014) TDS (t1999) TDS (t2014)
Medium High Low Low
Intermediary
Activities Value Incentives Disincentives
Talent Agencies Medium High Low Medium
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this observation by itself suggests that talent agencies could strengthen their 
position in the last fifteen years, a full picture can only emerge, when the remaining 
facets of intermediation are taken into account as well.  
The third research question asks, in how far and why the value that 
intermediaries in the motion picture sector provide has changed in the last fifteen 
years. The analysis of talent agencies revealed that they increase the transaction 
efficiency and the transaction result. For each of these two categories the relevant 
value sources, their strength and the change in strength in the past fifteen years 
have been examined. It was shown that technological advancements had a positive 
effect on the value provided by talent agencies. In other words, the total value 
strength has increased in 2014 when compared to 1999. Talent agencies are thus 
able to add more value than before, which further strengthened their position.  
Finally, the fourth practical research question asks, in how far and why the 
incentives and disincentives of working with intermediaries changed in the past 
fifteen year. From the onset it was pointed out that the cooperation with talent 
agencies is in reality not optional. It is rather a mandatory requirement to find 
employment. Nevertheless, the analysis still revealed some incentives and 
disincentives. It was pointed out that the incentive strength increased, while the 
disincentive strength remained low in the last fifteen years. In conclusion, it now 
becomes evident, why talent agencies have been able to strengthen their position 
despite all the technological advancements influencing the industry.  
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4.2.2 Sales Agencies 
After talent agencies, sales agencies have been highlighted as the next 
intermediaries in the motion picture value system. They have been visualized as 
part of the Licensing, Distribution and Marketing Stage and they are mediating 
between producers and distributors. Examples for sales agencies in the United 
States are Paradigm, UTA Independent Film Group and WME Global.  
 It has to be pointed out again, that Major studios typically handle the 
distribution of movies through subsidiaries around the globe. Accordingly, they 
have no need for sales agencies. Independent producers on the other hand, have to 
find a distributor first. This is where sales agencies come in. They sell the 
distribution rights for the producer to interested buyers (distributors). Thus, sales 
agencies are typically only relevant for independent productions. The position of 
sales agencies between demand (distributors) and supply (producers) is 
highlighted in Figure 32.  
 
Fig.32: Sales Agencies in the Licensing, Distribution and Marketing Stage, 
based on: own research. 
As indicated by the golden box, sales agencies are match makers as well. They 
do not buy and re-sell a product at their own risk, but rather support the transaction 
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in different ways. According to Finney (2010, p. 48) one of the key activities of sales 
agencies is to “negotiate a license with the distributor (the buyer) for one or more 
films in one or more territories, negotiating the terms of commercial exploitation in 
one or more vertical media like theatrical, DVD retail and rent, VOD, Pay TV, Free 
TV for a fixed license period”, these activities are summed up under the term 
matching in the value system model. Most independent producers are not able to 
reach distributors and the international marketplace by themselves. They therefore 
heavily depend on sales agencies. In regards to the international market, it has to 
be noted that the Motion Picture Value System Model as well as Figure 32 
dramatically simplify the situation. Figure 33 gives a better visualization of the 
actual complexity of this stage. 
In the Motion Picture Value System Model only the licensing to one theatrical 
distributor or one home entertainment distributor is illustrated. As indicated in 
Figure 33, many more distributors can be involved, each purchasing the 
distribution rights for a specific territory and media. Both Bloore (2009) and Finney 
(2010) highlight the importance of sales agencies, and point out that their role 
within the motion picture industry is often overlooked. Finney (2010, p. 48) for 
example claims that “many players outside the sales sector remain unclear about 
the functions and strategic role of a sales company”.  
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Fig.33: Licensing Complexity, based on: Wrobel 2014, p. 84. 
The key driver for a sales agency is a flow of new movies to sell. Accordingly, 
the acquisition is of paramount importance. Specialized staff will actively track 
projects and talented producers for the agency to pursue. Sales agencies typically 
track new potential movies, movies in production and monitor older projects as 
well. For all of these projects, sales agencies collect notes on the script as well as 
information on the director, the involved talent and budget. As such, the most 
important role of the acquisition staff or acquisition executives is the development 
of a strong network of producers (Finney 2010, p. 48).  
Once the sales agency has established a relationship with a producer, the 
agency’s job is to nurture the relationship and provide a channel for information 
EX-POST ANALYSIS OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 275 
and feedback, for example, regarding the development of the script and the talent 
package. For this, sales agencies read scripts, treatments and other written 
submissions and provide reviews and recommendations. The focus of sales 
agencies is on the commercial prospects of the package. They will be aware of the 
credits, reputations and career paths of directors, actors, producers and financiers. 
They also screen completed motion pictures at festivals, on screeners or at private 
screenings and report on their suitability for the agency (Finney 2010, p. 48).   
Once sales agencies have identified promising projects and closed an 
agreement with the producer about the sale of the distribution rights, the actual 
sales process starts. Sales agencies typically have specialized sales executives, who 
negotiate a license with the distributor. As previously highlighted, this stage is very 
complex and can involve multiple distributors. The sales agency licenses these 
rights in return for a share of revenue and usually receives an upfront advance 
against that share. The importance of exclusivity has already been highlighted, 
accordingly the rights are normally licensed exclusively to only one distributor per 
media per territory. It is thus unsurprising, that a very strong movie is normally 
the subject of major competition. Accordingly, identifying the optimum deal 
requires a high degree of knowledge of the territory in questions, about the bidding 
distributors, their expertise, track record, credit rating and future plans. The sales 
agency will also acquire knowledge about the distributor’s plan for marketing and 
releasing the motion picture and evaluate, how those fit with the specific market 
and product. Finally, the sales agency ensures that required approvals for the deal 
are obtained from producers and/or financiers (Finney 2010, pp. 48-49). 
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It should come as no surprise that the movie sales business involves 
numerous documents and agreements that tend to lack consensus on standard 
terms and conditions. Accordingly, in addition to sales staff, qualified in-house 
lawyers, paralegals or experienced contract executives are involved in these 
negotiations as well. This extends to the definition of media rights and territories 
to be granted even before hard commercial and financial points are reached (Finney 
2010, p. 50).  
Depending on the specific production, sales agencies can also be involved 
much earlier in the motion picture value system. Independent producers often 
need a set of estimates in order to attract and start negotiations with financiers and 
investors in the Development and Production Stage. It is the job of the sales agency 
to compile those sales estimates. They estimate the value of a movie in each 
territory in the world. It has to be noted, that these estimates cover all territories 
available. However, in reality, many motion pictures fail to be sold to more than 
five to ten territories around the world and some sell to no territories outside their 
home market (Finney 2010, p. 49). Based on this observation, a conflict of interests 
arises. On the one hand, sales agencies have an incentive to provide positive 
estimates upfront. Financiers and investors use these numbers to determine 
whether they are going to invest in the movie or provide a loan for its production. 
Should the estimates be not compelling, then the movie does not get produced and 
the sales agency has nothing to sell. However, sales agencies are well aware about 
the importance of their reputation. Accordingly, they have an incentive to remain 
realistic about the market value of the motion picture in question. According to 
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Finney (2010, p. 49) the reputation of a sales agency “almost exclusively comes 
down to its ability to meet the majority of its estimates. These estimates are the 
currency they compete and trade in”. Producers come to depend on the estimates 
and live in hope that serious pre-sales are possible to achieve. The financiers, in 
turn, depend on the reliability, experience and reputation of the sales agency to 
deliver on the estimates (Finney 2010, p. 49). The described activities are often 
summed up under the term pre-sales in value system models for the independent 
sector (Bloore 2009, p. 8; Finney 2010, p. 11; Finney 2010a, p. 7). 
Lastly, sales agencies have their own marketing departments that are 
responsible for the image and positioning of each movie on the agency’s slate. As 
a motion picture is prepared for the market prior to, or during, production, a 
concept poster is commissioned and designed, often by an outside agency. A teaser 
or trailer is commissioned as well. The marketing department likewise prepares 
information for the trade and press, as well as materials that distributors can use 
for local markets. It is important to highlight that it is never the sales agencies job 
to market the motion picture to audiences, instead, their job is to get distributors 
interested, which is what their marketing activities are aimed at (Finney 2010, pp. 
49-52). 
The preparation for festivals, where movies are being launched, is a major 
part of the marketing department’s responsibilities as well. Festivals, an additional 
intermediary in the motion picture value system, will be discussed in Chapter 4.2.3. 
The following looks at festivals from the point of view of sales agencies. Individual 
tasks include the booking of the appropriate office, technical equipment, poster 
FLORIAN WROBEL  278 
hanging as well as screens for trailers and promos to run.  The sales agency needs 
to wield considerable strategic skill when weaving together complex festival- and 
market events. They for example have to decide, when to launch a movie and at 
what point in time sales can be attempted to close. In addition, they have to 
evaluate the timing and profile of each festival in regards to the fit with the overall 
sales and marketing strategy (Finney 2010, p. 49). Finally, they ensure that all the 
physical materials necessary to exploit the movie, including the picture and audio 
materials, foreign language tracks, marketing elements and documentation, are 
available. Just like distributors, sales agencies also rely on an out-sourced company, 
for the actual execution of these physical activities. Nevertheless, service executives 
from the sales agency typically have in-depth technical knowledge of different 
formats and interact with laboratories and distributors to ensure the timely and 
cost-effective provision of all necessary materials. They will also manage supplier 
relations to ensure the agency’s time-sensitive communications are reliable, 
including material shipments, couriering of legal documentation and delivery of 
marketing materials to trade shows and other events (Finney 2010, p. 50). 
4.2.2.1 Step 2: Activities of Sales Agencies 
Now that a general understanding of the role of sales agencies has been 
established, the focus can shift towards the formal analysis of their activities. The 
analysis will start with the activities on the informational level. Table 49 shows the 
impact of technological advancements on the informational activities. The cost for 
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executing the relevant activities in 1999 are compared to the cost for their execution 
in 2014.  
 
Tab.49: Impact on Informational Activities (Sales Agencies), based on: own  
 research. 
For the activities identification, selection, inspection and classification a cost 
increase occurred. On the supply side, digital technologies enabled more and more 
independent producers to produce their own motion pictures. In 1999, for example, 
256 independent motion pictures have been released in North America, this 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in transaction partners (more buyers and sellers)
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in transaction partners (more buyers and sellers)
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in transaction partners (more buyers and sellers)
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Complexity of deals and contracts increased
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in the information amount 
- Increased security concerns (quality standard)
- Limited degree of automation
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Limited transparency
- Increased complexity of deals and more transaction partners
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number has risen to 571 releases in 2014.86 The identification, selection, inspection 
and classification of promising motion pictures involves mostly manual labor. 
Scripts have to be read, movies have to be screened and festival have to be visited. 
None of these activities can be automated by technology. Accordingly, an increase 
in supply led to an increase in cost.  
This assessment becomes even more evident, when the demand side is 
examined as well. As highlighted throughout Chapter 4, the number of buyers also 
increased. Firstly, the number of countries in which motion pictures are on average 
released in has risen by 25 countries in the last fifteen year. While new countries 
can be served by traditional distributors, new buyers have emerged as well. 
Secondly, the rise of the Internet as a new media in which motion pictures can be 
exploited in, brought additional potential buyers to the table. 
Both of these aforementioned reasons are ultimately also responsible for the 
increase in complexity of deals and contracts. This in turn is reflected in the 
negotiation support activity. An increase in complexity, with limited degree of 
automation and heavy involvement of experienced professionals, accordingly also 
resulted in an increase in the cost for the execution of said activity. The same 
argumentation is also valid for the two remaining activities information processing 
as well as monitoring and reporting, whose execution likewise experienced a cost 
increase. 
                                                     
86  As previously highlighted, the number of release of MPAA member studios 
(that typically do not employ sales agencies) declined from 200 release to 136 in 
the same time frame (Wrobel 2016, p. 126). 
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While sales agencies are typically match makers, the detailed discussion of 
these intermediaries revealed that depending on the motion picture project, they 
can be involved in various stages of the value system and carry out additional 
activities. One of these, is the presentation activity, as highlighted in Table 50. 
 
Tab.50: Impact on Physical Activities (Sales Agencies), based  
 on: own research. 
The variety of (B2B) marketing activities that sales agencies do sometimes 
carry out has already been highlighted. These activities are summed up under the 
term presentation as established during the development of the analysis approach 
in Chapter 3. As highlighted in Table 50, the cost for the execution of this activity 
on the physical level have also increased. It is likewise an activity that cannot be 
automated, but instead, has to be carried out by professionals.  
4.2.2.2 Step 3: Value of Sales Agencies 
Now that the activities of sales agencies and their change have been 
discussed, the focus can shift towards the value they provide. Just like talent 
agencies, sales agencies also do not perform the required activities to increase the 
production- and logistic efficiency, nor do they increase the production result. Sales 
agencies do however increase the transaction efficiency and the transaction result. 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in transaction partners (more buyers and sellers)
- Increased competition => Higher degree of marketing required
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
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Table 51 highlights the value sources that enable sales agencies to increase the 
transaction efficiency as well as the strength of each value source at the two 
examined points in time. 
 
Tab.51: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Efficiency (Sales Agencies),  
 based on: own research. 
It comes as no surprise that sales agencies reduce contact costs due to their 
mediating position between multiple producers and numerous distributors. Since 
the number of transaction partners increased on both sides, the strength of the 
Baligh-Richartz-Effect has increased as well.  
As previously highlighted, sales agencies can only to a certain degree 
standardize the transaction between producers and distributors. Many (legal) 
documents lack a consensus and will thus vary to a certain degree with each 
project. While this indicates a comparatively low value source strength, sales 
agencies still add value through standardization. This for example includes the 
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- Increase in transaction partners (more buyers and sellers)
- Number of sales agencies remained comparatively low
No direct or indirect impact
- Processes differ per transaction, but only limited standardization
  possible
- Degree of standardization remained comparatively low
No direct or indirect impact
- Required investments in immaterial resources remained  
  (Business relationships, brand, reputation)
- Producers are too small to create an efficiency advantage
No direct or indirect impact
- Required skills, capabilities and experience remained high
- Required investments to build up skills and capabilities
  remained high
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provisioning of sales estimates, a streamlined process, which producers and 
financiers have gotten used to. Likewise, the actual selling of the movie, follows 
largely standardized processes that distributors know and come to expect. This for 
example includes how the distributor is approached and how the motion picture is 
presented (e.g. accompanying documentation, etc.).  
Sales agencies add value through scale effects as well. Similar to talent 
agencies, this relates to intangible resources, such as reputation and business 
relationships as well as immaterial resources in the form of highly specialized and 
qualified personnel. Sales agencies can invest in purchasing-, sales-, marketing- 
and service-executives with highly specialized knowledge, because they can 
spread these investments on a larger number of transactions. If every producer 
were to invest in these resources, the transaction efficiency would be reduced. 
Ultimately, their specialization and experience is the key source that allows sales 
agencies to increase the transaction efficiency.  
In addition to the increase of the transaction efficiency, sales agencies also 
increase the transaction result. The relevant sources for this value category as well 
as their individual value strength is highlighted in Table 52. 
The previous paragraphs highlighted the various ways in which sales 
agencies increase the transaction efficiency. Chapter 3 already pointed out that in 
addition to a reduction in transaction costs, this can also lead to a higher 
performance of the market and a better exchange result in the sense of allocation-, 
evaluation- and information efficiency (Bienert 1996, p. 31; Peiseler 1990, p. 94). 
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Based on the previous discussion, sales agencies likewise increase the transaction 
result, i.e. without sales agencies, fewer distribution rights would be sold. 
 
Tab.52: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Result (Sales Agencies), based  
 on: own research. 
In addition, situations in which information asymmetries between producer 
and distributor are not surmountable at all, are conceivable as well. Due to their 
specialization, skills and experience, sales agencies can gather the required 
information more effectively. Even more importantly, due to their reputation (and 
the importance of maintaining a high reputation), they can also more effectively 
communicate this information to producers and distributors. This in turn enables 
sales agencies to effectively eliminate information asymmetries and thus, to 
improve the transaction result. 
4.2.2.3 Step 4: Incentives to cooperate with Sales Agencies 
Finally, the incentives and disincentives for producers and distributors to 
cooperate with sales agencies have to be examined as well. The analysis is thus now 
focusing on the sales agency’s up- and downstream market participants rather than 
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- The ability to reduce transaction costs increased slightly
- Due to lower transaction cost, more transactions take place
No direct or indirect impact
- Ability of sales agencies to reduce information asymmetries
  remained
- Importance of a sales agency's reputation remained high
No direct or indirect impact
- Market power of individual producers remained low
- Ability of sales agencies to  reduce market power of distributors
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on the sales agencies directly. Similar to talents, for whom the cooperation with 
talent agencies is in practice not optional, the cooperation with sales agencies is also 
not optional for independent producers, who want to achieve meaningful 
distribution. As the tool for the analysis of the incentives and disincentives to 
cooperate with intermediaries was created under the assumption that there is 
freedom of choice, the meaning of the following results is likely diminished. 
Nevertheless, incentives and disincentives to cooperate can still be identified. The 
analysis will start with the incentives to cooperate with sales agencies. Two 
incentives can be identified. These as well as their development are illustrated in 
Table 53. 
 
Tab.53: Impact on Cooperation Incentives (Sales Agencies), based on: own  
 research. 
A strong argument for both, producers and distributors, to cooperate with 
sales agencies is the previous described ability of sales agencies to increase the 
transaction efficiency and effectiveness. The decrease in transaction cost and the 
increase in transactions is in the interest of producers and distributors as well.  
Incentives (I) ISIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements ISIn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- The efficiency and effectiveness provided by sales agencies increased
  slightly
- The cooperation with sales agencies is more efficient and effective
  from the producer's point of view
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- High market entry barriers remained
- Sales agencies can achieve sales faster and penetrate the market 
  wider
- Number of relevant countries / territories increased
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In addition, the cooperation with sales agencies allows producers to enter the 
market faster and penetrate it wider as would be the case, if the producers would 
try to achieve international distribution by themselves. Since especially the 
international market has grown and motion pictures are licensed to an increasing 
number of countries, the incentive to cooperate is more pronounced as well.  
Unsurprisingly, there are also a variety of arguments against a cooperation 
with sales agencies. For example, sales agencies can attain considerable market 
power and use it to ask for a bigger share of revenues, which is neither in the 
interest of producers, nor in the interest of distributors.  
 
Tab.54: Impact on Cooperation Disincentives (Sales Agencies), based on: own  
 research. 
Likewise, as highlighted in Table 54, the risk of discrimination and the 
disclosing of sensitive information are additional disincentives for the cooperation 
with sales agencies.  From the producer’s point of view, the access to the 
distribution channels in not permanently secured. Producers thus rely heavily on 
sales agencies. While sales agencies have a profit incentives to sell the distribution 
rights to as many countries as possible, situations can arise in which a less popular 
movie is marketed less intensively as other products. While an argument can be 
Disincentives (DI) DSIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements  DSIn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- Sales agencies have retained some market power
- Producers depend on sales agencies to get in contact with distributors
No direct or indirect impact
- Access to distribution is not permanently ensured
No direct or indirect impact
- Critical and sensitive information has to be disclosed
Disclosing of sensitive 
Information 
Low Low
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made that digital technology has given birth to numerous distribution alternatives 
(e.g. the producer can distribute the movie directly over the Internet without the 
need of a sales agency), the direct distribution over the internet is not the reason 
why most independent producers elect to create a motion picture in the first place. 
In addition, the importance of price differentiation in order to maximize profits as 
well as the slim success changes of direct online releases, have already been 
discussed. Independent producers know this and therefore want to reach theatrical 
distribution – and then the cooperation with sales agencies usually is necessary.  
In regards to the disincentive of having to disclose sensitive information, it 
has to be highlighted, that this is the first point at which the producer hands the 
product over to another party. For example in form of a screener to get the agencies 
interested in the movie at the beginning of the relationship. The producer has to be 
sure that the sales agency handles those materials with care. This risk has become 
even more pronounced with the rise of piracy over the Internet. Should such a 
screener land on the Internet, the revenue potential of the movie would be severely 
diminished.  
4.2.2.4 Summary 
The previous sub chapters focused on the analysis of sales agencies, which 
are mediating between producers and distributors in the motion picture value 
system. Table 55 provides a summary of the results of the preceding analysis. 
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Tab.55: Summary - Impact on Sales Agencies, based on: own research. 
Based on these results, the practical research questions can be answered for 
sales agencies. The second research questions asks, in how far and why the 
activities of intermediaries in the motion picture sector have changed in the last 
fifteen years. The analysis of sales agencies revealed that the activities in their core 
have not been affected by technological advancements. They remain personnel 
intensive, requiring a great amount of experience and specialization.  Nevertheless, 
technology increased the number of buyers and sellers and as such, the cost for 
performing the majority of the activities increased as well. This, however, is in the 
interest of sales agencies. If they would not perform the activities, then the 
production companies and distributors would have to carry out the activities 
themselves. With the costs for their execution increasing, both, producer and 
distributor have strong incentives to not do so.  
The third research questions asks, in how far and why the value that 
intermediaries in the motion picture sector provide has changed in the last fifteen 
years. The analysis of sales agencies revealed that they increase the transaction 
efficiency as well as the transaction result. For each of these two categories the 
relevant value sources have been examined. It was shown that technological 
advancements had a positive effect on the value provided by sales agencies.  
CI (t1999) CI (t2014) TVS (t1999) TVS (t2014) TIS (t1999) TIS (t2014) TDS (t1999) TDS (t2014)
Activities Value Incentives Disincentives
Intermediary
LowSales Agencies Medium High Low Medium Medium High Low
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Finally, the fourth practical research questions asks, in how far and why the 
incentives and disincentives of working with intermediaries changed in the motion 
picture sector in the past fifteen years due to technological advancements. From the 
onset it was pointed out that the cooperation with sales agencies is in reality not 
optional for most producers. It is rather a mandatory requirement to find 
meaningful distribution. Nevertheless, the analysis still revealed relevant 
incentives and disincentives and showed that the incentive strength increased in 
the last fifteen years while the disincentive strength remained low.  
4.2.3 Festivals 
Festivals have been highlighted as additional intermediaries in the motion 
picture value system. They are part of the Licensing, Distribution and Marketing 
Stage as well. Just like sales agencies, festivals are also mediating between 
producers and distributors. Their position between demand and supply is 
highlighted in Figure 34.   
 
Fig.34: Festivals in the Licensing, Distribution and Marketing Stage, based on: 
own research. 
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As indicated by the golden box, festivals are typical match makers as well. 
They do not buy and re-sell a product at their own risk, but rather support the 
transaction in different ways. Unlike the previous intermediaries, however, 
festivals are not directly involved in the transactions between producers and 
distributors. Instead, they merely provide a marketplace for demand and supply 
to meet. Accordingly, the coordination capabilities of festivals are of paramount 
importance. This makes them interesting and warrants a detailed analysis. 
 Film festivals are typically annual events, in which selected movies are 
presented to the public (including buyers, critics87, entertainment press and 
audiences). Festivals typically do not show movies of mainstream character, 
instead, they focus on movies, which are notable for their style, their content, or the 
treated subject. Given the event nature of festivals, they typically receive large 
media coverage, which, in turn, provides producers with an opportunity to get 
attention for their project.  
The importance of festivals is highlighted by Finney (2010, p. 55), who notes 
that “festivals are one of the few marketing and positioning platforms outside the 
studio release system that the rest of the movie business has to make people aware 
of their motion pictures”. This observation is also confirmed by Kreuzer (2009, p. 
31) for whom festivals are the most efficient way to position a movie on the 
(international) market. He adds that movies that do find an international 
                                                     
87  Refer to Reinstein and Snyder (2005) for an investigation on the influence of 
movie critics on the demand for motion pictures. 
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distributor, do so for the most part thanks to a successful festival run. The 
marketing hook of potential awards increases the effectiveness of these market 
even further. 
Different types of festivals can be distinguished. There are for example 
competitive and non-competitive festivals, market-driven or press-driven events, 
national or international festivals, and finally, independent festivals that are 
designed to showcase work produced outside of large studios system (Hoover 
2013, p. 163). It thus comes as no surprise that there is a hierarchy among festivals. 
While during some international events, multi-million dollar deals are routinely 
made, others festivals are completely insignificant. Some of the best-known and 
most prestigious festivals are highlighted in Table 56. These festivals are intensely 
competitive, and compete for the most promising, interesting, and often the most 
controversial movies every year.  
 
Tab.56: Important Festivals and Markets, based on: Hoover 2013, pp. 163-166. 
Festival Timing Location
Cannes International Film Festival ~May Cannes, France
Venice Film Festival ~August Venice, Italy
San Francisco International Film Festival Spring San Francisco, USA
Toronto International Film Festival September Toronto, Canada
Seattle International Film Festival ~May Seattle, USA
Sundance Film Festival January Utah, USA
South by Southwest (SXSW) Spring Austin, USA
Tribeca Film Festival Spring New York City, USA
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Given the large variety of festivals, it is also not surprising that each festival 
has its own policies and guidelines (Finney 2010, p. 55). Some festivals for example 
are invite-only. In other words, the festival organization identifies promising movie 
projects in advance and invites the producers to screen the movie at the festival. 
Other festivals are submission driven. Those festivals set out guidelines to which 
the movie must adhere to in every regard. This may include the content, the format, 
the runtime and so forth (Hoover 2013, p. 163). Any producer with a movie that 
meets these criteria can submit a movie for entry. The festival staff then has to 
screen all of those submissions and determine, which movies should be included 
in the festival program. The press is typically the critical element of the festival 
process. All events need to be assessed in terms of industry attendance and foreign 
press presence. Festival directors make their selections and design their schedules 
with both contingents in mind (Finney 2010, p. 55).  
In regards to changes in the last fifteen years, two developments have to be 
highlighted: (1) an increase in submissions and (2) an increase in festivals. The 
Sundance Film Festival for example had 129 potential slots for feature movies 
available in 2002 for which it received 1.740 submissions. This number increased to 
2.000 submission in 2003. In 2009, the available slots decreased to 118, however, the 
number of submissions reached 3.661 (Kreuzer 2009, p. 32). Finally in 2014, 
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Sundance received 4.057 full-length movie submissions for 119 slots (Sundance 
2014, w/o p.).88 
Not only did the number of movie entries increase, the number of festivals 
has grown dramatically in the last fifteen years as well. The number has arguably 
become unmanageable for most producers. The European Coordination of Film 
Festivals (ECFF) counted 800 festivals in the territory of the European Union alone 
in 2007 (Kreuzer 2009, p. 33). In 2014, more than 5.000 festivals can be identified 
worldwide (Fischer 2012, p. 154). Kreuzer (2009, p. 33) points to digitalization and 
advances in presentation technologies as factors that have given life to many small 
festivals. In addition, the Internet is also responsible for the growth in festival 
numbers as it has given rise to online film festivals. The increase in festival numbers 
is not necessary beneficial for producers. A major disadvantage is that is has 
become even more difficult to determine, which festivals are really useful and can 
be valuable for a particular movie. Even without those changes, navigating the 
festival circuit is not an easy task for producers as was already highlighted in the 
previous chapter, when the important role of sales agencies in carrying out the 
relevant festival activities for the producer was highlighted. The rise in the number 
of festivals adds to the complexity for both parties. 
                                                     
88  Geoffrey Gilmore, the Sundance festival director until 2009, makes the rise of 
digital production technologies responsible for the increase in submissions. He 
points out that filmmakers had to thoroughly learn the handling of a film camera 
in the past, nowadays, they can just pick up a digital camera and get started 
(Spiegel 2003, w/o p.). 
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Finally, it has to be pointed out that in parallel to big festivals, often markets 
are held on which sellers and buyers meet. Major markets run alongside the 
festivals in Cannes, Berlin and Los Angeles. Film markets are entirely commercial 
events that take the form of trade shows. The entire point of these events is to 
facilitate the motion picture industry. Participants include buyers, sellers and those, 
who are looking to get new movies produced. Participating in these markets can 
cost thousands of dollars, for example, for booths and displays or for renting the 
required infrastructure to screen the movie. Producers thus face the risk of not 
being able to recoup the costs of participating should they not get a deal (Hoover 
2013, pp. 170-172).  
4.2.3.1 Step 2: Activities of Festivals 
Now that a general understanding of the role of festivals has been 
established, the focus can shift towards the formal analysis of their activities. Table 
57 shows the impact of technological advancement on the informational activities.  
 
Tab.57: Impact on Informational Activities (Festivals), based on: own research. 
As previously highlighted, festivals provide a market for producers and 
distributors to meet. They are not directly involved in the transaction between 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in the number of submissions
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in the number of submissions
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in the number of submissions
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producers and distributors. Accordingly, they do not carry out some of the 
informational activities. They, for example, do not support the negotiations, nor do 
they monitor transaction partners or process information between both parties. 
They do, however, indirectly influence the transaction between demand and 
supply by identifying, selecting, as well as inspecting and classifying those motion 
pictures that will be included in the festival program. In other words, the festival 
director ultimately decides, which producers will have an opportunity to present 
their motion pictures to buyers and critics. The cost for executing these three 
activities have increased in the past fifteen years. This was prominently highlighted 
by using Sundance as an example, which saw the number of submission more than 
double in the past fifteen years.    
4.2.3.2 Step 3: Value of Festivals 
Now that the activities of festivals and their change have been discussed, the 
focus can shift towards the value festivals provide. Just like the previous discussed 
intermediaries, festivals also increase the transaction efficiency and the transaction 
result. Table 58 highlights the value sources that enable festivals to increase the 
transaction efficiency.  
Unlike the previous intermediaries, festivals do not decrease the number of 
contacts. However, as described in Chapter 3, the provisioning of a market for 
demand and supply to meet has a very similar transaction cost reducing effect. 
Closely related to the coordination capabilities of festivals, their specialization and 
experience is a particular relevant value source as well. The organization and 
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execution of a festival that attracts the attention of buyers, critics and the media 
alike, requires highly specialized and qualified personnel. Ultimately, this 
specialization and experience is the key source that allows festivals to increase the 
transaction efficiency.  
 
Tab.58: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Efficiency (Festivals), based on:  
 own research. 
In addition to the increase of the transaction efficiency, festivals increase the 
transaction result as well. The relevant source for this value category is highlighted 
in Table 59. Just as before, an argument can be made that the reduction of 
transaction cost, which results from the provisioning of a marketplace for supply 
and demand to meet, leads to more transactions taken place, i.e. more motion 
pictures find distribution. 
 
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- Festivals reduce transaction costs through coordination
- Importance of coordination capacity remained high
No direct or indirect impact
- Festivals standardize various processes
- The importance of standardization hasn't changed
No direct or indirect impact
- Required investments in immaterial resources remained high 
  (brand and reputation)
- Producers are too small to create an efficiency advantage
No direct or indirect impact
- Required skills, capabilities and experience remained high
- Required investments to build up skills and capabilities
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Tab.59: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Result (Festivals), based on:  
 own research. 
4.2.3.3 Step 4: Incentives to cooperate with Festivals 
 Finally, the incentives and disincentives for producers and distributors to 
cooperate with festivals have to be examined as well. The analysis is thus now 
focusing on the festival’s up- and downstream market participants rather than on 
the festivals themselves. Unlike the previous intermediaries, the cooperation with 
festivals is to a much larger degree optional for producers and distributors. The 
analysis will start with the relevant incentives to cooperate with festivals. Two 
incentives can be identified. These as well as their development are illustrated in 
Table 60.          
 
Tab.60: Impact on Cooperation Incentives (Festivals), based on: own research. 
A strong argument for both, producers and distributors, to cooperate with 
festivals is their previous described ability to increase the transaction efficiency and 
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- The ability to reduce transaction costs remained















Incentives (I) ISIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements ISIn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- The effectiveness provided by festivals remained
- The cooperation with festivals is more efficient and
  effective from the producer's or sales agency's point of view
No direct or indirect impact
- High market entry barriers remained




Faster Market Entry and 
Penetration
High High
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effectiveness. In addition, from the producer’s point of view, the cooperation with 
festivals also provides the opportunity to enter the market faster and penetrate it 
wider. International festivals, for example, provide the opportunity to present the 
movie to international buyers.  
 
Tab.61: Impact on Cooperation Disincentives (Festivals), based on: own  
 research. 
Finally, one argument against a cooperation with festivals has to be 
highlighted as well, namely, the disclosing of the sensitive information. This is 
highlighted in Table 61. A producer has to ensure, that the festivals is trustworthy, 
before submitting a screener in the hope of getting selected. Should the festival not 
handle the submitted information with care, it may wrongfully land on the 
Internet. With the increase in piracy, this is a very real risk and a strong argument 
for avoiding a cooperation with festivals. 
4.2.3.4 Summary 
The previous sub chapters focused on the analysis of festivals. Festivals are 
mediating between producers and distributors in the motion picture value system. 
They have been introduced as special match makers, because, unlike the previous 
intermediaries, festivals are not directly involved in the transaction between 
producers and distributors. Instead, they provide a marketplace for demand and 
Disincentives (DI) DSIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements  DSIn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- Critical and sensitive information has to be disclosed
Disclosing of sensitive 
Information 
Medium Medium
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supply to meet. Table 62 provides a summary of the results of the preceding 
analysis. 
 
Tab.62: Summary - Impact on Festivals, based on: own research. 
Based on these results, the practical research questions can be answered in 
respect to festivals. The analysis revealed that the activities in their core have not 
been affected by technological advancements. They remain personnel intensive, 
requiring a great amount of experience and specialization.  Nevertheless, 
technology increased the number of producers and thus, the number of 
submissions also grew. As such, the costs for performing the activities increased as 
well. This, however, is in the interest of festivals. If they would not perform the 
activities, then the production companies and distributors would have to carry out 
the activities themselves. With the cost for their performance increasing, both, 
producer and distributor have strong incentives to not do so.  
In regards to the value that intermediaries in the motion picture sector 
provide, the analysis of festivals revealed that they increase the transaction 
efficiency as well as the transaction result. For each of these two categories the 
relevant value sources have been examined. It was shown that technological 
advancements had a neutral effect on the value provided by festivals.  
CI (t1999) CI (t2014) TVS (t1999) TVS (t2014) TIS (t1999) TIS (t2014) TDS (t1999) TDS (t2014)
High High Medium Medium
Intermediary
Activities Value Incentives Disincentives
Festivals Medium High Medium Medium
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Finally, the incentives and disincentives to cooperate with festivals have been 
examined as well. The analysis revealed relevant incentives and disincentives and 
showed that neither the incentive strength nor the disincentive strength was 
affected by technological advancements.  
4.2.4 Distributors 
Distributors have been identified as additional intermediaries in the 
Licensing, Distribution and Marketing Stage. They are generally mediating 
between producers and cinema operators. Their position between supply and 
demand is highlighted in Figure 35. 
 
Fig.35: Distributors in the Licensing, Distribution and Marketing Stage, based 
on: own research. 
As indicated by the orange box, distributors have been identified as the first 
market markers in the motion picture value system. This is because they buy and 
sell the distribution / exploitation rights for motion pictures at their own risk. It has 
to be highlighted, that the mediating position of distributors is not as clearly 
defined as Figure 35 suggests. On the supply side, producers are typically not able 
to directly negotiate a deal with the distributors. As previously discussed, in those 
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cases, sales agencies take the place of the producers as they will be in negotiations 
with the distributors (on behalf of the producers).  
One the demand side, most distributors will decline to acquire only theatrical 
rights as the theatrical distribution is often not as profitable as other media. They 
thus often try to acquire as much territory and media as they can. If they do not 
serve a particular territory or media themselves, they will lay off rights on sub 
distributors, and take a fee for serving as the middle man (Wrobel 2014, p. 84). 
Accordingly, distributors are not only in contact with cinema operators, but with 
other intermediaries from the exploitation segment as well. These include video 
stores, TV networks as well as digital distributors, and in some cases, other 
distributors or sub-distributors. Even more importantly, distributors are also 
responsible for marketing the movie to consumers.  Accordingly, consumers are 
relevant entities to be considered on the demand side as well.  
Based on these considerations, the tasks and activities of distributors can be 
divided into two distinct groups: (1) strategies to maximize value over the life of a 
single property, and (2) strategies to drive consumption by increasing awareness 
and interest. In regards to the first aspect, the distributor typically starts the 
distribution process by screening the movie to focus groups in order to determine 
the general distribution approach. For each category of media, the distributor has 
to address how the motion picture is consumed and monetized. This includes 
setting the price, deciding where and how the motion picture is sold or rented, how 
many units are being made and how the inventory is managed (Ulin 2013, p. 497; 
Wrobel 2014, p. 86). In addition to the positioning of the movie, its placement 
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compared to competing productions is of major importance as well (Swami et al. 
1999, p. 352). The positioning of the movie refers to the timing of the release and to 
the selection of movie theaters and cinema chains in which the movie will be 
screened (Wirtz 2012, p. 377). All these activities are summarized as release 
planning in the Motion Picture Value System Model. The objective as highlighted 
is to maximize consumption and corresponding revenues across multiple 
exploitation options. With the increase in media and territories in the past fifteen 
years, the complexity of these activities has risen as well. The challenge that 
distributors are facing is accurately summed up by Ulin (2013, p. 54), who points 
out that “the trick, which all distributors of motion pictures will need to master, is 
how to prudently manage the continuing maturation of traditional ancillary 
distribution while continuing to enfranchise the unquestioned potential inherent 
in digital distribution through new media; all within the context of continuing to 
grow the overall revenue generated by this continuingly evolving array of 
opportunities for consumers to enjoy motion pictures.”  
In regards to the second point, the multiple marketing strategies used by 
distributors to increase interest and awareness have to be highlighted. The setting 
of the promotional budget initially forms the basis for the marketing campaign. For 
the actual execution of the campaign, various instruments are available. The movie 
poster is the main advertising medium. It gives the movie a trade mark and ensures 
a high recognition value. The layout of the poster is often also used as the cover of 
DVDs and Blu-Rays. In addition to globally distributed movie posters, specific 
cultural alterations are produced as well (Wirtz 2012, pp. 378). 
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Other instruments are trailers and teasers, which are produced using actual 
movie footage and presented to audiences in theaters immediately before the 
screening of another feature. They are thus an inexpensive and efficient way to 
reach interested audiences (Wirtz 2012, p. 378). It comes as no surprise that the 
Internet is increasingly used as an information platform for new releases as well. 
Special trailers and teasers lure prospective buyers to the movie-specific homepage 
and increase the interest and awareness before the start of the classic advertising 
activities. In addition, trailer and teaser are published on video platforms such as 
YouTube in the hope of it being distributed from user to user (i.e. viral marketing). 
Preview screenings, i.e. screenings before the actual premiere event, are another 
instrument used to intensify interest in the public. These screenings typically take 
place in front of a selected audience from which the distributor expects positive 
word of mouth and good reviews (Wirtz 2012, p. 378). 
Especially for costly productions, television, radio and print advertising are 
the most important means of communication. This is because a large number of 
potential viewers can only be reached within a short period of time through the use 
of the mass media. Information events for journalists, edited newspaper articles 
and interviews with actors are typical examples for instruments in the area of 
public relations (Wirtz 2012, p. 379). Figure 36 gives an overview of the distribution 
of advertising cost for MPAA studios in 2007. 
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Fig.36: Average Distribution of U.S. Advertising Cost in 2007, based on: MPAA 
2008, p. 7. 
As illustrated in Figure 36, TV commercials make up the largest cost block 
and are the biggest cost driver in marketing motion pictures.89 Other media 
includes radio ads, ads in magazines and billboards, while other non-media 
expenditures, include creative services, exhibitor services, promotion and publicity 
as well as market research (MPAA 2008, p. 7).  
In this context is has to be noted that the marketing costs have risen sharply 
in recent years. Wirtz (2012, p. 377) points out that the average marketing cost for 
a motion picture increased to $35.9 million per movie, which represents roughly 
                                                     
89  Refer to Elliot and Simmons (2010, pp. 201-205) for an investigation of the factors 
determining motion picture advertising strategies and the determinants of 
advertising expenditure in different media. 
EX-POST ANALYSIS OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 305 
one-third of the total cost. This development is illustrated in Figure 37. Here the 
average costs for prints and advertising as well as their sum, the so called P&A 
costs, for MPAA studios from 1999 to 2007 are highlighted. 
 
Fig.37: MPAA Studios Average P&A Costs per movie (1999 – 2007), based on: 
MPA 2003, p. 20; MPAA 2008, p. 7. 
While no official MPAA data is available for the years after 2007, McClintock 
(2014, w/o p.) suspects that, if the MPAA still tracked spending on P&A, the 
number would be north of $40 million today for medium-size motion pictures. She 
also highlights that to market tentpoles internationally, distributors are spending 
an additional $100 million per movie. She uses Transformers (2007) as an example 
and points to the $150 million spent in 2007 to market the movie domestically and 
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internationally. This number increased by 33% to $200 million to market 
Transformers: Age of Extinction (2014) in 2014 (McClintock 2014, w/o p.).90 
4.2.4.1 Step 2: Activities of Distributors 
Now that a general understanding of the role of distributors has been 
established, the focus can shift towards the formal analysis of their activities. Since 
distributors are market makers, all three activity levels are relevant. The analysis 
will start with the activities on the informational level, which are highlighted in 
Table 63.  
Just as was the case with the previous intermediaries, for distributors the cost 
for executing the three activities identification, selection, inspection and 
classification increased as well. Not only did the number of motion pictures that 
are seeking distribution increase, the number of transaction partners increased as 
well, e.g. new digital distributors appeared.  
Unlike talent agencies and sales agencies, distributors do not support 
negotiations, instead, they conduct negotiations in their own name. Nevertheless, 
the increase in territories, the rise of new media windows and other technological 
advancements, also increased the complexity of the negotiations and contracts for 
distributors. This is also the reason why the cost for information processing as well 
as monitoring and reporting increased.  
                                                     
90  For an analysis of the impact of total advertising on movie revenues refer to 
Elberse and Anand (2005), Elliot and Simmons (2008), Hennig-Thurau et al. 
(2006) as well as Prag and Casavant (1994). 
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Tab.63: Impact on Informational Activities (Distributors), based on: own  
 research. 
 
   The aforementioned increase in complexity also has an effect on the 
activities on the legal-financial level. These activities are highlighted in Table 64. 
The licensing is one of the most important activities of distributors. It is an activity 
that requires a great amount of experience and skills and accordingly cannot be 
automated or in other way significantly altered by technology. Due to the increase 
in complexity of deals, and the increase in transaction partners, the costs for the 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in offerings and alternatives
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in offerings and alternatives
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in offerings and alternatives
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in transaction partners (more sellers)
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Complexity of deals and contracts increased
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in the information amount 
- Increased security concerns (quality standard)
- Limited degree of automation
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Limited transparency
- Limited degree of automation / use of ICT
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execution of this activity have increased as well. The same reasons are responsible 
for the increase of the costs for payment processing as well.91  
 
Tab.64: Impact on Legal-Financial Activities (Distributors), based on: own  
 research. 
The activity contract adjustment is particular relevant for agreements made 
with cinema operators as will be discussed in more detail when the exhibition 
sector will be examined. However, due to the increase in complexity of contracts, 
the execution of this activity creates higher cost in 2014 when compared to 1999 as 
well.  
In regards to the activities on the physical level, it has to be highlighted that 
the literature on media management typically identifies distribution and 
                                                     
91  In has to be highlighted, that the distributor is in the middle of the remittance 
chain. They collect revenues from all upstream participants and distribute them 
downstream. 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Higher capital requirements / higher risks
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in transaction partners (more buyers and sellers)
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Increased complexity of deals and contracts
- Degree of price discrimination further increased
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in payments and transaction partners
- High quality standard (security)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
- Increased complexity of deals and contracts
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reproduction as core activities of distributors. However, as highlighted in the 
motion picture value system, distributors do not carry out those physical activities 
by themselves. The transformation, reproduction, distribution and repair 
processing are all outsourced to an additional intermediary – laboratories in the 
past and the DCDC in recent years. The only physical activity that distributors 
typically carry out themselves, is presentation, which, in the case of distributors, 
solely refers to the extensive marketing activities they perform. The increase in 
marketing cost was already discussed. The cost increase for the execution of the 
presentation activity thus comes as no surprise. This is also highlighted in Table 65 
below. 
 
Tab.65: Impact on Physical Activities (Distributors), based on: own research. 
4.2.4.2 Step 3: Value of Distributors 
Now that the activities of distributors have been discussed, the focus can shift 
towards the value distributors provide. Table 66 highlights the first set of value 
sources that enable distributors to increase the transaction efficiency.  
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increased competition => Higher degree of marketing required
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
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Tab.66: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Efficiency (Distributors), based  
 on: own research. 
Distributors also reduce contact costs due to their mediating position 
between multiple sellers and multiple buyers. With the number of transaction 
partners increasing on both sides, the strength of the Baligh-Richartz-Effect has 
increased as well.  
Likewise, distributors also reduce transaction costs through standardization. 
The buyers and sellers get used to the processes of distributors and therefore learn 
to efficiently carry out transactions with them. This situation has not changed in 
the last decade. 
Scale effects as well as the specialization and experience of distributors are 
particularly strong value sources. Scale effects occur in regards to material 
resources, i.e. offices around the globe or a global distribution network, but also for 
intangible resources, such as their reputation and business relationships as well as 
immaterial resources in the form of highly specialized and qualified personnel.  
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- Increase in transaction partners (more buyers and sellers)
- Number of distributors remained comparatively low
No direct or indirect impact
- Standardization is of paramount importance
- The importance of standardization remained high
No direct or indirect impact
- Required investments in immaterial and material resources
  remained high 
- Producers are too small to create an efficiency advantage
No direct or indirect impact
- Required skills, capabilities and experience remained high
- Required investments to build up skills and capabilities
  remained high





















Scale Effects High High
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Since distributors are market makers, additional value sources that increase 
the transaction efficiency have to be considered as well. These are illustrated in 
Table 67. 
 
Tab.67: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Efficiency II (Distributors),  
 based on: own research. 
Due to the high marketing costs of motion pictures, the distributor faces 
considerable risks, which have increased with escalating marketing cost. A 
producer would face the same risk, if the producer were to distribute the movie 
directly. Unlike individual producers, however, distributors can spread the risk 
over their entire portfolio. Accordingly, risk cost and thus transaction cost are 
reduced (Noam 2010, p. 63). A similar argument can be made in regards to the risk 
aversion. Due to the aforementioned reasons, is a distributor more likely to risk 
high marketing expenditure compared to individual producers or production 
companies. Lastly, and in particular when the distributor is part of a larger media 
conglomerate, the capital cost of the distributor are lower than those of individuals 
production companies, whose access to capital is much more limited.  
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- Spreading of the risk through the distribution of multiple movies
- P&A cost increased and associated risk has grown accordingly
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- Risk aversion of distributors is less pronounced 
- Associated risks have grown
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- Capital cost of distributors are lower






 Lower Risk 
Aversion of the 
Intermediary
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In addition to the increase of the transaction efficiency, distributors increase 
the transaction result as well. The relevant sources for this value category are 
illustrated in Table 68. Just as before, an argument can be made that the reduction 
of transaction cost, and the reduction of market power of producers and cinema 
operators, results in more transactions taken place, i.e. more motion picture being 
distributed.  
 
Tab.68: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Result (Distributors), based on:  
 own research. 
4.2.4.3 Step 4: Incentives to cooperate with Distributors 
Finally, the incentives and disincentives for producers and cinema operators 
to cooperate with distributors have to be examined as well. The analysis is thus 
now focusing on the distributor’s up- and downstream market participants rather 
than on the distributors themselves. Similar to talents, for whom the cooperation 
with talent agencies is in practice not optional, the cooperation with distributors is 
also not optional for producers, who want to their movie to be seen around the 
globe and revenues maximized over the lifetime of the movie. Nevertheless, 
various incentives and disincentives to cooperate with distributors can still be 
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- The ability to reduce transaction costs increased slightly
- Due to lower transaction cost, more transactions take place
No direct or indirect impact
- Market power of producers remained low
- Distributor increase their market power through the
  aggregation of demand and supply 
- Ability of producers to reduce market power of the exhibition
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identified. The analysis will start with the incentives. Three incentives can be 
identified, these are illustrated in Table 69. 
 
Tab.69: Impact on Cooperation Incentives (Distributors), based on: own  
 research. 
A strong argument for both, producers and cinema operators or other players 
in the Exploitation and Consumption Stage, to cooperate with distributors is their 
previously described ability to increase the transaction efficiency and -
effectiveness. The decrease in transaction cost and the increase in transactions is in 
the interest of producers and cinema operators as well.  
In addition, the cooperation with distributors provides producers the 
opportunity to enter the market faster and penetrate it wider. Producers by 
themselves would not be able to distribute the movie internationally as efficiently. 
Since the number of countries and the importance of the international market has 
grown, the incentive to cooperate is more pronounced as well.  
Unsurprisingly, there are also a variety of arguments against a cooperation 
with distributors. For example, particularly the distribution arms of the Major 
Incentives (I) ISIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements ISIn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- The efficiency and effectiveness provided by distributors increased
- The cooperation with distributors is more efficient and effective from
  the producer's or cinema's point of view
No direct or indirect impact
- Multiple sales channels can be reached through distributors
- Producer typically has no direct distribution 
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- High market entry barriers remained
- Distributors can achieve global distribution faster 
- Amount of potential markets increased
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studios wield a considerable market power. They use their market power to 
demand a large share of revenues and fees, which is neither in the interest of the 
producer, nor in the interest of cinema operators or other licensees.  
 
Tab.70: Impact on Cooperation Disincentives (Distributors), based on: own  
 research. 
Likewise, as highlighted in Table 70, the risk of discrimination is an 
additional disincentives to cooperate with distributors.  From the producer’s point 
of view the access to the distribution channels is not permanently secured. 
Producers are thus highly dependent on distributors. They therefore should 
theoretically avoid this dependency and the risk of being discriminated. However, 
as previously mentioned, producers face a lack of alternatives.  
The disincentive of having to disclose sensitive information is particular 
relevant for cinema operators, which, due to the nature of their agreements with 
distributors, have to provide detailed reports about ticket sales, screenings and so 
on. The distributor often even has the right to audit the cinema operator directly or 
through a third party. A strong argument to not cooperate with distributors - if an 
alternative would exist.  
Disincentives (DI) DSIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements  DSIn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- Distributors retained a tremendous amount of market power
- They take over control of the movie and therefore also a large portion
  of the revenues
- Theater operators depend on a continuous flow of products
No direct or indirect impact
- Access to (worldwide) distribution is not ensured
- Theater operators depend on a continuous flow of products
No direct or indirect impact
- Critical and sensitive information has to be disclosed
Disclosing of sensitive 
Information 
Low Low
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4.2.4.4 Summary 
The previous sub chapters focused on the analysis of distributors. They are 
mediating between producers and cinema operators in the motion picture value 
system. Table 71 provides a summary of the results of the preceding analysis. 
 
Tab.71: Summary - Impact on Distributors, based on: own research. 
Based on these results, the practical research questions can be answered in 
respect to distributors. The analysis revealed that the activities in their core have 
not been affected by technological advancements. They remain personnel 
intensive, requiring a great amount of experience and specialization.  Nevertheless, 
technology increased the number of buyers and sellers and as such, the cost for 
performing the majority of the activities increased as well.  
In regards to the value that intermediaries in the motion picture sector 
provide, the analysis revealed that distributors increase the transaction efficiency 
as well as the transaction result. For each of these two categories the relevant value 
sources have been examined. It was shown that technological advancements had a 
positive effect on the value provided by distributors.  
Finally, the incentives and disincentives to cooperate with distributors have 
been examined as well.  From the onset it was pointed out that the cooperation with 
distributors is in reality not optional for most producers. It is rather a mandatory 
CI (t1999) CI (t2014) TVS (t1999) TVS (t2014) TIS (t1999) TIS (t2014) TDS (t1999) TDS (t2014)
Medium High Medium Medium
Intermediary
Activities Value Incentives Disincentives
Distributors Medium High Medium High
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requirement. Nevertheless, the analysis still revealed relevant incentives and 
disincentives and showed that the incentive strength increased in the last fifteen 
years while the disincentive strength remained at a similar level. 
4.2.5 Laboratories / DCDC 
Laboratories such as Deluxe and Technicolor have been highlighted as 
additional intermediaries in the motion picture value system. They are the last 
intermediaries in the Licensing, Distribution and Marketing Stage. Their position 
between supply (distributors) and demand (exhibition outlets such as cinemas or 
video stores) is visualized in Figure 38.  
 
Fig.38: Laboratories in the Licensing, Distribution and Marketing Stage, based 
on: own research. 
The previous chapter highlighted the various activities of distributors and 
pointed out that most of the physical activities are outsourced. This is where 
laboratories such as Deluxe or Technicolor traditionally stepped in to ensure that 
the movie material is delivered to the respective buyers on time and in the desired 
quantities. They support the transaction between distributor and cinema operator 
by taking over the physical reproduction, transformation and distribution of 
EX-POST ANALYSIS OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 317 
motion pictures for the distributor. They do not acquire any property rights, nor do 
they sell the reproduced movies to cinema operators. Instead, they receive a fee for 
their service from the distributor. 
Unsurprisingly, the conversion of cinema screens worldwide to digital 
projection affected laboratories dramatically. This was predicted by many authors, 
however, no one foresaw the developments that have actually occurred. The 
following paragraphs will thus briefly chronic the evolution of laboratories in the 
last fifteen years, before the new world – the new standard of delivering motion 
pictures to cinemas - will be presented. 
Deluxe and Technicolor have been the pillars in the film service segment for 
nearly a century. Technicolor’s film development business dates back to 1914, while 
Deluxe has been processing film since 1915. Both have been the leaders in lab 
services in California and worldwide (Giardina 2011, w/o p.). In 1999, a feature with 
a length of about two hours consisted of six projection reels, each weighing 
approximately 40kg (Hawkins and Vickery 2008, p. 77). This was required to show 
the movie on one screen. The job of Technicolor and Deluxe was to ensure that 
movies could be shown on thousands of screens simultaneously. They handled the 
chemical process of reproducing the film reels and delivering those reels to theaters 
across North America. Setting up the duplication process forms a major part of the 
duplication costs. Accordingly, it made sense to use an intermediary. The 
distributors could avoid investing in the required machinery to duplicate film reels, 
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while laboratories were able to spread the investment over a larger number of 
transactions.92   
As was already highlighted, the digital cinema revolution started in 1999. 
From then on, each year, more and more screens converted to digital projection – 
eliminating the need for film reels. As movies still had to be delivered to theaters 
somehow, Deluxe and Technicolor ventured in the digital cinema segment as well. 
They started to focus on theatrical digital cinema mastering, distribution and key 
management services. This follows the post-production process and gets the files 
ready for distribution into cinemas (made into a DCP), checks them (QC), gets them 
into cinemas (delivery of hard drives) and makes sure that the security keys 
(KDM93) are sent out and any problems are dealt with. In addition, they also 
ventured into related businesses including digital postproduction and digital 
cinema distribution. However, both Technicolor and Deluxe struggled to get their 
own distribution solutions accepted by the market (Hancock 2015, w/o p.). 
Then, in only the last five years, a number of remarkable events occurred. It 
started in 2010, when Deluxe announced that it had formed a joint venture with 
EchoStar.  This marriage essentially brought together the digital asset management 
                                                     
92  While it didn’t matter for the most part of the last century, the investments 
conducted by those laboratories are characterized by a high degree of specificity 
and thus created a hold-up for the laboratories. 
93  The abbreviation KDM refers to Key Delivery Message. It is a component of the 
DRM system used in DCI-compliant digital cinema servers. 
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and distribution expertise of industry veteran Deluxe with the satellite operations 
and transmission expertise of EchoStar Satellite Services (Variety 2010, w/o p.). 
In July 2011, Deluxe and Technicolor began an orderly retreat from film, 
inking three-year subcontracting agreements that reduced their footprint of film 
services around the world. Per the agreement, Technicolor subcontracted its 35mm 
bulk release printing business to Deluxe in North America, while Deluxe 
subcontracted its 35mm print distribution business in the US to Technicolor. 
Additionally, Deluxe subcontracted its 35mm/16mm color negative processing 
business to Technicolor in London (Giardina 2011, w/o p.). For many these news 
underscored the approaching end of the era where film dominated the theatrical 
motion picture industry.  
Then, in 2013, the Digital Cinema Distribution Coalition (DCDC) was formed 
by AMC Theatres, Regal Entertainment Group, Cinemark Theatres, Universal 
Pictures and Warner Bros. Entertainment. The three largest theater chains and two 
Major studios came together with the goal to offer a range of satellite and terrestrial 
offerings to theaters. Their aim was to send movies and other content to theaters 
via a satellite network, eliminating the need to ship hard drives. In addition to the 
two studios involved directly in the joint venture, the DCDC had also reached 
agreements with Lionsgate, Disney, and Paramount Pictures to provide each with 
theatrical digital-delivery services across North America (DCDC 2015, w/o p.).  
In the same year, the Deluxe/EchoStar joint venture announced that it has 
been selected by the Digital Cinema Distribution Coalition to provide digital asset 
management, distribution by satellite and other means, as well as operations 
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support for its advanced theatrical digital delivery platform (Deluxe/EchoStar 2013, 
w/o p.). Up to this point, Deluxe/EchoStar was the primary competitor in the digital 
delivery business, as Deluxe/EchoStar was offering their own delivery systems to 
theater operators. With the announcement, Deluxe/EchoStar also became DCDC’s 
primary service provider.  
In 2014, Deluxe closed it remaining Film Lab in Hollywood. COO Warren 
Stein acknowledged that processing volumes had declined sharply, and as a result, 
the laboratory had incurred significant financial losses. Technicolor has already 
ceased offering these services in Southern California, meaning that with the 
shutting of Deluxe’s lab, only privately owned Fotokem in Burbank remained in 
this market (Giardina 2014, w/o p.). 
In the same year, DCDC acquired the Deluxe/Echostar satellite network. As 
previously pointed out, until this point, Deluxe/Echostar had been both DCDC’s 
primary service provider and owner of a competing distribution network. Many 
theaters had to have satellite dishes for both networks. Under the deal 
Deluxe/Echostar remained DCDC’s primary service provider and over the next 
year, DCDC converted the 699 already deployed Deluxe/Echostar screens to 
DCDC’s technology. The DCDC absorbed the costs of the conversion (Cohen 2014, 
w/o p.). 
With this transaction, some confusion in the digital cinema distribution 
market was eliminated and the Digital Cinema Distribution Coalition (DCDC) 
became effectively the sole player in delivering features to cinemas. This was 
highlighted in 2015, when the DCDC announced that it is accelerating its rollout of 
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technologies, predicting that its satellite-distribution system will reach 32,000 
movie screens at 3.000 locations by 2018. As of 2015, the DCDC has pacts with 73 
theater circuits spanning 2.300 locations and 28,000 screens. About 1.700 of those 
locations and 22.000 screens have DCDC’s proprietary equipment installed.94 In 
addition, DCDC has agreements with 24 content providers, including all major 
studios and various independent production companies (Kelley 2015, w/o p.). 
The DCDC has established the new de-facto standard for digital movie 
delivery and became the dominant player in this segment in just two years. It is 
thus warranted to explain, how the digital delivery of motion picture looks like 
now and will look like for the foreseeable future. 
Once the post-production is complete a master hard drive is delivered to 
DCDC’s ingest point at Deluxe in Burbank, California. Here the file is quality 
controlled by highly qualified personnel before it is ingested into the network. The 
content than travels two different routes via fiber optic cable: (1) to the DCDC 
network operations center in Salt Lake City and (2) to DCDC’s uplink in Gilbert, 
Arizona. At DCDC’s uplink in Gilbert, the content is checked once again before it 
is beamed to DCDC’s full time transponder on AMC 15, EchoStar’s state of the art 
satellite. AMC 15 is in synchronous orbit above the center of the United States. 
From there the content is transmitted to individual cinemas across North America. 
                                                     
94  As previously highlighted, as of March 2015, 38.719 screens (97% of total screen) 
have been converted to digital projection. The DCDC delivers the content to 56% 
(22.000) of those digital screens in 2015 and plans to increase the share to 72% by 
2018. 
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In the cinema, the digital assets are captured by DCDC’s proprietary catch server, 
which is required at each satellite enabled location. As soon as the theater has been 
booked for the transmitted feature, the content becomes available for digestion into 
the local theater management server, from where it can then be transferred to its 
assigned playback auditorium. This new situation is illustrated in Figure 39 (DCDC 
2015a, w/o p.). 
 
Fig.39: DCDC in the Licensing, Distribution and Marketing Stage, based on: 
own research. 
While the short amount of time in which the DCDC managed to build its 
monopoly is certainly impressive, the fact itself should come as no surprise. As 
discussed before, a structure with one intermediary is often the most efficient. In 
addition, from the perspective of cinema operators, each investment in delivery 
technologies is an investment with high specificity, i.e. two receiver, two satellite 
dishes, etc. It is in their interest to only have to deal and maintain the technology 
from one provider rather than from multiple providers. While studios and 
producers do not face high investments, it is also in their interest to only deal with 
one provider to cover the distribution rather than having to make agreements and 
monitor multiple providers. 
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In retrospective, the players involved in the joint venture are also not 
surprising. The motion picture industry is characterized by a large degree of 
vertical integration. The conversion from analog to digital projection provided the 
Major studios with the opportunity to integrate further. In addition, having Major 
studios involved certainly helped with getting more content providers on board. 
Likewise, the involvement of the large cinema chains makes sense. They, after all, 
are the most affected and, as previously mentioned, have a strong interest to 
establish a single standard as soon as possible to avoid unnecessary costs. With the 
large chains directly involved, they cannot only shape the standard, but also drive 
adaptation on the exhibition side.  Arguably, the key to the success of the DCDC is 
exactly that important and established players from both sides came together. 
Ultimately, this is just another example for the observation that the players in the 
motion picture industry would rather work with a known rival than see a new 
competitor arise (Gomery 2004, p. 203). 
4.2.5.1 Step 2: Activities of Laboratories / DCDC 
Now that a general understanding of the traditional role of laboratories and 
the new role of the DCDC have been established, the focus can shift towards the 
formal analysis of their activities. As the previous discussion highlighted, 
laboratories such as Deluxe and Technicolor have been strongly impacted by 
technology. The conversion from analog to digital projection altered many of the 
physical activities that have been traditionally carried out by laboratories and 
ultimately led to a situation, in which laboratories (in their original incarnation) are 
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no longer part of the motion picture value system. They have been succeeded by 
the DCDC. This has implications for the application of the Intermediation Analysis 
Approach as a comparative statics analysis is not possible. Therefore a deviation in 
the approach is necessary.   
Table 72 highlights the relevant activities of laboratories on the information 
level as well as the cost for their execution in 1999. As indicated, the execution of 
these activities was generally associated with high cost as they mostly involved 
manual labor. Qualified personnel had to inspect any master they received. From 
particular importance also were the activities information processing as well as 
monitoring and reporting. It was the job of laboratories to coordinate delivery dates 
with distributors and cinema operators. They had to track the deliveries, the repairs 
of reels and had to report back to the distributor. None of which was automated in 
1999. 
 
Tab.72: Impact on Informational Activities (Laboratories), based on: own  
 research. 
In contrast to this, a different picture emerges when the DCDC is examined. 
The same informational activities are still relevant in 2014, however, they are now 




- High cost due to mostly manual labor
- Very limited degree of automation possible
- High cost as specific expertise was required
Information Processing High
- High cost due to mostly manual labor
- Very limited degree of automation possible




- High cost due to mostly manual labor
- High cost due to limited transparency
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performed by the DCDC and the costs for their execution are lower, which is 
illustrated in Table 73. 
 
Tab.73: Impact on Informational Activities (DCDC), based on: own research. 
The digitalization of the delivery process has also impacted the activities on 
the informational level. The inspection of the master is now mainly done by 
computers. The processing of information now relies heavily on the use of ICT and 
is to a certain degree automated. The DCDC, for example, provides their customers 
a portal on the Internet, which is used as a communication platform and allows 
cinema operators to manage their deliveries. The cost for monitoring and reporting 
have decreased as well. Digital technologies allow real time tracking of when 
movies are delivered to the catch server at cinema sides and when they are 
transferred to the cinema management server. 
On the legal-financial level, warranty processing is an activity with high 
relevance. As indicated in Table 74, the costs for executing this activity in 1999 were 
high. Film prints had an extremely limited life span. They deteriorated in 
proportion to the number of times they were projected (Husak 2004, p. 923). 
 Level Activity (A) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Inspection and 
Classification 
- Cost decrease through the removal of most manual labor
- Cost decrease through full digitalization and large degree of
  automation
- Specific infrastructure  and expertise required
Low
Information Processing
- Cost increase due to a higher amount of information  
- Cost decrease due to large degree of automation




- Cost decrease due to increased transparency
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Accordingly, the processing of repairs and warranties was an important activity of 
laboratories. 
 
Tab.74: Impact on Legal-Financial Activities (Laboratories), based on: own  
 research. 
Unsurprisingly, the cost for warranty processing have decreased 
dramatically with the conversion from analog to digital cinema as the described 
deterioration does not occur with digital files. This is also illustrated in Table 75.  
 
Tab.75: Impact on Legal-Financial Activities (DCDC), based on: own research. 
Finally, the activities of the physical level are the most important ones and 
the most affected by technological advancements. The relevant activities and the 
cost for their execution in 1999 are illustrated in Table 76. 













- High failure rate 
- Very limited automation possible
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 













- Decrease in failure rate 
- High degree of automation / use of digital technologies
Low
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Tab.76: Impact on Physical Activities (Laboratories), based on: own research. 
In 1999, the costs for their execution was high. The creation of different 
versions (transformation), the reproduction of thousands of film reels and the 
shipping of those reels across North America, involved mostly manual labor. Those 
activities required a very specific infrastructure (i.e. machinery) and qualified 
personnel that knew how to use the machinery. 
 
Tab.77: Impact on Physical Activities (DCDC), based on: own research. 
This situation has changed dramatically in 2014 as illustrated in Table 77. The 
delivery of motion pictures over satellite equals a simultaneous reproduction and 
distribution. Instead of having to reproduce thousands of film reels. The master 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements
Transformation High
- High cost due to mostly manual labor
- Very limited degree of automation possible
- High cost as specific infrastructure  and expertise was required
Reproduction High
- Very high First-Copy-Cost  effect
- High cost due to mostly manual labor
- High cost as specific infrastructure  and expertise was required
Distribution / Repair 
Processing
High
- High cost due to mostly manual labor
- High cost due to high failure rate of product










 Level Activity (A) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Transformation
- Cost decrease through the removal of most manual labor
- Cost decrease through full digitalization and large degree of
  automation
- Cost increase through an increase in variations (versions)
- Specific infrastructure  and expertise required
Low
Reproduction 
- Cost decrease through the removal of most manual labor
- Cost decrease through full digitalization and large degree of
  automation (First-Copy-Cost  effect decreased)
- Cost increase through an increase in variations (versions)
- Specific infrastructure  and expertise required
- Simultaneous reproduction and distribution possible
Low
Distribution / Repair 
Processing
- Cost decrease through the removal of most manual labor
- Cost decrease due to lower failure rate
- Specific infrastructure  and expertise required
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only has to be made into a DLP and beamed to the satellite from where the file is 
send to each theater. While all this still requires a very specific infrastructure as 
well as specific skills and capabilities, the cost for executing those activities is still 
lower than compared to 1999. 
4.2.5.2 Step 3: Value of Laboratories / DCDC 
Now that the activities have been discussed, the focus can shift towards the 
value laboratories and the DCDC provide. Both increase the transaction efficiency 
as well as the logistic efficiency. Table 78 highlights the value sources that enabled 
laboratories to enhance the transaction efficiency. 
 
Tab.78: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Efficiency (Laboratories), based  
 on: own research. 
In 1999, with digital cinema still being in the very early stages, laboratories 
were able to decrease transaction costs in a variety of ways. Firstly, they reduced 
contact costs due to their mediating position between multiple distributors and 
thousands of cinema sides. Standardization played an important role as well. By 
then, distributors and cinema operators had been working with Technicolor and 
Deluxe for many decades and learned to efficiently conduct transactions. Scale 
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements
Baligh-Richartz-Effect Medium
- Large amount of buyers and sellers
- Comparatively high cost per contact due to large amount of
  manual (physical) activities
Standardization High - Large degree of standardization
Scale Effects High
- Laboratories have been able to exploit scale effect in regards to




- The reproduction and delivery of movies required specific skills
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effects, particular in regards to material resources, i.e. the machinery and 
infrastructure required to reproduce thousands of film reels, also was an important 
value source. Since Technicolor and Deluxe were able to spread the investments 
over a larger number of transactions, compared to a situation in which each 
distributor builds up his own reproduction and distribution capabilities, the 
transaction efficiency was increased.  
The same value sources are still relevant in 2014. This is highlighted in Table 
79. The DCDC still reduces contact costs, however, the cost per contact are 
considerable lower due to the use of technology. Accordingly, the strength of this 
value source is less pronounced now than it was 15 years ago for laboratories. 
 
Tab.79: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Efficiency (DCDC), based on:  
 own research. 
The importance of standardization, scale effects and specialization remained, 
even though the standards, required infrastructure and skills have changed over 
the past fifteen years. The DCDC replaced old standards and established new ones. 
While no longer machinery is required to reproduce thousands of film reels, the 
Type Value Source Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
Baligh-Richartz-Effect
- Large amount of buyers and sellers
- Comparatively low cost per contact due to digital technologies
Low
Standardization
- Established the new de-facto standard for digital theatrical
  delivery in North America
- Importance is likely to increase as distributors and cinema
  operators get used to the new processes
High
Scale Effects
- High investments in machinery have been replaced by equally





- DCDC acquired new skills and capabilities 
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operation of a satellite distribution network nevertheless requires considerable 
investments. With so many content providers and cinema operators on board, the 
DCDC can spread these costs over a larger number of transactions, which increases 
the efficiency. 
In addition to the transaction efficiency, laboratories increased the logistics 
efficiency as well. This is illustrated in Table 80. It should come as no surprise that 
it is more efficient to have Deluxe and Technicolor reproduce, store and ship film 
reels to cinema sides, than a situation in which all distributors have to perform the 
aforementioned activities by themselves. 
 
Tab.80: Impact on Value Sources – Logistic Efficiency (Laboratories), based on:  
 own research. 
While the cost for storing and delivering motion pictures is considerably 
lower in 2014, the DCDC does increase the logistic efficiency as well. This follows 
the same logic as previously discussed and is illustrated in Table 81. 
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements
Logistics High
- Manual logistic activities carried out by laboratories resulted in
  efficiency advantages
- The strong coordination skills and capabilities of laboratories
  was one of the reasons for the efficiency increase. 
Storage High
- Manual storage activities carried out by laboratories resulted in
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Tab.81: Impact on Value Sources – Logistic Efficiency (DCDC), based on: own  
 research. 
4.2.5.3 Step 4: Incentives to cooperate with Laboratories / DCDC 
Finally, the incentives and disincentives for distributors and cinema 
operators to cooperate with laboratories or the DCDC also have to be examined. 
Similar to many of the previous intermediaries, the cooperation with laboratories 
or the DCDC is in practice not optional as well. Due to the high cost associated with 
building up the required infrastructure to reproduce and deliver motion pictures, 
distributors had to rely on laboratories and now have to rely on the DCDC. 
Nevertheless, one incentive to cooperate with laboratories can still be identified. 
This is illustrated in Table 82. 
 
Tab.82: Impact on Cooperation Incentives (Laboratories), based on: own 
 research. 
A strong argument for both, distributors and cinema operators, to cooperate 
with laboratories was the previous described ability to increase the transaction- and 
Type Value Source Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
Logistics
- Logistic activities have been completely digitalized, however, by
  taking over the digital distribution for multiple producers or
  distributors the logistic efficiency is still increased




- Storage activities have been completely digitalized, however, by
  taking over the storage for multiple producers/distributors the













Incentives (I) ISIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements
Increased Transaction- 
and Logistic Efficiency
High - Laboratories provided many efficiency and effectiveness advantages
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logistic efficiency. The decrease in transaction cost was in the interest of distributors 
and cinema operators as well. The same incentive is still valid in 2014. The DCDC 
also increases the transaction efficiency, which is still in the interest of distributors 
and cinema operators. This is illustrated in Table 83. 
 
Tab.83: Impact on Cooperation Incentives (DCDC), based on: own research. 
There is also a strong argument against a cooperation with laboratories and 
the DCDC, namely their high market power. For laboratories this is illustrated in 
Table 84. The laboratories, which have been operating in a duopoly for almost a 
century, could use their market power to ask for higher fees, which is not in the 
interest of distributors.  
 
Tab.84: Impact on Cooperation Disincentives (Laboratories), based on: own  
 research. 
In 2014, this disincentive is even more pronounced with the DCDC operating 
in a monopoly as illustrated in Table 85. In addition, from a cinema operator’s point 
of view, specific investments are required in order to be able to receive content 
digitally from the DCDC. Cinema operators thus enter into a strong dependency. 
They face the risk of a hold-up and discrimination. For these reasons a cooperation 
Incentives (I) Impact of Technological Advancements ISIn (t2014)
Increased Transaction- 
and Logistic Efficiency
- DCDC provides many efficiency and effectiveness advantages
- For distributors / producers as well as cinema operators the cooperation
  with these intermediaries is more efficient and effective
High
Disincentives (DI) DSIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements
Market Power of the 
Intermediary
Medium
- Laboratories yielded considerable market power in a duopoly 
- Alternatives were virtually not existent
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with the DCDC should theoretical be rejected, however, due the lack of 
alternatives, this is a mood point. 
 
Tab.85: Impact on Cooperation Disincentives (DCDC), based on: own research. 
4.2.5.4 Summary 
The previous sub chapters focused on the analysis of traditional laboratories 
as well as their digital equivalent, the DCDC. Both are mediating between 
distributors and cinema operators and carry out many of the physical activities for 
the distributor. The preceding analysis revealed that the conversion from analog to 
digital projection altered many of the physical activities that have been traditionally 
carried out by laboratories and ultimately led to a situation, in which laboratories 
are no longer part of the motion picture value system. Accordingly, a deviation for 
the analysis approach was necessary. Table 86 provides a summary of the results 
of the preceding analysis. 
Based on these results, the practical research questions can be answered in 
respect to laboratories and the DCDC. The analysis revealed that the activities of 
laboratories have been altered in their core by technological advancements. This 
led to a decrease in the cost for executing most activities. Particularly, the activities 
on the physical level have been affected. For example, the satellite delivery of 
Disincentives (DI) Impact of Technological Advancements  DSIn (t2014)
Market Power of the 
Intermediary
- DCDC created a monopoly in a very short amount of time




- DCDC created a monopoly in a very short amount of time
- DCDC thus controls the digital delivery of motion pictures 
High
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motion pictures allows a simultaneous reproduction and distribution, whereas 
laboratories had to reproduce thousands of film reels and ship them manually.  
 
Tab.86: Summary - Impact on Laboratories and the DCDC, based on: own  
 research. 
In regards to the value that intermediaries in the motion picture sector 
provide, the analysis revealed that both, laboratories and the DCDC, increase the 
transaction efficiency as well as the transaction result. Naturally, with the relevance 
of laboratories fading in recent years, their value decreased as well. 
Finally, the incentives and disincentives to cooperate with laboratories and 
the DCDC have been examined as well.  From the onset it was pointed out that the 
cooperation with neither of them is or was optional. It is rather a mandatory 
requirement in order to get the movie material into theaters. Nevertheless, the 
analysis still revealed relevant incentives and disincentives and showed that the 
incentives, but also disincentives to cooperate, are more pronounced in 2014.  
 
 
CI (t1999) CI (t2014) TVS (t1999) TVS (t2014) TIS (t1999) TIS (t2014) TDS (t1999) TDS (t2014)
CI (t1999) CI (t2014) TVS (t1999) TVS (t2014) TIS (t1999) TIS (t2014) TDS (t1999) TDS (t2014)
Intermediary
Activities Value Incentives Disincentives
Medium X Medium X
Intermediary
Activities Value Incentives Disincentives
Laboratories High X High X
High X HighDCDC X Low X High X
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4.2.6 Cinema Operators 
Cinema operators have been introduced as the first intermediaries in the 
Exploitation and Consumption Stage. They are mediating between distributors and 
consumers. This position is highlighted in Figure 40.   
 
Fig.40: Cinema Operators in the Exploitation and Consumption Stage, based 
on: own research. 
As indicated by the orange box, just like distributors, cinema operators are 
market markers as well. They procure (rent) the exploitation rights from 
distributors and sell tickets to consumers. They do so at their own risk. Before 
cinema operators will be discussed in more detail, it is worthwhile to look back. By 
now, a single, simple idea for a movie eventually generated hundreds of pounds of 
legal paperwork and hundreds of thousands feet of processed film or computer 
hard drives filled with trillions of digits. Multiple parties, and especially a variety 
of intermediaries, have been involved in this long creative manufacturing process. 
This process is coming to an end with the screening of the movie in the theater. 
However, it is also the beginning of a new process: as consumers leave their dollars 
at the box office, the chain of remittances begins (Vogel 2015, p. 238).  
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The business model operated by movie theaters is based on conducting and 
marketing screenings of motion pictures. Cinema operators procure a wide range 
of products and services, however, the negotiations with distributors are the most 
important (Wirtz 2012, p. 354). The various aspects that distributors have to 
consider when releasing a movie have already been discussed. Cinema operators 
have to agree to the terms and conditions under which the movie is rented to the 
theater. In addition, cinema operator and distributor also have to agree on the 
timing proposed by the distributor. It has to be highlighted, that while theater 
chains can keep all the revenues from selling popcorn and soda, they share the box 
office revenues with the distributor of the movie.95 In addition to distributors, 
cinema operators will be in contact with multiple other parties including 
technology- and infrastructure suppliers (e.g. DCDC), building owners, 
wholesalers, goods manufacturers and suppliers (for food, drinks, and 
merchandising articles) as well as advertising agencies to acquire advertising 
customers (Wirtz 2012, p. 354).  
In order to present movies to audiences, theaters must operate and maintain 
specific infrastructure, particularly the building as well as the projection 
technology. Cinema operators will also conduct market research prior to 
negotiating deals with distributors. This primarily relates to the evaluation of the 
                                                     
95  While terms can vary to a certain degree, in general cinema operator and 
distributor each receive 50% of the box office revenues. For an overview of the 
different types of deals between distributor and cinema operator refer to Vogel 
(2015, pp. 205-223). 
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target groups and the market potential on which cinema operators base their 
program planning on. The performance process differs between cinema chains and 
individual cinemas, in particular regarding the program planning. While cinema 
chains can coordinate and optimize their program among a large number of 
cinemas, the operator of a single theater can only take into account the location- 
and movie-specific consumer requirements (Swani et al. 1999, pp. 352-372; Wirtz 
2012, p. 354).  
The importance of cinemas and the relationship between cinema operators 
and distributors cannot be overstated. The behavior of the cinema operator as well 
as the specifics of the deal between cinema operator and distributor directly 
influence the income of other parties downstream. The cinema operator, for 
example, negotiates with the distributor the house expense (the so called nut). This 
is an item that can be inflated to ensure a profit for the cinema operator. The degree 
of this inflation can be the result of long-standing tacit agreement, or it may be 
subject to momentary relative bargaining strength. Either way, the size of the nut 
ultimately affects the grosses (rentals) received by the distributor and thus the 
income of other parties downstream (Vogel 2015, p. 238).  
Ticket-pricing policies, however, may generally have the greatest effect on 
what the downstream participants might ultimately receive. Pricing is subject to 
local competitive conditions, moviegoer-demand schedules, and the cinema 
operator’s interest in making as much as possible from concession sales. Cinema 
operators, who attempt to promote concession sales by setting low admission 
prices, are in effect diverting, and thereby diminishing, income available for 
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downstream disbursements. To prevent abuses in this area, distributors 
occasionally write contracts, which specify the minimum per capita ticket prices 
(Vogel 2015, pp. 238-239). 
The incomes of those parties would also be reduced, if theater owners paid 
their bills slowly. Playing the float (i.e. the time value of money) is another problem. 
This is somewhat surprising, because box office income is mostly in cash, and, in 
theory, cinema operators should have absolutely no difficulty in paying rentals 
immediately. Moreover, because theater owners normally have an interest in 
playing a distributor’s next movie, large distributors have important leverage to 
encourage prompt remittances. Nevertheless, in practice, playing the float appears 
at all levels of the industry and when interest rates are high it has a significant 
cumulative adverse effect on profit participants (Vogel 2015, p. 239). 
In addition to the previously mentioned points, various other unscrupulous 
practices exist, which can be used by cinema operators to skim rentals properly 
belonging to the distributor - diminishing income available for downstream 
disbursements. These include (Vogel 2015, pp. 238-239): 
 False national advertising. 
 Distributor-exhibitor settlements. 
 Bicycling. 
 Palming tickets or changing ticket roles. 
 Unauthorized reprinting of the negative. 
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Cinema operators and distributors might be tempted to cooperate and falsely 
claim that national advertising has been conducted, when the advertising in reality 
is characteristically local. National advertising is typically charged to the 
producer’s share, leaving the distributor and exhibitor are large profit. It is also 
sometimes possible for an unscrupulous exhibitor to obtain false invoices for more 
local advertising (paid on a co-op basis with the distributor) than is actually placed 
in local papers or quantity rebates are not disclosed to distributors (Vogel 2015, p. 
238).  
Distributor-exhibitor settlements are renegotiations of terms for pictures that 
do not perform according to expectations or that reflect shifting bargaining power 
between distributor and cinema operator. These settlements can be abused. The 
distributor may cooperate with the cinema operator to agree to terms that deprive 
producers and other participants of income that would otherwise be theirs (Vogel 
2015, p. 239). 
Bicycling refers to the practice of using a single print, without authorization, 
to generate free revenues by showing it at more than one location. In multiscreen 
theaters, for example, a picture that is not playing at capacity might, in violation of 
contract terms, be replaced in some showings by another movie that is 
unauthorized, but more popular. Two screens might also be serviced with one 
projector and print, often without the distributor knowing (Vogel 2015, p. 239). 
Palming tickets refers to the practice of leaving the ticket untorn and 
recycling it to the box office, where it can be resold without disturbing the number 
sequence of the ticket roll. Alternatively, the ticket roll itself could also be changed 
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after a few hundred tickets have been sold. Ticket sales on the substituted roll then 
go unreported (Vogel 2015, p. 239). 
The cinema operator may also engage in piracy and use the received print to 
create unauthorized copies. This includes felonious reproductions of DVDs, tapes, 
and Internet site downloads, the distribution of which results in significant 
diminishment of revenues (Vogel 2015, p. 240). 
Now that some of the moral hazards that cinema operators are facing have 
been discussed, the focus can shift to the changes that have occurred in the last 
fifteen years. One of the changes that has to be highlighted is the intensified 
competition from a glut of multiplex facilities, which have been built in the United 
States in the last decade. This put most theater operators in a tense economic 
situation. This situation has intensified further due to the required investment-
intensive upgrades to digital technologies. However, digital technologies have also 
given cinema operators a greater flexibility in program planning. Thus, the initial 
drawbacks of high costs for new technologies could to a certain degree be 
mitigated. In addition to the conversion to digital projection technology, the 
upgrade to digital 3D cinema required a considerable investment as well. These 
costs could to a certain degree be mitigated. 3D technology enabled many theaters 
to establish increased ticket prices in the form of a 3D surcharge, a potential 
competitive advantage over cinemas without 3D technology (Wirtz 2012, pp. 333-
335). 
Finally, it has to be highlighted that most of the multiplexes in North America 
are organized as chains to take advantage of economies of scale and increased 
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bargaining power when negotiating with distributors or the discounts on items 
sold at their concession stands (Gomery 2004, p. 204). The largest cinema chains in 
North America are: AMC Theatres, Carmike Cinemas, Century Theatres, Cinemark 
Theatres, Edwards Theatres, Regal Cinemas, Regal Entertainment Group and 
United Artists Theatres. 
4.2.6.1 Step 2: Activities of Cinema Operators 
Now that a general understanding of the role of cinema operators has been 
established, the focus can shift towards the formal analysis of their activities. The 
analysis will start with the activities on the informational level. The relevant 
activities are highlighted in Table 87.  
Just as was the case with most of the previously discussed intermediaries, the 
cost for executing the three activities identification, selection, inspection and 
classification increased for cinema operators as well. Not only did the number of 
motion pictures increase, but also new alternative content has become available, 
which cinema operators have to consider for their program planning as well.   
Just like distributors, cinema operators also do not support negotiations, 
instead, they conduct negotiations in their own name. The increased complexity of 
the negotiations as well as the corresponding contracts that was already discussed 
when distributors were analyzed, is reflected here as well.  
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Tab.87: Impact on Informational Activities (Cinema Operators), based on: own  
 research. 
   The aforementioned increase in complexity has an effect on the activities on 
the legal-financial level as well. These activities are highlighted in Table 88. With 
more alternatives and versions being available, the procurement of content has 
become more complicated. Offering these different versions and alternative 
content to audiences also affected the complexity of sales, i.e. pricing structure. 
The processing of payments creates high cost for cinema operators. They 
have to handle cash, but also have to offer a variety of other payment options, i.e. 
credit card, which require the adherence to certain security standards. The 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in offerings and alternatives
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in offerings and alternatives
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in offerings and alternatives
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in transaction partners (more sellers)
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Complexity of deals and contracts increased
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Limited transparency
- Limited degree of automation / use of ICT
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importance of contract adjustments was already highlighted when distributor-
exhibition settlements have been discussed. 
 
Tab.88: Impact on Legal-Financial Activities (Cinema Operators), based on:  
 own research. 
In regards to warranty processing, the deterioration of film reels has already 
been discussed. In the past, this resulted in screenings being interrupted mid-
screening, forcing the cinema operator to reimburse the ticket price. With film reels 
becoming obsolete, the cost for performing this activity decreased.  
On the physical level, two activities are relevant for cinema operators. These 
are highlighted in Table 89.  The presentation activity includes the screening of the 
motion picture to audiences as well the marketing activities conducted by cinema 
operators. The aggregation activity on the other hand refers to the arrangement of 
multiple motion pictures and versions into a program that meets the preferences of 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in offerings and alternatives
- Increase in the complexity of price differentiation
- Increased automation / use of ICT
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
No direct or indirect impact
- Increase in payment options
- Increased automation / use of ICT
- Specific infrastructure required
- High security standard (e.g. PCI DSS)
No direct or indirect impact
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
- Limited degree of automation / use of ICT
Indirect Impact (Small cost decrease)
- Decrease in failure rate 
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as many consumers as possible. The high upgrade costs necessary to present 
movies have already been highlighted and are responsible for the cost increase.  
 
Tab.89: Impact on Physical Activities (Cinema Operators), based on: own  
 research. 
4.2.6.2 Step 3: Value of Cinema Operators 
Now that the activities of cinema operators and their change have been 
discussed, the focus can shift towards the value cinema operators provide. Table 
90 highlights the value sources that enable cinema operators to enhance the 
transaction efficiency. 
Cinema operators also reduce contact costs due to their mediating position 
between multiple sellers and millions of consumers. Nevertheless, the contact 
reduction was greater in 1999 when 170 million more tickets were sold compared 
to 2014. Likewise, cinema operators also reduce transaction costs through 
standardization. Consumers and distributors get used to the processes and learn to 
efficiently carry out transactions with them. This situation has not changed in the 
last decade. Scale effects as well as the specialization and experience of cinema 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increased use of digital technologies / automation
- Increase in  product variations (versions) and alternatives
- Specific infrastructure and expertise required
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increased use of digital technologies / automation
- Increase in  product variations (versions) and alternatives
- Specific infrastructure and expertise required
- Increased competition => Higher degree of Marketing required












EX-POST ANALYSIS OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 345 
operators are particularly strong value sources. Scale effects occur in regards to 
material resources, i.e. the cinema infrastructure, but also for immaterial resources 
such as highly specialized and qualified personnel, i.e. for handling the projectors. 
 
Tab.90: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Efficiency (Cinema Operators),  
 based on: own research. 
4.2.6.3 Step 4: Incentives to cooperate with Cinema Operators 
Finally, the incentives and disincentives for distributors and consumers to 
cooperate with cinema operators have to be examined as well. The question arises 
again, whether the cooperation is really optional. While consumers can just wait 
and consume the motion picture in other media, the distributor does not have a lot 
of choice. In order to maximize revenues, distributors depend on theaters. 
Nevertheless, two incentives can be identified. These are illustrated in Table 91. 
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small decrease in strength)
- Comparatively large decrease in the number of consumers 
- Number of cinemas increased
No direct or indirect impact
- Cinema operators standardize multiple processes 
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- Required investments in material resources increased
No direct or indirect impact
- The required skills and capabilities changed with digital
  conversion but remained important 
- Required investments to build up skills and capabilities
  remained high
Medium
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Tab.91: Impact on Cooperation Incentives (Cinema Operators), based on: own 
 research. 
A strong argument for distributors to cooperate with cinema operators is 
their previous described ability to increase the transaction efficiency. The decrease 
in transaction costs is in the interest of distributors as well. Even more important, 
from the distributor’s point of view, is the ability to differentiate prices for which 
multiple outlets are required.  
 Unsurprisingly, there are also a variety of arguments against a cooperation 
with cinema operators. It was already highlighted that cinema operators can use 
their market power to negotiate higher fees, which is not in the interest of 
distributors. Likewise, as highlighted in Table 92, the risk of discrimination and the 
disclosing of sensitive information are additional disincentives to cooperate with 
cinema operators. From the distributor’s point of view the access to this particular 
distribution channel is not permanently secured. If cinema operators reject to 
screen a particular motion picture, there is not much the distributor can do. With 
the rise of alternative content, this risk arguable further increased, i.e. cinema 
Incentives (I) ISIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements ISIn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- The efficiency and effectiveness provided by theater operators
  remained the same
- The cooperation with cinemas is more efficient and effective from the
  producer's or sales agency's point of view
No direct or indirect impact
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operators may elect to screen the World Cup Final during summer time leaving 
less room for features.96  
 
Tab.92: Impact on Cooperation Disincentives (Cinema Operators), based on:  
 own research. 
4.2.6.4 Summary 
The previous sub chapters focused on the analysis of cinema operators. They 
are mediating between distributors and consumers in the motion picture value 
system. Table 93 provides a summary of the results of the preceding analysis. 
 
Tab.93: Summary - Impact on Cinema Operators, based on: own research. 
Based on these results, the practical research questions can be answered in 
respect to cinema operators. The analysis revealed that most activities have been 
                                                     
96  Alternative content accounted for less than 1% of revenues for cinema operators 
in 2014. Tim Warner, chief executive of Cinemark Holdings Inc., predicts that 
number to increase to 10% or more in three to five years (Verrier 2014, w/o p.).  
Disincentives (DI) DSIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements  DSIn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- Cinema operators retained high market power
- Cinema operators have control of the distribution channel
Indirect Impact (Small increase in strength)
- Risk increased due to an increase in alternative content
- Access to distribution channel is not permanently ensured
Medium






CI (t1999) CI (t2014) TVS (t1999) TVS (t2014) TIS (t1999) TIS (t2014) TDS (t1999) TDS (t2014)
High High Low Medium
Intermediary
Activities Value Incentives Disincentives
Cinema Operators Medium High Medium Medium
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affected by technological advancements. These activities in general remained 
personnel intensive, requiring a great amount of experience and specialization. 
However, with the rise of new projection and delivery technologies, additional 
skills and capabilities had to be build up. In addition, technology increased the 
amount of content and the number sellers, and as such, the cost for performing the 
majority of the activities increased as well.  
In regards to the value that intermediaries in the motion picture sector 
provide, the analysis revealed that cinema operators increase the transaction 
efficiency as well. However, it was shown that technological advancements had no 
effect on the ability of cinema operators to add value. The value strength remained 
on a similar level.  
Finally, the incentives and disincentives to cooperate with cinema operators 
have been examined as well.  From the onset it was pointed out that the cooperation 
with cinema operators is in reality not optional for distributors. Nevertheless, the 
analysis still revealed relevant incentives and disincentives and showed that the 
incentive strength remained at a similar level in the last fifteen years, while the 
disincentive strength increased. 
4.2.7 Video Stores 
As highlighted in the motion picture value system, video stores are 
additional intermediaries in the Exploitation and Consumption Stage. Just like 
cinema operators, video stores are also mediating between distributors and 
consumers. Their position between supply and demand is highlighted in Figure 41. 
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Fig.41: Video Stores in the Exploitation and Consumption Stage, based on: own 
research. 
Similar to cinema operators, video stores are also market markers. They buy 
movies on DVD or Blu-Ray from distributors and sell or rent them to consumers at 
their own risk. It is important to highlight that it was technology that created the 
situation, in which there is now a differentiation between sales and rentals of 
movies. In the 1980s, VHS cassettes were typically only sold to video stores, where 
consumers could then rent them. Consumers did not have the option to buy movies 
directly in stores (Ulin 2013, pp. 203-207). Then in the late 1990s revenue sharing 
arrangements started to take off. This was a scheme, in which the distributors gave 
the major rental chains, such as Blockbuster and Hollywood Video, their movies 
on a consignment basis. Instead of charging $29-40 for a movie, the distributors 
deferred the up-front revenue in favor of a split of rental income.97 Moreover, once 
a movie was past its peak release period, excess inventory was sold in store with 
the proceeds shared between the distributor and rental chain (Ulin 2013, p. 217). 
                                                     
97  Although the deals differed, it was reputed that as a rule of thumb, studios were 
granted 60% of the revenue from rental transactions (Ulin 2013, p. 117). 
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Some have theorized that the introduction of revenue sharing was a gambit 
to increase DVD penetration, as the studios encouraged the shift away from VHS. 
The distributors realized as early as 2001 that the DVD business is shaping up as a 
sellers, not a renters, market. Accordingly, they simply sold the DVD's outright to 
video stores and the video stores could then rent or sell them. The revenue sharing 
schemes thus waned with the shift from VHS to DVD (Fabrikant 2001, w/o p.). 
At the same time, an even bigger shift of video economics occurred. Many of 
the distributors started selling their DVD's directly to retailers such as Wal-Mart 
and Target for about the same price they charged rental chains such as Blockbuster. 
While with retail sales, new outlets for consumers to purchase movies have become 
available, it signaled the end of the rental market. Distributors became much less 
financially vested in the movie rental business. Consequently, the dependence on 
chains such as Blockbuster started to decline as well. As Warren Lieberfarb, 
president of Warner Home Video, stated in 2001: “Blockbuster is an endangered 
species” (Lieberfarb quoted in Fabrikant 2001, w/o p.).  
The increase in broadband connections and the Internet becoming an 
increasingly interesting distribution channel, then made things even worse for 
video stores. The competition from Netflix and Redbox, for example, caused 
Blockbuster to lose significant revenue forcing it to file for bankruptcy protection 
in 2010. In fact, video stores have become an endangered species around the world. 
In Germany, for example, the number of video stores has decreased from more than 
5.000 in 1999 to 2.795 in 2010 (Wirtz 2012, p. 329). In North America the largest 
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video store chain still in operation is Family Video with 775 stores in 19 U.S. states 
and Canada (Family Video 2015, w/o p.). 
4.2.7.1 Step 2: Activities of Video Stores 
Now that a general understanding of the role of video stores has been 
established, the focus can shift towards the formal analysis of their activities. The 
analysis will start will activities on the informational level. These are illustrated in 
Table 94. 
 
Tab.94: Impact on Informational Activities (Video Stores), based on: own  
 research. 
Just as was the case with cinema operators, the cost for executing the three 
activities identification, selection, inspection and classification increased for video 
stores as well. This is because the number of products and variations increased and 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in products and variations
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in products and variations
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in products and variations
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost decrease)
- Increase in transaction partners (more sellers)
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Complexity of deals and contracts decreased

















FLORIAN WROBEL  352 
with limited shelf space video stores have to ensure that they have the right 
products in sufficient quantity. Video stores also do not support negotiations, 
instead, they conduct negotiations in their own name. With revenue sharing 
agreement becoming obsolete and negotiations being reduced to simple purchase 
agreements, the cost for executing this activity have decreased.  
The activities on the legal-financial level have been affected as well. This is 
illustrated in Table 95. While video stores received movies on a consignment basis 
in the past, they now have to purchase them at wholesale price from distributors, 
which requires more capital. Accordingly, the cost for capital procurement 
increased. 
 
Tab.95: Impact on Legal-Financial Activities (Video Stores), based on: own  
 research. 
The procuring and selling of movies has become more complex as well. Not 
only are there more products and variations for which the appropriate prices have 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Switch from rental to sell through model increased capital
  requirements
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in products and variations
- Increase in the complexity of price differentiation
- Increased automation / use of ICT
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
No direct or indirect impact
- Increase in payment options
- Increased automation / use of ICT
- High security standard (e.g. PCI DSS)
- Decrease in payment complexity
Indirect Impact (Small cost decrease)
- Failure rate of products decreased
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to be determined, the switch from the rental to sell through model also forces video 
stores to carefully evaluate, how much inventory to stock and when to sell 
excessive stock off. Similar to cinema operators, the processing of payments creates 
high cost for video stores as well. They have to handle cash and also have to offer 
a variety of other payment options. The importance of warranty processing on the 
other hand has decreased, similar to film reels, VHS tapes also have a higher failure 
rate when compared to DVDs. With tapes becoming obsolete, the cost for 
performing this activity decreased.  
 
Tab.96: Impact on Physical Activities (Video Stores), based on: own research. 
The activities on the physical level have not been influenced by technological 
advancements as illustrated in Table 96. These activities remain labor intensive and 
require a specific infrastructure, i.e. a storefront and storage. In addition, movies 
have to be aggregated inside the store by personnel, i.e. on the basis of their genre. 
 
 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- Increase in  products and variations (versions) 
- Specific expertise required
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
No direct or indirect impact
- Increase in  products and variations (versions) 
- Specific infrastructure and expertise required
- Increased competition => Higher degree of Marketing required
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
No direct or indirect impact
- No changes to distribution or storage requirements
- Limited degree of automation / use of ICT
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4.2.7.2 Step 3: Value of Video Stores 
Now that the activities of video stores have been discussed, the focus can shift 
towards the value they provide. Table 97 highlights the value sources that enable 
video stores to enhance the transaction efficiency. 
 
Tab.97: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Efficiency (Video Stores), based  
 on: own research. 
Video stores reduce contact costs due to their mediating position between 
multiple sellers and millions of consumers. Nevertheless, the contact reduction was 
greater in 1999. This is explained by the large number of consumers that moved to 
video on demand on the Internet.  
Likewise, video stores also reduce transaction cost through standardization. 
Consumers and distributors get used to the processes and learn to efficiently carry 
out transactions with them. Scale effects are a relevant value source as well and 
mainly occur in regards to material resources, i.e. stores and other infrastructure.  
 
 
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small decrease in strength)
- Comparatively large decrease in the number of consumers 
- Number of video stores decreased equally fast
No direct or indirect impact
- Retail / Video stores standardize multiple processes 
- Relevance of standardization relatively low 
Indirect Impact (Small decrease in strength)
















Scale Effects Medium Low
EX-POST ANALYSIS OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 355 
4.2.7.3 Step 4: Incentives to cooperate with Video Stores 
Finally, the incentives and disincentives for distributors and consumers to 
cooperate with video stores have to be examined. Unlike most of the previous 
intermediaries, the cooperation with video stores is optional for both consumers 
and distributors as for both a variety of alternatives are available. The analysis will 
start with the incentives to cooperate with video stores. Two incentives can be 
identified. These as well as their development are illustrated in Table 98. 
 
Tab.98: Impact on Cooperation Incentives (Video Stores), based on: own  
 research. 
A strong argument for distributors to cooperate with video stores was their 
previous described ability to increase the transaction efficiency. The decrease in 
transaction costs is also in the interest of distributors. However, since the efficiency 
advantage has decreased, the strength of this particular incentive decreased as well. 
An additional argument for distributors to cooperate with video stores is that they 
provide an additional outlet, which enables further price differentiation.  
 Unsurprisingly, a variety of arguments against cooperating with video 
stores can be identified as well. For example, in the past large video store chains 
such as Blockbuster had considerable market power, which they could use to 
Incentives (I) ISIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements ISIn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small decrease in strength)
- The efficiency advantages provided by video stores have decreased
- Only in specific circumstances is the cooperation with video stores
   more efficient from the consumer's point of view
No direct or indirect impact
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negotiate better deals with distributors. As previously highlighted though, their 
market power decreased and this disincentive is thus less pronounced. 
 
Tab.99: Impact on Cooperation Disincentives (Video Stores), based on: own  
 research. 
In addition, as highlighted in Table 99 the risk of discrimination and the 
disclosing of sensitive information are additional disincentives to cooperate with 
video stores. In the past, distributors depended on video stores. The access to this 
particular distribution channel was not permanently secured. With the switch to 
the sell through model and by directly selling DVDs to large retailers, this 
dependency vanished and the disincentive is now less pronounced. The disclosing 
of sensitive information is particular relevant for consumers. In addition to their 
payment details, such as credit card data, they typically have to sign up to rent a 
movie and are thus forced to provide additional personal information as well.  
4.2.7.4 Summary 
The previous sub chapters focused on the analysis of video stores, which are 
mediating between distributors and consumers in the motion picture value system. 
Table 100 provides a summary of the results of the preceding analysis. 
Disincentives (DI) DSIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements  DSIn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small decrease in strength)
- Market power of Retail / Video stores decreased
- Retail / Video stores control this distribution channel
Indirect Impact (Small decrease in strength)
- Risk decrease due to multiple alternatives (sell through)
No direct or indirect impact
- Critical and sensitive information has to be disclosed
LowLow
Disclosing of sensitive 
Information 
Low
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Tab.100: Summary - Impact on Video Stores, based on: own research. 
Based on these results, the practical research questions can be answered for 
video stores. The analysis revealed that the activities in their core have not been 
affected by technological advancements. They remain personnel intensive and 
require specific infrastructure such as stores and storage. Technology did, however, 
increase the number of products and variations, and as such, the cost for 
performing the majority of the activities increased as well.  
In regards to the value that intermediaries in the motion picture sector 
provide, the analysis revealed that video stores increase the transaction efficiency. 
It was shown that technological advancements had a negative effect on the value 
provided by video stores.   
Finally, the incentives and disincentives to cooperate with video stores have 
been examined. The analysis revealed relevant incentives and disincentives and 
showed that the strength of both has decreased in the last fifteen years. 
4.2.8 Television Operators  
Television operators have been highlighted as additional intermediaries in 
the motion picture value system. They are also located in the Exploitation and 
CI (t1999) CI (t2014) TVS (t1999) TVS (t2014) TIS (t1999) TIS (t2014) TDS (t1999) TDS (t2014)
High Medium Medium Low
Intermediary
Activities Value Incentives Disincentives
Video Stores Medium High Medium Low
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Consumption Stage. Their position between demand (consumers) and supply 
(distributors) is highlighted in Figure 42. 
 
Fig.42: Television Operators in the Exploitation and Consumption Stage, based 
on: own research. 
Just like cinema operators, television operators are also market markers. They 
purchase the exploitation rights from distributors and sell the movie to their 
consumers, for example in form of pay per view. As previously highlighted, the 
television sector is part of the media industry, just like the motion picture sector. 
The TV market is thus both a primary and secondary platform for content. Ulin 
(2013, p. 272) points out that TV is traditionally thought about in terms of TV series 
and other made-for-television productions. However, the TV sector also relies 
heavily on other products, for example, on motion pictures. Accordingly, the 
following paragraphs will not focus on analyzing first run programming, but rather 
focus on how television garners revenues for motion pictures that can be aired on 
television, but were originally produced for theatrical distribution.   
The U.S. market is divided into terrestrial over-the-air national networks 
(Free TV) as well as cable and satellite television stations (Pay TV). The five largest 
national networks in the United States are NBC, CBS, ABC, CW and Fox. These are 
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part of larger media conglomerates just like the movie studios. These networks are 
somewhat complicated entities. They are really a grouping of local television 
stations that are either owned or affiliated with the parent network company. The 
large five networks can be understood as an aggregation of local TV broadcasters 
and affiliated stations. These cover all major designated market areas (DMA) and 
reach nearly all the potential households in the United States. These networks are 
primarily financed through advertising revenue and fees. For the consumer, 
consumption on the networks is free, the networks generate revenues through fees 
and the displaying of advertising. Ultimately, the advertisers pay for the attention 
of a specific target group (Ulin 2013, pp. 276-277). 
That is what distinguishes Free TV from Pay TV. In contrast to Free TV, Pay 
TV relies on fees from the recipient markets. This means that consumers, who are 
not willing to pay, are excluded from consumption. This is technically enforced 
through encryption. The TV signal is encrypted and only paying customers can 
encrypt the signal with a decoder. The range of Pay TV channels differs 
significantly from Free TV offerings. This comes as no surprise, as without 
differentiation and greater perceived benefits, the consumer will have no 
willingness to pay for the offered services (Wirtz 2012, pp. 429-430). There are 
currently over 200 cable stations in the United States, with top tiered channels 
bundled in basic carriage packages. These channels have to be distinguished from 
premium cable channels such as HBO, Showtime and Starz, for which the 
consumer pays a direct incremental fee (Ulin 2013, pp. 267-277).  
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The market for motion pictures on TV has traditionally been very strong, and 
for years a key sales benchmark was a license to one of the major national networks. 
As highlighted during the discussion of the windowing strategy, in the best case 
scenario, the market even provides multiple successive TV windows. Traditionally, 
a theatrical feature movie is licensed to a broadcast network for debut 
approximately three years after its theatrical release. This allows an exclusive 
period for the theatrical run, followed by the home entertainment window and a 
Pay TV license, i.e. a 12-18 month window on premium cable channels such as 
HBO, Showtime, and Starz. Then, the 3-4 year window on network TV begins, 
which is followed by multi-year windows on cable and in syndication, allowing for 
millions of dollars continuously flowing in for well over decade (Ulin 2013, pp. 276-
277).  
The so-called network window has historically been the most lucrative, as the 
networks simply had a larger reach and audience share. With the larger advertising 
revenues earned, they could simply pay more (Ulin 2013, p. 280). The peak demand 
for network motion picture licenses appears to have been reached in the late 1970s. 
At this point in time, cable was still in its infancy and the broadcasting networks 
had a lot of cash. Accordingly, they bid aggressively for rights to exhibit recent 
theatrical hits. Many of the major licenses at the time permitted up to five runs for 
fees as high as $20 million per movie (Vogel 2015, p. 228).  
However, once it became apparent that pay cable was siphoning off the 
potential for high network ratings with early showing of uncut movies without 
commercial interruptions, the enthusiasm for bidding cooled down. Despite this 
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development, movies, which had their first network appearance in the early 1980s, 
could still command an average of $5 million for two runs. (Vogel 2015, p. 228) 
A similar trend could be witnessed in regards to premium cable channels 
such as HBO and Showtime. They realized early that the availability of relatively 
recent movies was essential to attracting new subscribers and building a brand. In 
an attempt to distinguish themselves from competitors, premium channels began 
to arrange exclusive long-term output deals with studios, which were happy to 
oblige. That is because in a typical year, a studios receiving an average of $10 
million per movie for 20 movies might be able to cover much, if not all, of its annual 
overhead costs. By the early 2000s, Hollywood’s major studios had been collecting 
more than $1 billion from this rich source of income. More recently however, 
saturation of potential premium channel subscriber households and proliferation 
of other ways to watch movies through DVDs, iPads, digital downloads, and 
advertiser-supported networks, has led pay-channel services providers to turn 
towards more self-produced original programming. This has accordingly resulted 
in significant reduction of financial support for both major and independent 
studios (Vogel 2015, p. 153). 
With the decline in network clout and the growth of cable channels, the 
traditional sequential TV windows are becoming more of an historical artifact. 
There are cases where movies go to network, then cable and then syndication, 
however, it is now common for cable stations to buy-out network windows or to 
partner with networks on shared long-term windows with oscillating periods of 
exclusivity. The playing field is relatively level and cable stations such as FX, 
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USA/SyFy, TBS/TNT, AMC, Spike, Bravo and ABC Family can compete with the 
networks, even in cases, where the networks may be an affiliated sister company. 
Because the licensors are trying to get the best deal for their specific movie or 
package, the best option may cut across different studio lines and unexpected 
cooperations can emerge (Ulin 2013, pp. 280-284).  
4.2.8.1 Step 2: Activities of Television Operators 
Now that a general understanding of the role of television operators has been 
established, the focus can shift towards the formal analysis of their activities. The 
analysis will start with the activities on the informational level. These are illustrated 
in Table 101. 
 
Tab.101: Impact on Informational Activities (Television Operators), based on:  
   own research. 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in offerings and alternatives
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in offerings and alternatives
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in offerings and alternatives
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in transaction partners (more sellers)
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Complexity of deals and contracts increased
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Just as was the case with cinema operators, the cost for executing the three 
activities identification, selection, inspection and classification increased for 
television operators as well. Television operators conduct negotiations in their own 
name. Unsurprisingly, technological advancements also made the contracts and 
deals that distributors and television operators negotiate more complex. This is best 
exemplified with the traditionally simple definition of a run. The Internet and 
digital technology introduced the ability to simulcasts on multiplex channels, such 
as NBC and NBC HD or to offer free streaming VOD repeats on the Internet. 
Accordingly, negotiations now have to determine, whether simulcasts on multiplex 
channels is only one run or two. The same question also arises for VOD repeats. 
In regards to the legal-financial level, the procuring and selling of movies has 
also become more complex. This is explained by the increase in products and 
variations as well as increased complexity in contracts. This is highlighted in Table 
102. 
 
Tab.102: Impact on Legal-Financial Activities (Television Operators), based on:  
   own research. 
Unlike cinema operators or video stores, the processing of payments creates 
comparatively low cost for television operators. They do not have to handle cash 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small cost increase)
- Increase in offerings and alternatives
- Increase in the complexity of price differentiation
- Increased automation / use of ICT
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
No direct or indirect impact
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or offer a wide variety of payment options, they either send invoices or withdraw 
the invoice amount directly.  
The activities on the physical level have not been influenced by technological 
advancements as illustrated in Table 103. These activities still require a specific 
infrastructure, i.e. the technology required to broadcast to millions of households.  
 
Tab.103: Impact on Physical Activities (Television Operators), based on: own  
   research. 
4.2.8.2 Step 3: Value of Television Operators 
Now that the activities of television operators have been discussed, the focus 
can shift towards the value they provide. Table 104 highlights the value sources 
that enable television operators to enhance the transaction efficiency. 
 Level Activity (A) CAn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- Increased use of digital technologies / automation
- Increase in  product variations (versions) and alternatives
- Specific infrastructure and expertise required
No direct or indirect impact
- Increased use of digital technologies / automation
- Increase in  product variations (versions) and alternatives
- Specific infrastructure and expertise required
- Increased competition => Higher degree of marketing required
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
No direct or indirect impact
- Simultaneous transformation, reproduction and distribution
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Tab.104: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Efficiency (TV Operators),  
   based on: own research. 
Television operators also reduce contact costs due to their mediating position 
between multiple sellers and millions of consumers. Likewise, they also reduce 
transaction cost through standardization. Scale effects as well as the specialization 
and experience are particularly strong value sources. Scale effects occur in regards 
to material resources, i.e. the infrastructure, but also for immaterial resources in the 
form of highly specialized and qualified personnel, i.e. for handling the network 
operations.  
4.2.8.3 Step 4: Incentives to cooperate with Television Operators 
Finally, the incentives and disincentives for distributors and consumers to 
cooperate with television operators have to be examined as well. Unlike most of 
the previous intermediaries, the cooperation with television operators is optional 
for both consumers and distributors as for both a variety of alternatives are 
available. The analysis will start with incentives to cooperate with television 
Type Value Source VSVn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- Very large number of consumers and multiple distributors
- Number of television channel providers increased
No direct or indirect impact
- Television channel standardize multiple processes 
- The importance of standardization remained at the same level
No direct or indirect impact
- Required investments in material resources remained at the
  same level
No direct or indirect impact
- Required skills, capabilities and experience remained high
- Required investments to build up skills and capabilities





















Scale Effects Medium Medium
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operators. Two incentives can be identified. These as well as their development are 
illustrated in Table 105. 
 
Tab.105: Impact on Cooperation Incentives (Television Operators), based on: 
   own research. 
A strong argument for distributors to cooperate with television operators is 
their previous described ability to increase the transaction efficiency. The decrease 
in transaction costs is in the interest of distributors as well. Even more important 
from the distributor’s point of view is the previously highlighted ability to 
differentiate prices. For this, distributors require multiple outlets, and the television 
sector represents one of the traditional outlets.  
 Two arguments against a cooperation with television operators can be 
identified as well. These are highlighted in Table 106. One of them is market power, 
which television operators could use to negotiate lower fees with distributors. With 
alternative options becoming available, i.e. Netflix buying out the cable window, 
the market power of television operators decreased and the disincentive is thus less 
pronounced. Thus, the risk of discrimination is less pronounced as well.   
Incentives (I) ISIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements ISIn (t2014)
No direct or indirect impact
- The efficiency and effectiveness provided by TV operators
  remained the same
- The cooperation with TV operators is more efficient and effective
  from the producer's or sales agency's point of view
No direct or indirect impact
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Tab.106: Impact on Cooperation Disincentives (Television Operators), based  
   on: own research. 
4.2.8.4 Summary 
The previous sub chapters focused on the analysis of television operators. 
Just like previous intermediaries in the exploitation segment, television networks 
are also mediating between distributors and consumers in the motion picture value 
system. Table 107 provides a summary of the results of the preceding analysis. 
 
Tab.107: Summary - Impact on Television Operators, based on: own research. 
Based on these results, the practical research questions can be answered in 
respect to television operators. The analysis revealed that most activities have not 
been directly affected by technological advancements. The activities in general 
remained personnel intensive and require specific infrastructure as well as a great 
amount of experience and specialization.  
Disincentives (DI) DSIn (t1999) Impact of Technological Advancements  DSIn (t2014)
Indirect Impact (Small decrease in strength)
- Market power of TV operators decreased slightly
- TV operators control this distribution channel
- More convenient alternatives from the consumer's point of view
  emerged
Indirect Impact (Small decrease in strength)
- Risk decreased due to an increase in alternative distribution
  options
- Access to distribution channel is not permanently ensured
Low






CI (t1999) CI (t2014) TVS (t1999) TVS (t2014) TIS (t1999) TIS (t2014) TDS (t1999) TDS (t2014)
High High Medium Low
Intermediary
Activities Value Incentives Disincentives
TV Operators Medium High Medium Medium
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In regards to the value that intermediaries in the motion picture sector 
provide, the analysis revealed that television operators also increase the transaction 
efficiency. However, it was shown that technological advancements had no effect 
on the ability of television operators to add value. The value strength remained on 
a similar level. 
Finally, the incentives and disincentives to cooperate with television 
operators have been examined as well. The analysis revealed the relevant 
incentives and disincentives and showed that the incentive strength remained at a 
similar level in the last fifteen years, while the disincentive strength decreased. 
4.2.9 Digital Distributors 
Digital distributors have been highlighted as the final intermediaries in the 
motion picture value system. They are part of the Exploitation and Consumption 
Stage as well. Just like the previous intermediaries, digital distributors such as 
Netflix or iTunes are also mediating between distributors and consumers. Their 
position between demand (consumer) and supply (distributor) is highlighted in 
Figure 43.   
 
Fig.43: Digital Distributors in the Exploitation and Consumption Stage, based 
on: own research. 
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Like all intermediaries introduced in the Exploitation and Consumption 
Stage, digital distributors are market markers as well. They buy the exploitation 
right for a particular movie for specific online media as well as specific territories 
and then offer the movie to consumers over the Internet. The process is essentially 
similar to other intermediaries in that the distributor provides a master to the 
buyer. The difference is that instead of a glass master or negative, the distributor 
provides a compressed encoded master, which the digital distributor then has to 
encrypt. The encryption is part of the sophisticated DRM system, which restricts 
how, where, and how often the content may be played (Ulin 2013, p. 363). 
As the discussion of the previous two intermediaries revealed, the two largest 
and most important ancillary revenue streams for motion picture distribution have 
been the home entertainment segment and the licensing of movies to pay television 
and broadcast and/or basic cable networks. These distribution businesses have 
matured and revenue growth begun to flatten or even to decline. Ulin (2013, p. 361) 
points to digital distributors and the increased availability of motion pictures 
through digitally delivered alternatives as the reasons for the flattening of the 
growth curve for the traditional ancillary distribution. The following paragraphs 
will examine these developments from the point of view of digital distributors. 
Unsurprisingly, the first wave of digital distributors was initiated by the 
Major studios, which recognized the potential of the market and the need to have 
legitimate platforms to counteract piracy and therefore launched their own Internet 
download services at the beginning of the millennium. The largest was MovieLink, 
a service co-owned by Sony, Universal, MGM, Paramount and Warner. MovieLink 
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went live in November 2002 (Cunningham and Silver 2012, p. 49; Ulin 2013, p. 423). 
A competitive service, CinemaNow, founded in 1999, also offered a range of studio 
productions.  
While these digital distributors were pioneers in providing a legal option for 
movie downloading, neither of these services caught on and adoption remained 
limited. Many reasons for this can identified, for example the functionality, piracy, 
pricing and available content. Ulin (2013, p. 423) argues, however, that the reasons 
for why the services didn’t catch on ultimately do not matter. He reasons that part 
of the early strategy for the studios was to simply show that they were offering a 
legal alternative to pirate peer-to-peer sites.  
By mid-2006, everyone was predicting a revolution in the world of video 
content and how programming would be consumed over the Internet as opposed 
to traditional television viewing. Ulin (2013, pp. 362-363) even argues that the years 
2006-2008 will be viewed historically as the years which revolutionized how 
consumers watched, accessed and paid for video-based content.  The explosion of 
video on the Internet came about suddenly and much of the change was enabled 
by technology. This includes widely adopted, reliable and flexible digital rights 
management (DRM) technology, increased broadband penetration, the 
introduction of the iPod and then the iPhone, the rise of Google and the realization 
that the Internet can be monetized as well as the emergence of instant streaming 
and video on demand (Ulin 2013, p. 363). 
Since 2007, the emerging major players in the online distribution space have 
been led by Apple, Netflix, Amazon and Hulu. The fundamental difference 
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between them and the previous wave is that they brought with them an existing 
critical mass of consumers to whom they could market their new digital services 
to. This has proven to be the key to success (Cunningham and Silver 2012, p. 53).  
Apple’s iTunes store for example has been selling 50.000 movies per day since 
2008 (Cunningham and Silver 2012, p. 52). Another example is Netflix, which in 
2006 placed 10.000 titles from its movie library online to watch instantly as a free 
value added service for its large base of existing customers. By 2010, Netflix 
transformed its core business model from a monthly subscription for DVDs-
delivered home to a monthly subscription service for unlimited movie and TV 
downloads via video on demand (Cunningham and Silver 2012, p. 53). This 
prepared consumer for the digital transition and by 2015, Netflix subscriber count 
grew to 65.55 million, with 42.2 million subscribers in the U.S. and 23.35 million 
internationally (Udland 2015, w/o p.). Netflix currently has exclusive Pay TV 
window deals with various studios. These deals in essence, give Netflix exclusive 
streaming rights and are not distinct from the distribution rights held by traditional 
pay television services, which are also effectively prohibited from obtaining first-
run linear television rights with these deals. Netflix also holds rights to back-
catalog movies from distributors such as Warner Bros., Universal Pictures, Sony 
Pictures Entertainment, 20th Century Fox and Disney (Szalai 2014, w/o p.).  
As has been highlighted before, these digital distributors also realized the 
important of hits and exclusivity in order to drive their platforms. While Netflix 
began to produce series early on, it wasn’t until 2014 that Netflix announced they 
would be producing and releasing their first original movie: the sequel to Crouching 
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Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), entitled The Green Legend (2016), which is scheduled for 
simultaneous Netflix and theatrical release (McClintock 2015, w/o p.; Setoodeh 
2015, w/o p.).98 
Finally, Amazon has to be highlighted as well. Their service debuted in 2006, 
when it was still called Amazon Unbox (Amazon 2007, w/o p.). In 2008, the service 
was then renamed Amazon Video on Demand and rebranded again in 2011 as 
Amazon Instant Video. Amazon also added access to 5.000 movies and TV shows 
for Amazon Prime members (Amazon 2011, w/o p.). Amazon Instant Video is 
available in the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Austria, Germany and soon 
India (Mishra and Jayadevan 2015, w/o p.). Similar to its competitors, Amazon has 
pursued a number of exclusive content deals to differentiate its service. In 2012, 
Amazon signed a deal with Pay TV channel Epix to feature movies on their 
streaming service (Bloomberg News 2012, w/o p.). Most recently, Amazon reached 
a multi-year licensing deal with HBO. However, Amazon also realized the 
importance of original content and premiered its first two original series in 
November 2013. Amazon also acquired Spike Lee's new movie Chi-Raq as its first 
Amazon Original Movie in 2015 (McClintock and Jarvey 2015, w/o p.). 
 
 
                                                     
98  As previously highlighted, the large cinema chains in the U.S. will boycott the 
movie as they want to protect their exclusive theatrical window (McClintock 
2015, w/o p.; Setoodeh 2015, w/o p.). 
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4.2.9.1 Step 2: Activities of Digital Distributors 
Now that a general understanding of the role of digital distributors has been 
established, the focus can shift towards the formal analysis of their activities. 
Similar to the DCDC, digital distributors did also not exist in 1999. This has 
implications for the application of the Intermediation Analysis Approach as a 
comparative statics analysis is not possible. Therefore, for digital distributors a 
deviation in the approach is necessary as well.  The analysis will start with the 
activities on the informational level. These are illustrated in Table 108. 
 
Tab.108: Impact on Informational Activities (Digital Distributors), based on: 
   own research. 
Similar to the previous intermediaries, the cost for executing the three 
activities identification, selection, inspection and classification are high for digital 
distributors as well. A tremendous amount of content is available, which has to be 
identified and selected by qualified personnel. Digital distributors conduct 
negotiations in their own name and deals are as complex as the previously 
 Level Activity (A) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Identification 
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
High
Selection 
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products




- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Very limited descriptiveness of products
- Expertise and experience required (personnel cost) 
High
Negotiations
- Very limited degree of automation / use of ICT
- Complexity of deals and contracts increased
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discussed deals with traditional outlets. Accordingly, for negotiations, experienced 
and specialized personnel is required, which creates high costs.  
 
Tab.109: Impact on Legal-Financial Activities (Digital Distributors), based on: 
   own research. 
In regards to the legal-financial level, the procuring and selling of content 
also creates costs for digital distributors. The processing of payments on the other 
hand creates comparatively low costs for digital distributors. They do not have to 
handle cash. By their very nature, they process all payments electronically. This is 
reflected in the assessment shown in Table 109. 
The activities on the physical level do only produce comparatively low cost 
as well. This is highlighted in Table 110. Similar to broadcasters, the reproduction 
and distribution occur simultaneously over the Internet. Accordingly, almost no 
cost occur for the reproduction (Noam 2010, p. 67). The transformation occurs to a 
large degree automatically as well. Nevertheless, cost for executing those activities 
still do occur as specific infrastructure and experience are still required.  
 Level Activity (A) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Procurement and 
Sales
- Large amount of products and transaction partners
- High degree of automation / use of ICT
- Specific infrastructure and technologies required




- Large amount of products and transaction partners
- Multiple payment options
- High degree of automation / use of ICT
- Specific infrastructure and technologies required
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Tab.110: Impact on Physical Activities (Digital Distributors), based on: own 
   research. 
4.2.9.2 Step 3: Value of Digital Distributors 
Now that the activities of digital distributors have been discussed, the focus 
can shift towards the value they provide. Table 111 highlights the value sources 
that enable digital distributors to enhance the transaction efficiency. 
 
Tab.111: Impact on Value Sources – Transaction Efficiency (Digital Distr.),  
   based on: own research. 
 Level Activity (A) Impact of Technological Advancements CAn (t2014)
Aggregation
- Large amount of products and variations (versions) 
- Specific infrastructure and expertise required
Low
Transformation
- Large amount of format and devices have to be served
- Specific infrastructure (CDN) and expertise required
- Large degree of automation
Low
Presentation 
- Large degree of automation
- Increased importance of end-user devices
- Specific infrastructure (Web Shop) and expertise required
- Use of filter technologies
- Increased importance of recommendations (algorithms)
Low
Distribution
- Simultaneous reproduction and distribution
- Distribution options limited by bandwidth











Type Value Source Impact of Technological Advancements VSVn (t2014)
Baligh-Richartz-
Effect
- Very large number of consumers and multiple distributors 
- Comparatively large number of digital intermediaries
High
Standardization - Standardization largely through protocol standards Medium
Scale Effects - High investments in material and immaterial resources required High
Specialization / 
Experience 
- Specific skills, capabilities and experience required
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Digital distributors also reduce contact costs due to their mediating position 
between multiple sellers and millions of consumers. Likewise, they also reduce 
transaction costs through standardization. Scale effects, specialization and 
experience are particularly strong value sources. Scale effects occur in regards to 
material resources, i.e. the infrastructure, but also for immaterial resources in the 
form of highly specialized and qualified personnel, i.e. for handling the network 
operations.  
4.2.9.3 Step 4: Incentives to cooperate with Digital Distributors 
Finally, the incentives and disincentives for distributors and consumers to 
cooperate with digital distributors have to be examined as well. Unlike most of the 
previous intermediaries, the cooperation with digital distributors is optional for 
both consumers and distributors as for both a variety of alternatives are available. 
The analysis will start with incentives to cooperate with digital distributors. 
Multiple incentives can be identified. These are illustrated in Table 112. 
A strong argument for distributors and consumers to cooperate with digital 
distributors is their previous described ability to increase the transaction efficiency 
as the decrease in transaction cost is also in the interest of distributors and 
consumers. Since the online segment is still relatively new, the cooperation with 
digital distributors gives distributors greater flexibility. They can experiment in this 
new segment and exit the market faster compared to a situation, where they would 
build up their own infrastructure for online distribution. The previously 
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highlighted importance of price differentiation is also a strong argument for 
distributors to cooperate with digital distributors.  
 
Tab.112: Impact on Cooperation Incentives (Digital Distributors), based on: 
own research. 
Unsurprisingly, a variety of arguments against a cooperation with digital 
distributors can be identified as well. These are illustrated in Table 113. For 
example, some digital distributors such as Netflix have attained considerable 
market power, which they can use to negotiate better deals with distributors.  
The risk of discrimination is comparatively low as distributors have multiple 
digital distributors they can choose to cooperate with. The risk of strengthening a 
potential competitor on the other hand, is a very strong disincentives. Netflix is a 
prominent example for this.  
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Tab.113: Impact on Cooperation Disincentives (Digital Distributors), based on:  
   own research. 
4.2.9.4 Summary 
The previous sub chapters focused on the analysis of digital distributors. Just 
like previous intermediaries in the Exploitation and Consumption Stage, digital 
distributors are also mediating between distributors and consumers in the motion 
picture value system. Table 114 provides a summary of the results of the preceding 
analysis. 
 
Tab.114: Summary - Impact on Digital Distributors, based on: own research. 
Based on these results, the practical research questions can be answered for 
digital distributors. In regards to the activities of digital distributors, the analysis 
revealed that for the majority of activities, comparatively high costs still do occur. 
This was explained by the observation that their performance requires a certain 
Disincentives (DI) Impact of Technological Advancements  DSIn (t2014)
Market Power of the 
Intermediary
- Some digital intermediaries gained considerable size and market
  power
- They thus can also have considerable bargaining power




- Risk is rather low due to multiple distribution options Low
Strengthening Potential 
Competition
- Risk is considerable as witnessed by the multitude of players also
  migrating into production
High
Disclosing of sensitive 
Information 
- Critical and sensitive information has to be disclosed Medium
CI (t1999) CI (t2014) TVS (t1999) TVS (t2014) TIS (t1999) TIS (t2014) TDS (t1999) TDS (t2014)
X High X Medium
Intermediary
Activities Value Incentives Disincentives
Digital Distributors X Medium X High
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experience and specific skills. The exception are activities on the physical level. 
Here, typically lower cost occur compared to traditional intermediaries such as 
video stores.   
In regards to the value that intermediaries in the motion picture sector 
provide, the analysis revealed that digital distributors also increase the transaction 
efficiency. Particular strong value sources are the Baligh-Richartz-Effect and scale 
effects. 
Finally, the incentives and disincentives to cooperate with digital distributors 
have been examined as well. The analysis revealed relevant incentives and 
disincentives and showed that strong incentives for both consumer and 
distributors exist to cooperate with digital distributors.  
4.2.10 Summary 
Chapter 4.2 was solely dedicated to the analysis of the intermediaries in the 
motion picture industry. Each intermediary was examined in detail and the tools 
for the analysis of their activities, the value they provide as well as for the analysis 
of the incentives and disincentives to cooperate with them have been applied. Table 
115 provides a summary of the results. 
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Tab.115: Summary – Impact on Intermediaries (1999 vs. 2014), based on: own  
   research. 
With the summary in Table 115 the changes that have occurred can be 
explained and a complete picture of intermediation in the motion picture industry 
emerges. For the majority of intermediaries, technological advancements did not 
have a direct impact on the activities. However, digital technologies increased the 
number of motion pictures produced and the Internet created a new exploitation 
segment. The increased number of products, transactions partners and increased 
complexity of contracts is ultimately responsible that the total cost for performing 
the examined activities increased in most cases. 
A notable exception are laboratories. They have been directly impacted by 
the conversion from film to digital projection technologies. This led to 
CI (t1999) CI (t2014) TVS (t1999) TVS (t2014) TIS (t1999) TIS (t2014) TDS (t1999) TDS (t2014)
Intermediary
Activities Value Incentives Disincentives
Low
Sales Agencies Medium High Low Medium Medium







Festivals Medium High Medium Medium Medium
Medium
Laboratories High X High X Medium X Medium X
Distributors Medium High Medium High
DCDC X Low X High X High X High
Medium High Medium Medium High High Low Medium
High Medium Medium
Cinema Operators
LowVideo Stores Medium High Medium Low
TV Operators Medium High Medium Medium High High Medium Low
High X MediumXDigital Distributors X Medium X High
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disintermediation of laboratories in their traditional incarnation and provided the 
opportunity for other players to carry out the activities in their new digital form.  
In regards to the value that intermediaries provide. The analysis revealed that 
various ways exist in which intermediaries in the motion picture industry add 
value. Most notably by reducing transaction cost. As indicated in Table 115, 
technological advancement did not reduce the value added by intermediaries, 
instead, the total value strength increased or remained on a similar level for most 
intermediaries. The only exception here are video stores.  
Finally, similar observations have also been made in regards to the incentives 
and disincentives to cooperate with intermediaries. While in most cases the 
cooperation is not optional, the incentives to cooperate still outweigh the 
disincentives. In addition, the incentives increased in a lot of cases, whereas the 
disincentives decreased or remained at a similar level. 
4.3 IMPLICATIONS AND CRITICISM  
As demonstrated in the preceding sub chapters, the Intermediation Analysis 
Approach allows a structured analysis of intermediaries in media markets. The 
approach ensures that as many relevant aspects as possible are taken into account 
and thus reduces uncertainty. As the focus is this dissertation was on the past and 
an ex-post analysis has been conducted, the results may not be of particular high 
strategic value. Researchers and practitioners, who want to draw strategic 
implications for relevant market participants from the analysis approach, would 
fare better with a forward looking analysis (ex-ante). The results of such an analysis 
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are strategically highly relevant for potential or existing intermediaries as they 
allow a company to define realistic goals in regards to the future role as an 
intermediary. This applies to the question, whether any activities in the market 
should be sought after as well as to the question of the desired form of 
intermediation or the desired business model. Once the target position is defined, 
an appropriate strategy can be developed. 
While the results of this dissertation are not particular suited to draw 
strategic conclusion, the results are nevertheless highly relevant. This dissertation 
started out by pointing out that particularly authors in media management, 
postulate again and again that due to the influence of digitalization, intermediation 
in media markets will either be omitted entirely or will occur in a completely 
different form (Cunningham and Fröschl 1999, p. 31; Picard 2002, pp. 34-36; Seufert 
2004, pp. 63-66; Wirtz 1995, p. 49; Wirtz 2012, p. 763). As highlighted by the 
referenced authors, some of the predictions were made more than a decade ago, 
while others have been made as recent as 2012.  While there are many contributions 
that predict developments, there is no research that captures the actual 
developments and explains them. The preceding ex-post analysis filled both gaps. 
The results highlighted that in contrast to the predictions, intermediation in the 
motion picture industry was neither omitted entirely nor did it occur in a 
completely different form.  
Many of the previously highlighted authors focus on all sectors of the media 
industry or the media industry in general. However, the predictions of those 
authors that focus on the motion picture sector, are equally diffuse. In order to 
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further highlight the importance of the ex-post analysis of the motion picture sector 
and the viability of the analysis approach, the following paragraphs will pick up 
some of these predictions and contrast them to the results of the preceding analysis.  
The first common theme that emerges from previous research on the motion 
picture is the overestimation of the impact of technology on the duplication 
activity. Hawkins and Vickery (2008, p. 103) for example, lament that “when the 
marginal costs of the duplication activity is reduced to virtually nothing, then the 
duplication activity will evolve into little more than issuing a license to exhibit”. 
They envision an environment in which the producer simply feeds the completed 
motion picture directly to cinemas operators. This view is shared by Bloore (2009) 
and Finney (2010). However, they both go even further and predict that producers 
will short-circuit the value system by marketing and distributing their motion 
pictures directly to the consumer. Finney (2010a, p. 17) sees the distributor’s role 
being taken over by the consumer-aware producer and/or the digitally-
programmed cinema operator. It has to be highlighted, that both authors are 
heavily influenced by the long tail theory. In this regards, Bloore (2009, p. 17) 
predicts increased profitability of cinema releases of niche movies and for Finney 
(2010a, p. 10) “niche audiences, once able to be tapped and marketed directly, have 
significant value, if they can be reached less expensively”. 
It has to be highlighted that the contributions of the aforementioned authors 
are noteworthy and brought the discourse of intermediation and value added 
structure in the motion picture industry forward. Nevertheless, the ex-post analysis 
revealed that none of these predictions has yet occurred. As was highlighted 
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throughout this dissertation, when intermediation is typically examined, the focus 
is typically very narrow. The aforementioned authors did also only consider the 
impact of technological advancements on the activities on the physical level. This 
is not sufficient. 
By using the Intermediation Analysis Approach, it would have been 
apparent that the proposed direct contact between producer and cinema operator 
has a variety of consequences. For example, all activities on the legal-financial level 
would then have to be handled by the producer, i.e. the processing of payments 
and distribution of payments downstream. The same is true for the activities on the 
informational level as well. When the value of distributors and laboratories / DCDC 
would have also been considered, it would have been obvious that a direct contact 
between producers and cinema operators would result in a tremendous increase in 
contact cost for both sides, resulting in higher transaction costs and decreased 
efficiency. Likewise, an analysis of scale effects or specialization and experience 
would have highlighted that a direct contact between producers and cinema 
operators is neither efficient, nor effective. 
 In regards to the duplication activity, standardization is the factor that has 
been ignored. The DCI released the first digital standard in 2005. The standard 
clearly states the infrastructure and key management procedures required for the 
digital delivery of motion pictures. If each producers builds up the infrastructure 
to adhere to the standard, the efficiency would only be further reduced. The 
preceding remarks are not meant to diminish the contributions of previous authors, 
they are, however, necessary to highlight the value the analysis approach can have 
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and how it can help to address the problem of relatively flat and diffuse discussion 
about intermediation.  
The Intermediation Analysis Approach was designed in such a way, that 
many of the flaws of other approaches were addressed from the onset. For example, 
most contributions on intermediation are criticized for the sole reliance on 
transaction cost theory. Accordingly, an expanded understanding of transaction 
costs was established and other aspects, such as the value intermediaries provide, 
have been included in the analysis as well. In addition to the activities and value of 
intermediaries, competitive strategic aspects (in the form of cooperation incentives 
and disincentives) have also been incorporated into the analysis approach. Finally, 
many of the previous approaches are characterized by a low degree of applicability. 
Therefore, a special attention was given to the applicability during the 
development of the Intermediation Analysis Approach and multiple tools and 
guidance have been created. However, despite all these precautions, the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach is not without flaws as well. These will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs.   
One point of criticism is the limited transferability of the approach. Per 
design, the approach was created for media markets. However, intermediaries play 
an important role in many industries as highlighted in Chapter 2. The application 
of the analysis approach to the financial sector for example, is likely not sensible 
without some adjustments.  
Another important point of criticism is the unavoidable subjectivity of 
indirect comparison in qualitative terms. When no numbers are used, the 
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determination of the cost of performing certain activities, the assessment of the 
value strength and the strength of incentives and disincentives, becomes subject to 
the researcher’s experience. While the developed guidelines are aimed at 
addressing exactly this problem, as they provide a clear frame of reference for the 
assessment, the subjectivity still remains. For industry insiders with access to 
relevant data, the use of actual numbers rather than a qualitative assessment is 
certainly more desirable. 
Finally, the application of the Intermediation Analysis Approach on 
intermediaries in the motion picture industry revealed an additional flaw. For some 
intermediaries a comparative statics analysis is simply not possible. This was 
prominently highlighted with laboratories and the DCDC. A comparative statics 
analysis may thus not the best approach to examine intermediaries. Other 
approaches may be better suited to capture the dynamics that laboratories have 
experienced, i.e. disintermediation. Despite these observations, it was still 
demonstrated that with a certain degree of flexibility and minor adjustments, even 
those cases can be captured and analyzed. 
4.4 SUMMARY  
The focus in Chapter 4 was on the practical research objective of this 
dissertation, the demonstration of the applicability of the developed analysis 
approach. The motion picture industry was chosen as the subject of the 
investigation. The analysis started with Step 1 of the Intermediation Analysis 
Approach. The motion picture industry was demarcated from other sectors of the 
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media- or entertainment industry and the unique product- and demand 
characteristics have been discussed. This was followed by the analysis of the value 
added structure, which highlighted the magnitude of intermediaries that are part 
of the motion picture value system. At the same time the first practical research 
question was answered as the relevant intermediaries have been identified. New 
intermediaries emerged in the Exploitation and Consumption Stage, while 
disintermediation occurred in the Distribution, Licensing and Marketing Stage. 
Traditional laboratories became obsolete and their activities were taken over by a 
new intermediary, the DCDC. Accordingly, the number of different types of 
intermediaries has increased rather than decreased in the last fifteen years. 
After the completion of Step 1, the focus shifted towards the identified 
intermediaries. Each intermediary was examined in detail and analysis Steps 2-4 
have been applied. Through this the remaining practical research questions could 
be answered for each intermediary individually. In regards to the activities of 
intermediaries and their change in the last fifteen years, the analysis showed, that 
the activities of most intermediaries have not been directly influenced by 
technological advancements. Particularly the activities on the informational level 
require a high degree of specialization and experience. These activities cannot be 
automated, but instead have to be carried out by human beings. It thus comes as 
no surprise that technology did not directly impact those activities.  
However, digital technologies enabled more producers to create their own 
motion pictures and accordingly the number of talents and motion pictures 
increased. The Internet, in addition, created a new exploitation segment. This led 
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to an increase in complexity of deals and brought more transactions partners into 
the picture as well. Together, these effects then indirectly increased the total cost 
for performing the examined activities of intermediaries. The exception, as 
previously highlighted are laboratories, which have been replaced by the DCDC 
due to a strong direct impact on their activities. 
In regards to the value that intermediaries in the motion picture sector 
provide and its change in the last fifteen years, the analysis revealed a variety of 
value sources, which enable intermediaries to add value. The contact reduction 
based on the Baligh-Richartz-Effect, standardization, scale effects and 
specialization are the most prominent value sources that enable the intermediaries 
in the motion picture industry to increase the transaction efficiency. In addition to 
the efficiency, a variety of intermediaries, particular those in the Licensing, 
Distribution and Marketing stage, increase the effectiveness of transactions as well. 
Laboratories in the past and the DCDC now, also increase the logistic efficiency as 
they do perform the necessary logistic activities to add value in this respect. Given 
the unique characteristics of motion pictures, it is unsurprising that no 
intermediary can increase the production result.   
In regards to changes in the value provided by intermediaries in the motion 
picture industry, the analysis showed that technological advancement did not 
reduce the strength of most value sources, instead, the total value strength 
increased or remained on a similar level. This is explained, on the one hand, by the 
increase in transaction partners, which leads to a greater reduction in contact cost 
and, on the other hand, by the observation that the importance of standardized 
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processes, the investment in material and/or immaterial resources and the 
experience of intermediaries remained. The exception to this are video stores, 
whose total value strength decreased, due to more efficient alternatives to consume 
motion pictures on the Internet.  
In regards to the incentives and disincentives of up- and downstream market 
participants to cooperate with intermediaries, the analysis showed that a variety of 
incentives and disincentives can be identified. However, in most cases the 
cooperation is not optional, often for both of the intermediary’s transaction 
partners. Prominent examples for this are the relationship between talent and talent 
agencies, producer and sales agency and producer/sales agency and distributor. 
While the dependency is not as strong with the intermediaries in the Exploitation 
and Consumption Stage, the same dynamics are still present. A distributor that 
wants to maximize revenues over as many periods of exclusivity as possible, 
ultimately has to find an agreement with one intermediary in each exploitation 
segment. While distributors can decide to not cooperate with television operators 
or digital distributors, they would ultimately hurt their revenue potential by doing 
so. Nevertheless, the analysis still revealed noteworthy incentives and 
disincentives. The most prominent one is the observation that the decrease in 
transaction costs and increase in transaction efficiency is in the interest of the 
involved transaction partners as well. In addition, since most intermediaries’ ability 
to increase efficiency improved, the incentives to cooperate with them grew 
stronger as well. The strength of the disincentives on the other hand decreased or 
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remained at a similar level. For most intermediaries, the incentives thus heavily 
outweigh the disincentives. 
By answering the practical research questions, the changes of the past fifteen 
years have been described and explained. Furthermore, the applicability of the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach has been demonstrated. In addition, the 
analysis approach was then also used to further stress the importance of a holistic 
approach, when examining intermediaries. Examples of predictions of well-known 
authors have been used for this. The ex-post analysis revealed that the predictions 
did not occur and that there are several reason, why these predictions are flawed. 
For example, the authors only focus on some of the physical activities and ignored 
the other activity levels. In addition, they also do not consider the value 
intermediaries provide, most prominently their transaction efficiency enhancing 
effect.  
Finally, flaws of the Intermediation Analysis Approach and attempts to 
mitigate them have been discussed as well. Relevant flaws include the limited 
transferability, the subjectivity of indirect qualitative comparisons as well as the 
limited feasibility of a comparative statics analysis in some cases.  
 
 
5 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
5.1 SUMMARY 
This dissertation started by highlighting that the media industry is perhaps 
impacted the strongest by technological advancements. In addition, it was pointed 
out that, while intermediaries play an important role in the sectors of the media 
industry, no comprehensive theoretical contribution on intermediaries in media 
markets has been developed so far. This dissertation set out to fill this void.  
Accordingly, the main research objective of this dissertation was to systematically 
capture and explain those changes in a particular sector of the media industry that 
are triggered through technological advancements and have an impact on 
intermediation. From the main objective, one theoretical and one practical research 
objectives have been derived:  
1. Theoretical Research Objective: Development of an Intermediation 
Analysis Approach that can explain the influence of technological 
advancements on intermediaries in media markets.  
2. Practical Research Objective: Demonstrating the applicability of the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach by employing it in the analysis of a 
selected sector of the media industry 
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In order to achieve the first research objective, it was necessary to establish 
the theoretical foundation of this dissertation (Chapter 2) and consolidate the 
results into a useable analysis approach (Chapter 3). In regards to the theoretical 
foundation, two large research strands have been identified. (1) Industrial 
Economics and the theory of the firm as well as (2) the large amount of literature 
on intermediation from various research strands.  
In regards to the first research strand,  the analysis highlighted that a variety 
of different and sometimes contradictory scientific theories contribute to an 
understanding of the firm (Audretsch 1995, p. 27; Bühler and Jaeger 2002, p. 46; 
Foss 2000, p. xxiv; Göbel 2002, p. 169;). The discussion of the neoclassical view of 
the firm (with an expanded understanding of the production function), for 
example, introduced economies of scale and scope, which was identified as a 
possible value source for intermediaries. The analysis of New Institutional 
Economics as a whole introduced information asymmetries and incomplete 
contracts. Thus monitoring and adjustment costs were introduced and additional 
activities and benefits of intermediaries highlighted. The analysis of transaction 
cost theory then highlighted many of the arguments for vertical integration, which 
can also be understood as arguments against intermediation. In addition, the 
relevance of factor specificity (hold-up) has been highlighted. The discussion of the 
property rights approach, on the other hand, pointed out the disadvantages of 
vertical integration and thus highlighted arguments for intermediation. The 
analysis of the principal agent theory introduced agency cost and different types of 
information asymmetries. Thus additional ways for intermediaries to add value 
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were identified. Finally, the analysis of the information perspective and 
competence perspective highlighted the importance of efficient and effective 
information processing as well as the importance of the resources of companies.  
In regards to the second part of the theoretical foundation, the literature on 
intermediation, the analysis started by highlighting that intermediation is a 
theoretical concept for the analysis of entities, which are located between supply 
and demand. Similar to the literature on the theory of the firm, the literature on 
intermediation is spread in various research strands as well. The analysis of the 
literature on the trade highlighted the justification of intermediaries by their 
transaction cost reducing effect as a common approach. In addition, the potential 
value provided by intermediaries was identified: increased efficiency and 
increased effectiveness. The analysis of the marketing literature revealed the first 
catalogs of distribution functions from which many of the activities of 
intermediaries have been derived. The analysis of the contributions on financial 
intermediation on the other hand, highlighted additional value sources for 
intermediaries such as the reduction of risk through diversification or the increase 
of effectiveness through the reduction of market imperfections. The analysis of 
intermediaries in the real estate industry further highlighted the importance of the 
information processing capabilities of the intermediary, whereas the media 
management literature revealed many of the media industry specific 
intermediation activities. Finally, the review of cross-industry research on 
intermediation introduced among other aspects the Baligh-Richartz-Effect – a 
fundamental source of value. 
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Once the theoretical foundation had been established, the focus shifted 
towards the development of the Intermediation Analysis Approach in Chapter 3. 
The analysis approach was envisioned as a set of tools that allow the systematical 
analysis of intermediation from all relevant viewpoints. The approach consists of 
four steps. In Step 1 general industry characteristics have to be examined, the value 
added structure of the industry has to be visualized and the intermediaries have to 
be identified. For this purpose and due to the limitations of existing methods, the 
Enhanced Value System Model was introduced as the first tool for the analysis. The 
second step focused on the various activities intermediaries perform. The activities 
of intermediaries in media market have been identified based on the preceding 
literature review. For the actual analysis of the activities a cost framework was 
established and the Activity Analysis Tool as well as the corresponding guidance 
was created. For the third step, the various value sources of intermediaries that 
have been identified during Chapter 2, were organized in four different value 
categories according to the suggestion by Tietz (2007 p. 85). In addition, the Value 
Analysis Tool and corresponding guidance was created. The same approach was 
followed for Step 4. Here the incentives and disincentives have been identified and 
the Incentive Analysis Tool as well as the corresponding guidance was created. 
With the Intermediation Analysis Approach created and the first research 
objective achieved, the focus shifted to the motion picture industry in Chapter 4 
and the second research objective – the demonstration of the applicability of the 
analysis approach. During the application of the first step of the analysis approach, 
the motion picture sector was demarcated from other sectors of the media industry 
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and the unique product characteristics were discussed, most prominently the 
commercial and artistic product traits that all motion pictures exhibit. The 
blockbuster strategy was highlighted as an important product characteristic as 
well. The analysis continued by examining the demand characteristics and it was 
pointed out that the international box office is growing, whereas the domestic box 
office is on a downwards trend – at least in regards to admission. Finally, by using 
the previously developed Enhanced Value System Model, the value added 
structure has been analyzed as well. In this context, the magnitude of 
intermediaries in the motion picture industry became evident for the first time. At 
the same time, the first research question was answered. The traditional 
intermediaries and new intermediaries have been identified, which was the 
prerequisite for the following analysis. It was highlighted, that the number of 
intermediaries has increased as new intermediaries entered the online segment. 
Additionally, disintermediation occurred with laboratories, whose place was 
assumed by the DCDC. 
The focus of the analysis then shifted towards the identified intermediaries 
and each intermediary was examined in detail. After the introduction of the 
intermediary, the formal analysis started and the activities, value as well as the 
incentives and disincentives have been examined by using the tools and guidance 
developed in Chapter 3. The result of this detailed analysis provided the basis for 
answering the practical research questions. In addition, a complete picture of 
intermediation in the motion picture industry and the changes that have occurred, 
emerged for the first time. The results can be summed up as follows: 
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 The activities of most intermediaries have not been directly influenced by 
technological advancements.  
 The majority of the activities require a high degree of specialization and 
experience.  
 Technological advancement led to an increase in the number of transaction 
partners, products and increased the complexity of contracts. This has a cost 
increasing effect on most activities. 
  The contact reduction based on the Baligh-Richartz-Effect, standardization, 
scale effects and specialization are the most prominent value sources.  
 Increased transaction efficiency is a benefit all intermediaries provide. 
Selected intermediaries also increase the effectiveness of the transactions as 
well as the efficiency of logistics.  
 Technological advancement did not reduce the strength of most value 
sources. Instead, the total value strength increased or remained on a similar 
level.  
 In most case, the cooperation with intermediaries in the motion picture 
sector is not optional.  
 The observation that the increase in transaction efficiency is in the interest 
of the involved transaction partners as well, is a strong incentive to 
cooperate with intermediaries.  
 For most intermediaries the incentives heavily outweigh the disincentives. 
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Lastly, the results of the analysis have been used to highlight, why 
predictions about developments in the motion picture sector did not occur. The 
several reasons, why these predictions are flawed have been emphasized. Finally, 
the flaws of the Intermediation Analysis Approach and attempts to mitigate them 
have been discussed as well. Relevant flaws include the limited transferability, the 
subjectivity of indirect qualitative comparisons as well as the limited feasibility of 
a comparative statics analysis in some case. 
5.2 OUTLOOK 
The preceding analysis examined the various facets of intermediation in 
detail. Furthermore, the motion picture industry was highlighted as an interesting 
object of investigation. In addition to intermediaries, the motion picture industry 
provides multiple other research topics, which warrant research in their own right. 
To conclude this dissertation, the following four research topics, which have only 
been briefly mentioned during the preceding analysis, will be highlighted as topics 
for future research: 
 Research on DCDC’s satellite distribution. 
 Research on preservation in the digital age. 
 Empirical research on the blockbuster theory. 
 Ex-Ante application of the analysis approach. 
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The preceding analysis highlighted the unique position of the DCDC, which 
managed to dominate the theatrical delivery of motion pictures in just two years. 
The very technical process of delivering motion pictures into theaters via satellite 
was described as well. Despite the detailed analysis of the DCDC itself, many 
interesting questions remain unanswered. These accordingly warrant their own 
research. The first aspect that would have to be further examined are the various 
contracts between parties. For outsiders the contract structure between distributor 
and the DCDC, the DCDC and Deluxe/EchoStar, as well as between the DCDC and 
cinema operators is not transparent.  The preceding analysis highlighted many of 
the disincentives to cooperate with the DCDC, it would be interesting to 
understand, if and how contractual agreements mitigate certain problems, i.e. 
discrimination. Even more importantly, there is the questions of fees. Who is paid 
what for the delivery is unclear, due to the lack of available research. Ten to 15 
years ago, it cost about $2.500 to deliver a film print to a theater. Verrier (2013, w/o 
p.) claims that these cost have decreased to $50-$125 for the distribution over 
DCDC’s digital platform. However, in 2008, the costs for the transmission of 
motion pictures over satellite were still too high according to Hawkins and Vickery 
(2008, pp. 78-79). Instead, it was cheaper to physically ship hard drives to cinema 
operators across North America. Accordingly, the strong cost decrease described 
by Verrier (2013, w/o p.) seems questionable and warrants further research. As 
previously mentioned, not only the analysis of costs is necessary, but the actual fees 
paid by distributors have to be analyzed as well. 
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The next area that warrants future research is the preservation of motion 
pictures. Preservation has been identified as one of the possible activities of 
intermediaries on the physical level. Yet, none of the discussed intermediaries is 
carrying out this activity. This by itself is not necessary surprising, as it is the 
producer or the owner of the intellectual property, who is responsible for 
preserving the motion picture. Traditionally, studios stored motion pictures on 
film. This has proven to be sufficient for the preservation for at least one hundred 
years. With film becoming obsolete and movies being digitally produced, the 
traditional archiving process is naturally affected as well. There is no current 
research on how and who is preserving today’s motion pictures for future 
generations. In addition, the future of preservation seems to be equally interesting 
as well. Technicolor, for example, is currently employing over 250 researchers 
around the world to work on a project, which attempts to preserve a movie onto 
tiny strands of DNA. DNA lasts for up to 700.000 years without proper storage and 
with proper storage, it can endure for millions of years. Therefore, information 
stored on DNA would not have to be re-saved every few years like current data 
storage methods require (Munson 2015, w/o p.). 
In addition to satellite delivery and preservation, the blockbuster theory as 
discussed by Elberse (2013) warrants additional research as well. While Elberse 
(2013) analyzed all entertainment sectors, she only includes limited examples from 
the motion picture sector and those examples date back to 2007 and 2011. In her 
book, Elberse (2013) relies heavily on the presentation of data from the music 
industry such as data from iTunes and Spotify. From the perspective of the motion 
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picture industry a quantification of this effect and its change over time would be 
desirable as well. This includes the theatrical exploitation as well as data from 
digital distributors such as Netflix, Hulu and Amazon Instant Video.  
In addition to these research topics, the concept of intermediation as 
established in this dissertation warrants further research as well. In future research, 
the Intermediation Analysis Approach could be applied for different use cases, for 
example, an ex-ante analysis of the motion picture industry in an attempt to predict 
future developments. Due to the high degree of complexity and multiple causality 
of changes in industry structure, future changes cannot be predicted with certainty. 
Nevertheless, the ex-ante application of the analysis approach would allow a 
structured discussion. The technological driven transformation processes are still 
ongoing and additional change is already on the horizon. The analysis approach 
could for example be used to forecast the impact of Virtual Reality (VR) on the 
structure of intermediation. Theaters around the globe have so far been able to keep 
up with technology. They invested in better and brighter picture quality and more 
sophisticated sound systems. Accordingly, consumers kept coming, despite 
various alternatives to consume entertainment. This situation however may change 
with VR. In the near future, all it takes is a pair of VR-Glasses and the consumer 
will be able to emerge in his own theater with a screen larger than anything that 
could be reasonably built in reality (Russell 2015, w/o p.). 
Interestingly, the above scenario may reveal additional weaknesses of the 
Intermediation Analysis Approach. In the above scenario, the activities, value and 
incentive may be less relevant. Instead other factors, such as social- and political 
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factors may have to be considered as well. The consumer may for example prefer 
the (real life) theater experience due to social aspects, i.e. hanging out with friends 
or just meeting people, despite the experience being inferior from a technological 
view point. In the mid- to long-term however, VR may change that as well and 
consumers will be able to meet friends or strangers virtually, e.g. a simulated 
theater with everyone being represented by some form of avatar (Epstein and 
Watercutter 2015). 
In the long-term, VR is expected to fundamentally change the motion picture 
itself. The consumer will be given the change to emerge in the motion picture itself 
- rather than being in a simulated theater showing the motion picture. This will 
most likely not only impact intermediaries, but especially the creative aspects of 
the production process. Story telling processes and camera perspectives might have 
to be invented from scratch (Epstein and Watercutter 2015, w/o p.; Russell 2015, 
w/o p.). However big the changes from VR might be, if the past teaches anything, 
it is almost certain that the motion picture industry will eventually establish it as 
yet an additional window of exploitation. This in turn, will then likely create 
additional intermediaries that will provide the consumers with the content and the 
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